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Abstract
This thesis is composed of three chapters. In the first chapter, I show that capital
reallocation is highly procyclical, in contrast to the prediction of existing business-
cycle models with firm heterogeneity, where it is highly countercyclical. I argue that
endogenizing the price of used capital relative to new solves this puzzle. First I show
empirically that in several sectors the price of used investment goods relative to new
is procyclical. Then I build a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
firms facing both aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Used capital is
an imperfect substitute for new capital because of firm-level capital specificity. In
equilibrium both the price of used capital and the volume of reallocation become
procyclical.
The second chapter studies the link between investment irreversibility and capital
utilization. I show that when it is costly to downsize, firms respond to negative transi-
tory profitability shocks by underutilizing their capital stock. In a partial equilibrium
setting I derive both analytical and numerical results on the links between the level
of irreversibility, the size and persistence of the shocks and the optimal utilization
decision. In an industry-equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and aggregate
shocks, I endogenize the resale price of capital as in the first chapter and show that
when this price falls, the option value of idle capital rises and the aggregate utilization
rate decreases.
The third chapter, co-authored with Esther Hauk and Albert Marcet, studies
optimal policy in a class of models of endogenous partial information. The economy
is hit by multiple shocks and the policy-maker cannot observe their realizations, but
only aggregate outcomes. In general the solution to this signal extraction problem
cannot be separated from the solution to the problem of finding the optimal policy
and we show how to solve them jointly. We apply the result to a model of optimal
fiscal policy with incomplete markets and show that the endogeneity of the signal
extraction may lead to highly non-linear optimal policies.
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Chapter 1
The Market for Used Capital:
Endogenous Irreversibility and
Reallocation over the Business
Cycle
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Motivation
Firms buy and sell large amounts of used investment goods both directly on secondary
markets for equipment and plants and indirectly through acquisitions. Over the busi-
ness cycle, this volume of capital reallocation is volatile and positively correlated
with aggregate output.1 Why is this the case? Can the cyclicality of reallocation be
1Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) show that reallocation of physical capital among US firms, which
amounts to approximately 30% of total investment, is strongly procyclical. The cyclical component
of their reallocation series, composed of Sales of Plants, Property and Equipment plus Acquisitions
from Compustat, is very volatile (about 7 times the volatility of output) and positively correlated
with US GDP (with a correlation coefficient of .56). Other measures of capital reallocation point to
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efficient? How do equilibrium dynamics in the market for used capital affect macroe-
conomic variables such as aggregate TFP and investment? This chapter addresses
these questions by first showing new evidence on prices of used real assets and then
building a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms facing aggre-
gate and idiosyncratic uncertainty.
Importantly, the market for used capital reallocates assets from less productive to
more productive firms, as Maksimovic and Phillips (2011) document. Hence, more
reallocation in booms means that more capital flows to highly productive firms when
the economy is expanding, while downturns are associated with a smaller flow of assets
towards their most productive use. This suggests that understanding the cyclicality
of capital reallocation may be a step towards a theory of the cyclical movements in
aggregate TFP. Particularly in the aftermath of the Great Recession, it seems impor-
tant to understand the drivers of this reallocative process, which policy-makers in the
UK see as an important condition for the onset of a strong recovery in productivity.2
Despite its relevance, the procyclicality of capital reallocation has so far been
a puzzle for the macroeconomic literature, for at least two reasons. First, existing
DSGE models of investment with heterogeneous firms (e.g. Khan and Thomas, 2008,
2013) imply a negative correlation between output and reallocation. In these mod-
els, unproductive firms want to disinvest by a larger amount in recessions, because
their profitability falls following a negative aggregate shock. As these are one-sector
models of the economy, demand for their used capital comes from both consumers
and other firms. This demand is perfectly elastic, as the standard assumption is ei-
ther full reversibility of investment, or a constant level of partial irreversibility, i.e.
the same stylized fact: sales of used corporate assets for the UK from the ONS Capital Expenditure
Survey are also procyclical and more disaggregated evidence on the market for used commercial ships
shows the same pattern of cyclicality. Section 1.2 and Appendix A present the empirical evidence.
2For instance, Ben Broadbent, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, attributes low labor
productivity in the slow recovery post-2008 in the UK to a lack of capital reallocation (Broadbent,
2012, Barnett et al., 2014).
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the relative price of used capital is assumed to be constant and less than 1. Hence,
an outward shift in supply of used capital from disinvesting firms necessarily leads
to more reallocation. This gives more reallocation in recessions and less in booms.
Second, as Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) point out, several measures of dispersion of
returns on capital are higher in recessions than in booms, suggesting that benefits
from reallocation are countercyclical. Hence we should expect to see more realloca-
tion during downturns, when higher dispersion makes reallocation of capital towards
its most productive use more beneficial.
In order to explain the puzzle, this paper starts by presenting a new stylized fact:
the relative price of used capital goods, far from being constant, is actually volatile
and strongly procyclical, suggesting that partial investment irreversibility is to a great
extent a market equilibrium outcome. Recessions are bad times to disinvest, as more
firms would like to sell their assets to downsize but the demand side coming from
investing firms is weak.
Starting from this observation, I build an equilibrium model of partially irre-
versible investment, where the resale price of capital is endogenous. I assume a
degree of capital specificity at the firm level: after installation, capital becomes a
different good with respect to the output (and consumption) good, partially specific
to the firm who owns it. Not only is it useless for consumers, but also an imperfect
substitute with respect to new investment for other firms. This assumption allows
me to rationalize the procyclicality of the resale price and capital reallocation in an
otherwise standard business-cycle model. In a recession, used capital is relatively
cheap, because more firms would like to disinvest and downsize, while expanding
firms cannot fully benefit from the abundance of used capital on the market, because
this capital is to an important extent specific to the firms that operated it previously.
The model emphasizes both a static and a dynamic real-options mechanism that
induce procyclical reallocation. Let us examine the static mechanism first. A lower
resale price associated with a recession increases the target level of capital of a dis-
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investing firm, hence reducing its desired level of disinvestment. Intuitively, after a
negative aggregate productivity shocks there are two opposing forces on the disinvest-
ment decision: both the internal value of capital for the firm and its market value fall.
In equilibrium, when new and used capital as sufficiently poor substitutes, the latter
effect dominates and sales of used capital fall. Next, let us introduce the dynamic
real-options effects. Consider again a firm that is hit by a negative idiosyncratic shock
in a recession and evaluates the opportunity to disinvest. In a dynamic environment,
this firm needs to compare the price at which it can sell its assets in the current period
with the price it would get by waiting one more period. In a recession, the current
resale price falls, and so does the future expected resale price. However, if there is
a positive probability of exiting the recession in the near future, the future expected
resale price falls by less than the current one, and it may be better to wait, hold on
to the assets and disinvest later by selling them at a higher price. This dynamic ef-
fect holds in general when the underlying stochastic process is mean-reverting and it
generates an option value from waiting to disinvest that further decreases and delays
the reallocation of capital in bad times.
The procyclicality of reallocation is matched by a countercyclical dispersion of
returns from capital, consistently with a growing body of empirical evidence (e.g.
Bloom et al., 2012). In the model, this happens because large unproductive firms
downsize by less in recessions and hence their marginal product remains low relative
to that of more productive firms. Several papers have interpreted the increase in the
dispersion of returns associated with downturns as a symptom of the worsening of
financial frictions, leading to the policy implication that credit expansions and non-
conventional monetary policy can facilitate reallocation and stimulate the recovery.
In contrast, the present paper shows that lack of reallocation and high dispersion of
returns in recessions can be efficient outcomes in an economy where capital is partially
specific at the firm level and hence used assets are imperfect substitutes for new ones.
While theories based on time-varying financial frictions may explain capital misal-
12
location in recessions, they do not have implications for the cyclicality of the relative
price of used capital. In contrast, my theory of capital specificity is able to explain
both dynamics in prices and quantities traded on secondary markets for capital. The
important and challenging question of how much dispersion in marginal products is
due to financial or to real frictions is beyond the scope of this paper. However, because
procyclical reallocation can be explained as an equilibrium outcome of a model with-
out financial frictions, a policy implication of the paper is that credit expansions may
in fact be less relevant for reallocation than previously thought. It should be noted
that reallocation has fallen in every recession since we have data for it (1970’s), that
is also in recessions for which the financial component was arguably less important
than in the Great Recession. A contribution of this paper is to present a real model
where only one aggregate shock can generate both standard business-cycle facts and
procyclical reallocation.
Furthermore, the model highlights important equilibrium real-options effects on
investment. Consider again a recession. Used capital becomes cheaper, so that overall
investment can be made at a lower cost. However, investment is also expected to
be harder to reverse in the future (if the recession is expected to persist). These
contrasting effects can either amplify or dampen the response of investing firms to
aggregate shocks depending on the properties of the idiosyncratic and aggregate shock
processes. In the quantitative section of the paper, I show that one of the aggregate
implications of endogenous irreversibility is a significant smoothing of the aggregate
investment series, bringing its volatility and autocorrelation closer to the empirical
counterparts. Hence, the mechanism presented in the paper can be seen as a plausible
microfoundation for an aggregate capital adjustment cost.
1.1.2 Related literature
Using Compustat data, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) show that Sales of Plants, Prop-
erty and Equipment, as well as Acquisitions, are highly procyclical and argue that
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this is a puzzle given that the benefits from reallocation, as measured for instance
by dispersion in TFP or dispersion in utilization rates, appear to be countercyclical.
Their conclusion is that there must be a countercyclical degree of reallocation fric-
tions. In this sense, one can see the present paper as microfounding this conclusion
by explicitly modelling a market for used capital and showing that the equilibrium
resale price falls in bad times.
The empirical evidence I present on the price of used capital fills an important
gap in the empirical literature on capital adjustment costs. Inference on investment
irreversibility is typically indirect, based on firms’ investment and disinvestment rates
rather than directly on prices (e.g. Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006). Furthermore,
irreversibility is generally assumed to be a constant technological friction. By looking
at sectors that allow a direct comparison of the price of new and used assets, I establish
that partial irreversibility is to a large extent a market equilibrium outcome and that
it varies significantly with the business cycle.
The most closely related papers are Khan and Thomas (2013) and Cui (2014).
Both papers build DSGE models with heterogeneous firms that feature constant par-
tial irreversibility (defined by a constant resale price of capital below one) and collat-
eral constraints. When feeding the model with aggregate TFP shocks, they cannot
generate a procyclical response of reallocation, because disinvesting firms face a con-
stant resale price and disinvest by more in recessions and less in booms. However, Cui
(2014) shows that the procyclicality of reallocation can be obtained by introducing
credit shocks, i.e. an exogenous tightening of the borrowing constraint. After such
shocks, unproductive firms hold on to their capital and use its return to pay back
their debt and deleverage. Regarding the question on the source of business cycles,
Cui (2014) interprets the procyclicality of reallocation as evidence in favor of credit
shocks.
The results in the present paper suggest that this conclusion may depend on the
assumption of a constant resale price of capital. In fact, I show that the procyclicality
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of this price can reconcile the Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) findings without resorting
to exogenous credit shocks. However, I would stress that this does not necessarily
mean that credit shocks are not important in driving business-cycle fluctuations. It
only implies that procyclical reallocation is less of a puzzle, as it can be rationalized
in a more standard business-cycle model, where only one aggregate shock drives
both standard business-cycle facts and reallocation.3 Furthermore, the present model
provides a useful framework that can be extended to include financial frictions in the
form of collateral constraints. Following aggregate shocks, the availability of credit
would change endogenously with movements in the price of used capital.
Caunedo (2014) also considers an economy with heterogeneous firms and invest-
ment irreversibility and shows that the dispersion in marginal products that arises
in equilibrium does not need to be inefficient. In this paper, I show that also the
cyclical movements of such dispersion of returns (high dispersion in recessions) are
not necessarily a symptom of time-varying financial frictions. Cooper and Schott
(2013) consider a similar framework with heterogeneous firms and introduce an ex-
ogenous time-varying probability of being able to reallocate capital. They show that
exogenous shocks to this probability may induce procyclical reallocation. Gilchrist et
al. (2014) treat the resale price of capital as an exogenous shock process and show
that a fall in this price, combined with collateral constraints, can replicate a recession
associated with a liquidity crisis. My contribution with respect to these papers is
to explicitly model the market for used capital and to endogenize the resale price
and show that both this price and reallocation respond positively to aggregate TFP
shocks in equilibrium.
A related strand of literature is that on real-options theory, starting with the
seminal work of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Abel et al. (1996). This literature
typically assumes exogenous stochastic paths for the prices at which a firm can buy
3Section 1.6 shows that the main mechanism is robust to both aggregate and investment-specific
productivity shocks.
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and sell capital. As the resale price is assumed to be strictly less than the buying
price, part of the investment is sunk and uncertainty regarding future productivity (or
equivalently the future output price) leads to the presence of option values connected
with the opportunity to wait and invest in the future. In this paper, I compute
the equilibrium effects of aggregate shocks on these option values and show that
with an endogenous resale price the value of the option to resell (put option) can be
procyclical, contrary to what arises in partial equilibrium.
The key assumption in this paper is imperfect substitutability between new and
used capital. In their seminal work on capital reallocation, Ramey and Shapiro (2001)
provide an extreme example of this friction. They report that during the liquidation
of an aerospace plant, a wind tunnel that could generate a 270 miles/hour wind was
sold to a company that rented it to bicycle helmet designers, who only needed low
speeds and did not value it as much as the aerospace firm who sold it. Edgerton
(2011) uses evidence from tax depreciation reforms in the US to estimate the elas-
ticity of substitution between new and used capital in the production function and
finds values in the range between 1 and 10 for sectors such as farming, construction
and aircraft. Jovanovic and Yatsenko (2012) build a vintage capital model to study
technology adoption decisions and assume that different vintages of capital enter the
production function in a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) form. Eisfeldt and
Rampini (2007) show that that in the data firms of all sizes invest both in new and in
used capital and build a model assuming that new and used investment goods differ
because used capital is cheaper, but requires more maintenance in the future, induc-
ing financially constrained firms to buy a higher ratio of used to new items. In this
paper, I abstract from financial frictions and focus on the role of capital specificity.
An alternative attempt to endogenize the resale price of capital relies on asym-
metric information, especially lemons problems in secondary markets (Eisfeldt, 2004,
Kurlat, 2013, Li and Whited, 2014). In my empirical evidence I focus on the aircraft
sector, for which asymmetric information is unlikely to be relevant, as the main-
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tenance history of each aircraft is public information. Furthermore, in models of
asymmetric information the fraction of lemons does not necessarily increase in re-
cessions, as would be required to explain a procyclical resale price and procyclical
reallocation. As Eisfeldt (2004) argues, one can imagine a case where the fraction of
lemons decreases in recessions, because more sellers owning good quality assets are
forced to downsize, leading to a higher resale price and more reallocation. Perri and
Quadrini (2014) follow a different approach to endogenize the resale price of capital:
they assume that the value of used capital depends on whether it is sold to other firms
or to consumers. In the latter case, the price is lower. In this paper, I assume that
used capital is useless for consumer and focus instead on its imperfect substitutability
with new investment.
Furthermore, this paper contributes to the literature on the link between micro-
level irreversibility and smooth aggregate investment. Using a partial equilibrium
model, Bertola and Caballero (1994) argued that irreversibility at the micro level is a
plausible explanation for what in the aggregate looks like a convex adjustment cost.
However, this result did not seem to pass the test of general equilibrium. Veracierto
(2002) considers a model with constant partial irreversibility and concludes that con-
sumption smoothing forces undo all the effects of irreversibility and the property of
the aggregate investment series are almost identical, independently of the level of the
resale price of capital. In this paper I show that endogenizing irreversibility reaffirms
the result of Bertola and Caballero (1994). What matters is not the average level
of the resale price, but its correlation with aggregate shocks: investment becomes
more irreversible exactly at the time when disinvesting firms would like to disinvest
by more and this induces more caution in investment decisions. Importantly, because
the price of used capital is procyclical, the total cost of investment (new and used)
is also procyclical and this further smooths investment decisions by making capital
cheaper in recessions and more expensive in booms.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the literature on DSGE models with hetero-
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geneous firms obtains results that imply a small or insignificant role for heterogeneity
and changes in the cross-sectional distribution of firms, especially following aggregate
TFP shocks. Most notably, Veracierto (2002) and Khan and Thomas (2008) show that
the aggregate behavior of these model is remarkably close to that of representative-
firm Real Business Cycle (RBC) models. The present paper is an example of a model
where heterogeneity is important in order to microfound and understand an aggregate
observation: without firms changing their idiosyncratic productivity levels over time,
the market for used capital would not open and we could not rationalize the data on
reallocation and the smoothing of the aggregate investment series.
1.2 Empirical evidence
1.2.1 Capital reallocation
Figure 1.1 shows the cyclical components of the Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) capital
reallocation series for the period 1971-2011, composed of annual Compustat data
on Sales of Plants, Property and Equipment (SPPE) plus Acquisitions (all deflated
using the US GDP deflator) and filtered using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with
smoothing parameter equal to 6.25 (as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig, 2002, for annual
data). Capital reallocation is very volatile (approximately 7 times as volatile as US
GDP) and positively correlated with output, with a correlation coefficient of .56.4
I confirm the evidence on the procyclicality of capital reallocation by looking at
two other data sources (both of which exclude acquisitions): UK sales of second-hand
4Acquisitions represent the larger component of the capital reallocation series (approximately two
thirds of the total). However, each of the two components (SPPE and Acquisitions) is significantly
procyclical. In this paper, I will not distinguish between bundled and unbundled sales of used capital
and I will refer to the sum of the two as capital reallocation, following Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006).
Using a different data source, i.e. the Longitudinal Research Database compiled by the US Census
Bureau, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) find that the fraction of manufacturing plants involved in
M&A activity goes from 3.89% in an average year to 6.19% in expansion years.
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investment goods and global sales of second-hand commercial ships. In the UK, data
on second-hand investment from the Survey of Capital Expenditures of the ONS show
positive correlation between sales volumes and GDP. In particular during the recent
recession, sales of second-hand investment goods were historically low, as shown in
Figure 1.13 in Appendix A.
The market for second-hand commercial ships also provides a useful source of data
on second-hand sales. Differently from the above-mentioned data sources, data on
trading of used ships are divided into prices and quantities traded (number of sales)
and do not depend on aggregation across types of investment goods.5 By looking
at these industry-level data, the following picture emerges: high trading volumes are
associated with the period of economic expansion leading to 2007, and an abrupt
fall in the number of sales coincides with the start of the Great Recession. This is
illustrated in Figure 1.14 in Appendix A.
1.2.2 The price of used capital
A new stylized fact emerges from the analysis of sectoral evidence on the resale price
of capital: the price of used investment goods is more volatile and more procyclical
than the price of new investment goods. I construct or gather price indices from
sectors that allow direct comparison of the value of new and used items in the same
asset class. These sectors are
• commercial aircraft
• commercial ships
• vehicles and trucks
• construction equipment.
5Price indices and sales numbers are compiled by Clarkson and VesselsValue.
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Figure 1.1: Capital reallocation and US GDP (cyclical components)
Log-deviations from HP trend (smoothing parameter = 6.25) of (i) the Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006)
capital reallocation series, composed of Sales of Property, Plants and Equipment and Acquisitions
from Compustat, deflated using the US GDP deflator, (ii) US real GDP. Yearly frequency.
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While this is only suggestive evidence related to these specific sectors, the pattern
of cyclicality in these four sectors is remarkably similar, showing a much stronger
reaction of the resale price of capital to business-cycle shocks relative to the price of
new investment goods. I will now describe the evidence related to the aircraft sector.
Appendix A reports the evidence for ships, vehicles and construction equipment.
Starting with a dataset on the value of all Western-built commercial aircraft from
1967 to 2009, I construct a price index of used and new aircraft. This dataset is
compiled by a specialized consulting company that evaluates aircraft based on actual
transactions prices for which the seller was not bankrupt. It includes prices of all
the different vintages of 38 types of aircraft, starting from their first production year
onwards. The observation unit is an aircraft of type j, vintage v in year t, with price
pjvt. To construct the index, I divide the data into prices of new aircraft (v = t) and
prices of used aircraft (v < t). I deflate all prices using the US GDP deflator. Then
I create dummy variables for year, age and type (and interaction terms) and run a
regression of log(pjvt) on these dummies. In each subsample (new and used), the
coefficients on the time dummies are the quality-age-adjusted price index of aircraft.
Finally, I detrend the series using an HP filter, with a smoothing coefficient of 6.25.6
Figure 1.2 plots the price index of new aircraft, that of used aircraft and US GDP
as a measure of the business cycle. It is evident that the cyclical component of
the price of used aircraft is more volatile than that of new aircraft. It is also more
strongly correlated with GDP. Table 1.1 reports standard deviations and coefficients
of correlation of these series.
I interpret variations in the relative price of used assets as evidence in favor of
capital specificity and against the standard assumption of perfect substitutability be-
tween new and used capital. Consistently with this interpretation, Gavazza (2011b)
suggests a reason why capital specificity may be playing an important role in deter-
mining the volatility of the price of used aircraft. Carriers typically operate a very
6Robustness exercises with different smoothing parameters lead to very similar results.
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small number of models in order to exploit economies of scale in maintenance and
staff training costs and they are unwilling to substitute into other models when there
is an increase in the supply of used aircraft due to aggregate shocks, leading to a
fall in the value of used aircraft. By looking at cross-sectional evidence on the prices
of different models, he finds support for this theory: the volatility of resale prices
of more specific models of aircraft (e.g. Boeing 747, which can operate on a limited
range of routes) is significantly higher than the volatility of more flexible models that
can be used on a larger range of routes (e.g. Boeing 737).
Evidence on secondary markets for commercial ships, vehicles and trucks and
construction equipment is consistent with the main finding: the price of used capital
relative to new is volatile and procyclical. Appendix A presents price series for these
sectors.
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Figure 1.2: Aircraft prices and US GDP (cyclical components)
Log-deviations from HP trend (smoothing parameter = 6.25) of (i) price index of new aircraft, (ii)
price index of used aircraft, (iii) US real GDP. Aircraft prices are deflated using the GDP deflator.
Yearly frequency.
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Series Standard Deviation Corr. with new Corr. with used Corr. with GDP
new 0.0342 1 - -
used 0.0799 0.4781 1 -
GDP 0.0239 0.4090 0.5647 1
Table 1.1: New and used aircraft prices: second order moments
Standard deviations and correlation coefficients of the cyclical components of the price index of
new aircraft, the price index of used aircraft and US real GDP. Yearly frequency, HP smoothing
parameter = 6.25.
1.2.3 Discussion
Looking again at the Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) reallocation series (Figure 1.1), in
light of this evidence on the cyclicality of resale prices one may ask whether deflating
their series with an index of used capital prices (instead of the GDP deflator) would
explain the procyclicality of the volume of reallocation. In other words: is the cycli-
cality in the volume of reallocation only due to the cyclicality of the price of used
capital? A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests a negative answer. Under the
assumption that the sectors discussed above (and in Appendix A) are representative
of the whole economy, it is possible to compare the cyclical movements in these price
series (cyclical deviations from trend in a ballpark of 10%) with that of the Eisfeldt
and Rampini series (approximately 20% above and below trend in booms and re-
cessions respectively). This suggests that part of the volatility in the Eisfeldt and
Rampini series is certainly due to prices, but approximately half of this volatility may
be due to movements in the quantity traded, consistently with the observation on the
quantities traded on the market for used commercial ships.
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that recessions are bad times to disinvest,
because the resale price of capital is low. By treating the resale price as a constant
parameter, the previous theoretical literature on investment irreversibility has not
drawn any distinction between the case of a firm that needs to downsize during an
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expansion or a firm that needs to downsize in a downturn. However, the price of
these two types of transactions can be quite different.
The assumption of perfect substitutability between new and used assets, which is
implicit in the literature, is inconsistent with the evidence presented on the relative
price of used capital: even an infinitesimal decrease in this price would lead investing
firms to jump to a corner solution and demand only used capital, which is counter-
factual. For instance, US Census ACES data on capital expenditures show a stable
ratio between used and new investment expenditures, with a standard deviation of
approximately 1%.7
1.3 A simple model of capital reallocation
Building on the empirical evidence presented above, this section introduces a simple
static model that features imperfect substitutability between new and used invest-
ment goods and allows the derivation of analytical results on the response of capital
reallocation to exogenous changes in aggregate productivity.
Section 1.4 extends this simple setup to include dynamic real-options effects and
section 1.5 embeds the mechanism in a dynamic general equilibrium model with
aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
1.3.1 Technological assumptions
There is a continuum of firms j ∈ [0, 1], all of which are endowed with an initial
capital level k0. They produce a homogeneous output good with production function
yj = zsjk
α
j , (1.1)
7The volatility of the price of used capital could also be partly explained by time-to-build frictions:
if used capital is readily available, while new capital takes time to become productive, shocks will
affect the relative price of used capital. I will abstract from this in the model, but the introduction
of time-to-build in my framework would be very interesting and is left for future work.
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where z is an aggregate productivity parameter, sj is an idiosyncratic shock with cdf
F (sj) and α ∈ (0, 1) is the returns-to-scale parameter.
Each firm uses its specific type of capital in order to produce the output good.
Before production, firms can adjust their capital level kj according to their produc-
tivity. Firms that decide to decrease their capital stock can sell some of their capital
on the market for used capital. On the other hand, firms that decide to increase
their capital level can invest using newly produced capital (supplied inelastically by
a representative consumer) or used capital sold by disinvesting firms. New capital
can be freely specialized. In contrast, used capital is partially specific to its previous
owner. As a consequence, expanding firms cannot make the whole investment buying
used capital and they need to bundle it instead with some newly produced output
good in order to make it specific to their firms. Hence the substitutability between
new and used investment goods is imperfect. This can be rationalized in a world
where investment goods needed to build a plant are of different types. Some of them
are fairly generic and can be easily purchased as used and put in production in a
different plant. Some others have to be specifically designed for the production of a
particular business line. In this environment, substitutability is imperfect and firms
will only be willing to substitute towards more used capital if this becomes cheaper.8
However, investing firms always have the choice to buy only new goods.
Formally, the investment technology is given by a perfect substitutes aggregator
8The sale of a GM pick-up trucks production plant in Shreveport, Louisiana, to three-wheeled
electric car manifacturer Elio Motors provides a recent example of capital reallocation with imperfect
susbstitutability. Elio chose to acquire the plant because it was ready for reuse as well as more
convenient than building a new plant from scratch. However, they clearly need to substitute part of
the GM machinery with specific equipment for the production of their product. (source: cnn.com,
April 2014)
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of new capital and a CES aggregator of used and new capital.9
kj − k0 = i˜j,new + g(ij,new, ij,used) (1.2)
g(ij,new, ij,used) = [η
1
ǫ (ij,new)
ǫ−1
ǫ + (1− η)
1
ǫ (ij,used)
ǫ−1
ǫ ]
ǫ
ǫ−1 (1.3)
where i˜j,new and ij,new are new investment goods and ij,used is used capital sold by
disinvesting firms. η ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter that determines the average ratio between
new and used investment, while ǫ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between new
and used investment goods.
The price of a unit of new capital in terms of the output good is 1, while the
cost of a unit of used capital is equal to the sum of the price of used capital qt and a
per-unit reallocation cost γ. Hence, the CES price index associated with a composite
g of new and used investment goods is
Q = [η + (1− η)(q + γ)1−ǫ]
1
1−ǫ . (1.4)
Clearly, firms will choose the cheapest option between a fully new investment i˜j,new
and a bundle g. As long as q < 1 − γ ⇒ Q < 1, the bundle is the cheapest option
and firms choose to make a fraction of their investment using used capital and set
i˜j,new = 0. However, if the price of used capital became hypothetically higher then
the price of new capital, firms would optimally buy only new capital. Throughout
the paper, in equilibrium it will always be the case that q < 1− γ, hence I will focus
on this case in the following analysis.
I interpret the elasticity ǫ as an inverse measure of capital specificity. When
ǫ→∞, new and used capital are perfect substitutes and the model nests a standard
model of partial irreversibility with constant resale price q = 1 − γ. On the other
9Differently from Jovanovic and Yatsenko (2012) and Edgerton (2011), and in order to make my
model computationally tractable, I assume that the imperfect substitutability is in the investment
technology rather than in the production function, which allows to endogenize the resale price while
at the same time keeping track of only one type of capital as a state variable in the full dynamic
model.
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hand, when ǫ = 0, the technology does not allow any substitutability between new
and used capital.
With imperfect substitutability, for each price of used capital q, there is a well
defined optimal ratio of used to new investment, in contrast to models that assume
perfect substitutability. Increasing the ratio of used to new investment goods above
this optimal level would be suboptimal, because the investing firm would be buying a
larger amount of capital that was specific to another firm, relative to the new capital
than can be freely specialized.
Finally, I assume that used capital is useless for consumers and the market for
used capital clears between investing and disinvesting firms only. While it is true
that some types of capital like cars and computers could be useful for consumers after
having been used by firms, for most other kinds of equipment and for plants this is
impossible. This assumption is equivalent to the assumption of total irreversibility
in the aggregate, as for instance in Sargent (1980). Investment is partially reversible
from an individual firm’s point of view, because it can be sold to another firm, but
in the aggregate, used capital cannot be retransformed into consumption.
1.3.2 Optimal investment and reallocation decisions
The solution to the firms’ optimal investment problem can be easily characterized:
• If they are sufficiently productive, they will invest, buying a bundle of new and
used capital at price Q. This will happen if sj ≥ s
I = Q
αzkα−1
0
. In this case, the
optimal capital level is given by
kj =
(
αzsj
Q
) 1
1−α
.
• If they are sufficiently unproductive, they will disinvest, selling part of their
capital at price q. This will happen if sj < s
D = q
αzkα−1
0
. In this case, the
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optimal capital level is given by
kj =
(
αzsj
q
) 1
1−α
.
• Firms with intermediate productivity sD ≤ sj < s
I will choose to keep their
capital level at k0, as their marginal product of capital lies between the pur-
chasing price Q and the selling price q.
1.3.3 Equilibrium in the market for used capital
Given a chosen amount of total investment, investing firms minimize their expen-
diture by buying a composite of new and used capital. By solving a standard CES
expenditure minimization problem and integrating over the measure of investing firms
we get total demand for used capital:
Dused = (1− η)
(
q + γ
Q
)−ǫ ∫
sI
[(
αzs
Q
) 1
1−α
− k0
]
dF (s). (1.5)
On the other hand, total supply of used capital, coming from disinvesting firms is
Sused =
∫ sD [
k0 −
(
αzs
q
) 1
1−α
]
dF (s). (1.6)
The market-clearing condition Dused = Sused defines implicitly the equilibrium
price as a function of the aggregate productivity parameter z, q = q(z; ǫ), where I
emphasize that this equilibrium price mapping depends on the elasticity of substi-
tution ǫ. The following proposition relates this elasticity to the effect of aggregates
shocks on irreversibility and reallocation.
Proposition 1. (i) q(z; ǫ) is increasing in z. (ii) There exists an ǫ¯ > 0 such that
for ǫ < ǫ¯ the elasticity of q with respect to z is greater than 1 and reallocation
is increasing in z.
The proof, in Appendix B, is based on an application of the Implicit Function
Theorem to the market-clearing condition. To derive intuition on the mechanism,
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consider without loss of generality a marginal decrease in z. At a given resale price,
disinvesting firms would like to sell more capital, because their optimal target level
is now lower. This implies that the supply schedule of used capital (1.6) shifts out
in a standard price-quantity space. Similarly, investing firms want to invest less and
demand (1.5) shifts in. The price of used capital q must fall to clear the market, and
the price index of investment Q will also decrease, although by less, because it is a
CES average of 1 (the price of new capital) and (q + γ). This reflects the fact that
investing firms cannot fully benefit from the cheaper used capital on offer, because
its specificity makes it less valuable for them.
For sufficiently low elasticity of substitution, q will fall by more than the initial
fall in z, the threshold sD = q/αzkα−10 will decrease and the choice of new capital
level conditional on sj for disinvesting firms will increase, inducing less reallocation.
Importantly, this is in contrast to a model where the resale price is constant, which
implies that the disinvesting threshold would increase following a fall in z, and total
reallocation would necessarily be higher.
We will see in the following sections that the reaction of the resale price potentially
leads to amplification of exogenous aggregate productivity shocks. The mechanism
works as follows: measured aggregate productivity (the Solow residual obtained as-
suming an aggregate production function) falls by more that the initial negative shock
because the decrease in trading in the market for used capital leads unproductive firms
to remain large relative to what they would be in a world with fixed resale price, and
as a consequence a larger fraction of aggregate capital is operated by firms with lower
productivity.
Furthermore, under a reasonable assumption on the distribution F , the model
generates a countercyclical dispersion of marginal products. Assume for simplicity
that F is uniform on [smin, smax]. Consider again a marginal decrease in z. Out of the
inaction region, investing firms set their marginal product equal to Q and disinvesting
firms set it equal to q. In the inaction region, the marginal product of each firm stays
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equal to its initial value. When aggregate productivity falls, the distance between q
and Q increases, because q decreases by more than Q (Q is a CES average of q + γ
and 1). This has two effects. First, the difference between the marginal product of
investing firms and that of disinvesting firms increases. Second, the mass of firms
in the inaction region increases. Both effects necessarily lead to higher dispersion of
marginal products.
The previous literature has often interpreted the countercyclical dispersion of
returns from capital as a consequence of a worsening of financial frictions in recessions,
with productive firms not getting enough external finance to implement high return
projects (see for instance Cui, 2014, Chen and Song, 2013). This model highlights
a different channel: part of the increase in the dispersion of returns in recessions is
due to imperfect substitutability between new and old capital and hence can be fully
efficient and should not be addressed with expansionary credit policies.
Figure 1.3 provides a graphical representation of the solution to the model and its
comparative statics. Consider the upper horizontal line. Each point on the line is the
marginal product of capital of a firm, evaluated at k0. Firms with initial marginal
product larger than Q invest up to the point where their marginal product equals Q.
Likewise, firms with initial marginal product below the resale price q disinvest up to
the point where their marginal product equals q. These investment and disinvestment
decisions are represented by the curved arrows pointing towards the two prices. Firms
with intermediate initial marginal product are in the inaction region and remain at
k0. The lower horizontal line corresponds to a decrease in z. Note that both Q and q
decrease, but the former decreases by less than the latter. Hence, the inaction region
becomes larger.
In conclusion, this simple static model shows that in an economy with a sufficient
degree of capital specificity a fall in aggregate productivity leads to an even larger
decrease in the resale price of capital, a decrease in reallocation and an increase in
the dispersion of marginal products.
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Figure 1.3: Graphical representation of the static mechanism
Firms’ investment/disinvestment decisions and inaction region. Upper horizontal line: benchmark
solution. Lower horizontal line: marginal decrease in aggregate productivity z.
1.4 Aggregate shocks and equilibrium real option
values
This section presents a two-period model with uncertainty and forward-looking firms,
where investment and reallocation decisions depend not only on current prices, but
also, importantly, on future expected prices at which firms can buy and sell investment
goods. The model extends the seminal work of Abel et al. (1996) by imposing
equilibrium in the market for used capital. Abel et al. (1996) assume exogenous
streams of purchasing and resale prices of capital and focus on solving the individual
firm’s problem of partially irreversible investment under idiosyncratic uncertainty.
They show that with partial irreversibility, as part of the investment is sunk, the firm
has an option value from waiting until future productivity is known (or equivalently
the future output price).
Here, I consider instead a continuum of firms hit by idiosyncratic and aggregate
shocks and I impose that the market for used capital clears in all states. This allows
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me to obtain results on the equilibrium effects of aggregate shocks on firms’ real option
values in an environment where all firms make their investment decisions taking these
options into account. As the resale price is positively correlated with the aggregate
productivity shock, the option value to sell capital is procyclical, contrary to what
happens in partial equilibrium, where this option is more valuable in recessions. After
a negative persistent aggregate TFP shock, capital is not only less productive, but
is also perceived as more irreversible, as its expected future resale price falls. This
section ends with a discussion of how such equilibrium effects of aggregate shocks on
real option values affect both investment and reallocation.
1.4.1 Two-period model
There is a continuum of firms with idiosyncratic productivity sjt producing with
technology
yjt = ztsjtk
α
jt, (1.7)
for t = 1, 2. Both zt and sjt follow a positively autocorrelated process. In particular,
aggregate productivity takes either of two values
{
zL, zH
}
and a Markov transition
matrix gives conditional probabilities for time t = 2. I assume Pr {z2 = z1} > 1/2.
The idiosyncratic shock at t = 1 is drawn from a log-normal distribution with mean
−σ21/2 and variance σ
2
1. At time 2, the shocks satisfies log (s2) = ρ log (s1)+ v2, with
v2 ∼ N(−σ
2
2/2, σ
2
2).
Firms start the initial period with a common level of capital k0, observe the re-
alizations of the two productivity shocks, (sj1, z1), and are allowed to choose their
capital level kj1 before starting production. If they invest, they can purchase a combi-
nation of new capital and used capital, which is being sold by disinvesting firms who
decide to decrease their capital level. As in the static model of the previous section,
the investment technology is given by (1.2) and the price index of investment goods
is given by (1.4) in both periods, except that q and Q will now have a t subscript.
The reallocation cost γ is constant.
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After the investment/disinvestment activity is concluded, production takes place.
Abstracting from physical depreciation for simplicity of exposition, firms start the
second period with an initial level of capital kj1, observe the realizations of sj2 and
z2 and are again allowed to adjust their capital level before production. Then pro-
duction takes place again and at the end of the period firms receive a terminal value
proportional to their capital level, χkj2, with χ ≥ 0.
1.4.2 Value of a firm
Because qt < Qt, in both periods some firms will invest, some will disinvest and
some will keep their capital stock unchanged because the marginal product of their
capital lies between the two prices. Let’s start by characterizing the value of a firm
after its choice of capital at t = 1. The next subsection will then move backwards
and solve for the optimal choice of kj1. By anticipating optimal behavior at t = 2,
the value of a firm can be decomposed into a component that assumes no further
adjustment in the second period, a component that depends on the opportunity to
buy more capital in the second period (call option) and a component that depends on
the possibility to sell some capital in the second period (put option). The call option
will be exercised only for sufficiently high sj2 and the put option for sufficiently low
sj2. In the following derivation I will drop the subscript j for notational convenience
and consider a generic firm. At t = 1, after observing the pair (s1, z1) and choosing
k1, the value of the firm is
V (k1, s1, z1) = z1s1k
α
1 + β (E1z2s2k
α
1 + χk1) + βC(k1, s1, z1) + βP (k1, s1, z1) (1.8)
where E1 is a conditional expectation operator that sums over the future realizations
of z and integrates over the distribution of s2, conditional on (s1, z1). The value of
the firm consists of the value of producing in both periods with k1, i.e. without doing
any further adjustment at t = 2, plus the call option value of increasing the capital
stock, C(k1, s1, z1) and the put option value of selling part of the capital stock in the
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second period, P (k1, s1, z1).
The call option value is given by
C(k1, s1, z1) = Ez1
∫
sI
2
(k1,z2)
{[z2s2 (k2 (s2, z2))
α + χk2 (s2, z2)]
− [z2s2k
α
1 + χk1]−Q2 [k2 (s2, z2)− k1]} dF (s2 |s1) (1.9)
where Ez1 sums over realizations of z2, with probabilities conditional on z1. This
option will be exercised at t = 2 if idiosyncratic productivity turns out to be above
the threshold sI2 (k1, z2) =
Q2−χ
αz2k
α−1
1
, in which case the firm will invest and go to a
capital level given by
k2 =
(
αzsj2
Q2 − χ
) 1
1−α
> k1.
Similarly, the put option is
P (k1, s1, z1) = Ez1
∫ sD
2
(k1,z2)
{[z2s2 (k2 (s2, z2))
α + χk2 (s2, z2)]
− [z2s2k
α
1 + χk1] + q2 [k1 − k2 (s2, z2)]} dF (s2 |s1) (1.10)
and will be exercised at t = 2 if idiosyncratic productivity turns out to be below the
threshold sD2 (k1, z2) =
q2−χ
αz2k
α−1
1
by selling capital up to the level
k2 =
(
αzsj2
q2 − χ
) 1
1−α
< k1.
It is easy to see that the value of the call option is decreasing in the realizations
of Q2, while the put option is increasing in the realizations of q2. While a higher Q2
makes it harder to expand tomorrow, a higher q2 makes it easier to downsize, should
it be desirable.
1.4.3 Optimal investment and reallocation decisions
We can now characterize the optimal choice of capital level in the first period. At
t = 1, firms compare the marginal value of their initial capital level k0 with the
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purchasing price Q1 and the selling price q1. Call Vk the partial derivative of V with
respect to its first argument.
• Firms who receive an idiosyncratic shock such that Vk(k0, s1, z1) ≥ Q1 will
choose to invest and their optimal capital level k1 (s1, z1) satisfies
Vk(k1, s1, z1)
Q1
=
Wk(k1, s1, z1) + Ck(k1, s1, z1) + Pk(k1, s1, z1)
Q1
= 1
where I have emphasized that the marginal value of capital is composed by
the present discounted value of their marginal product assuming no further
adjustment, which I call Wk, the marginal call Ck and the marginal put Pk.
Note that Wk and Pk are positive, while Ck is negative as increasing the capital
level implies exercising part of the call option value.
• For firms with sufficiently low idiosyncratic productivity, Vk(k0, s1, z1) < q1.
They will disinvest and choose k1 (s1, z1) by solving
Vk(k1, s1, z1)
q1
=
Wk(k1, s1, z1) + Ck(k1, s1, z1) + Pk(k1, s1, z1)
q1
= 1
• Firms with intermediate productivity, such that q1 ≤ Vk(k0, s1, z1) < Q1, are in
the inaction region and optimally keep k1 (s1, z1) = k0.
As in the static model, firms compare the marginal value of capital with Q if
they consider investing and with q if they consider disinvesting. Differently from the
static model, however, this marginal value now takes into account the variations in
the option values induced by such investment and disinvestment activity.
The market for used capital clears, meaning that total disinvestment from un-
productive firms equals investment in used capital coming from investing firms. The
market-clearing equation is analogous to that in the previous section.
1.4.4 Put option in booms and recessions
As the evidence presented in section 1.2 suggests, the resale price of capital is more
volatile and procyclical than the price of new capital. Hence, I will focus on the
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put option value and its reaction to shocks, although similar arguments can be made
about equilibrium effects of shocks on the call option.
To understand how equilibrium real options affect investment and disinvestment
behavior following business-cycle shocks, consider the marginal value of the put op-
tion Pk. Differentiating (1.10) with respect to the choice of capital and writing the
expectation more explicitly, we get
Pk(k1, s1, z1) =
∑
z2∈{zL,zH}
Pr {z2|z1}
∫ sD
2
(k1,z2) [
q2(z1, z2)− αz2s2k
α−1
1 − χ
]
dF (s2 |s1) (1.11)
where I emphasize that the equilibrium resale price depends on both realizations of
the aggregate shock. Hence, conditional on z1, there are two possible outcomes for q2
depending on the realization of z2.
Intuitively, Pk is increasing in the expected value of the future resale price q2, as
this price adds value to a marginal unit of capital bought in the first period, in the
case this unit has to be resold in the second period. Consider the two elements of
the summation over z2. If one keeps the resale price q2 constant, it appears that the
marginal put value of capital is decreasing in z2, i.e. a decrease in the value of aggre-
gate productivity leads necessarily to an increase in Pk. This is because Pk depends
negatively on the marginal product of installed capital. However, the expected resale
price is also endogenous in this model. In numerical examples, for sufficiently low
elasticity of substitution between new and used capital ǫ, this equilibrium effect dom-
inates the effect of exogenous changes in z2, implying that the marginal put option
value becomes procyclical. The intuition for this is that the value of a marginal unit
of capital purchased in the first period depends positively both on its productivity in
the second period and on its resaleability.
Figure 1.4 illustrates the payoff of the put option value in equation (1.10), eval-
uated at k0, as a function of the initial idiosyncratic shock s1 and for each of two
values of z1. I label the low realization of the aggregate state “recession” and the
high realization “boom”. This figure shows that this option value has a similar payoff
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function to a financial option. Here the strike price is the resale price q2 and the
underlying asset value is the marginal value of the firm’s capital. For a firm with very
low s1, k0 is a relatively high capital level, so that assuming no adjustment at t = 1,
it is likely that some disinvestment will be optimal at t = 2, given the autocorrelation
of st. This explains a high put option value. On the other hand, for a firm with very
high s1, the optimal size is higher than k0, so that if the firm keeps its capital level at
k0 it is unlikely that there will be any need for disinvesting at t = 2, which explains
a put option value close to 0.
Figure 1.5 shows what happens to the option value after firms choose k1, both
when z1 = z
L and when z1 = z
H . Low productivity firms exercised some of their
initial put value by selling some capital. High productivity firms, on the other hand,
invest and purchase some put option value. Firms with intermediate productivity are
in the inaction region and optimally choose to keep k1 = k0, so their put option value
after trading equals the initial put option value. This figure illustrates that when
aggregate productivity is low, the put option value falls, because of the equilibrium
effect on the expected resale price illustrated above, thus making investment more
irreversible.
1.4.5 Equilibrium real options and investment
The model has rich implications in terms of the effects of aggregate shocks on invest-
ment. In a boom, capital is now attractive for two reasons. First of all, it is directly
more productive. Second, it is easier to resell, in case a bad idiosyncratic shock hits
the firm in the future. Third, it is more expensive today, because the current price
of used assets increases and hence total investment comes at a higher price.
In the quantitative model presented in the next section, I investigate the aggregate
effects of all these different incentives on investment and disinvestment decisions. It
turns out that in general equilibrium endogenous irreversibility smooths aggregate
investment, bringing its volatility and autocorrelation closer to the data, consistently
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Figure 1.4: Put option value, before trading at t = 1
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Figure 1.5: Put option value, after trading at t = 1
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with the original conjecture of Bertola and Caballero (1994) on the aggregate effects
of micro-irreversibilities and in contrast to DSGE models where the resale price of
capital is assumed to be constant.
1.4.6 Equilibrium real options and reallocation
For disinvesting firms, the first order condition for k1 suggests a key comparison
between the marginal value of capital and the current resale price. The ratio between
the present discounted value of marginal returns and q1 behaves similarly to the static
model. Let us disregard variations in the marginal call value as they are small, given
the relatively low volatility of Qt and focus on the ratio
Pk
q1
.
Unproductive firms compare the price they can get for their assets at t = 1, with
the value from waiting to disinvest until the second period, which as we have seen
is an increasing function of the expected value of q2. This allows us to identify two
forces that act in opposite directions. On the one hand, in a recession the marginal
put option falls, because the resale value of capital is going to fall at t = 2 with high
probability (as the aggregate shock is persistent). This would imply that it is optimal
to disinvest by more in the first period. On the other hand, also the current resale
price in the first period is low. Importantly, with positive probability z2 will be high
and the resale price will increase, in which case it would be optimal to disinvest by
less in the first period and wait until the second period.
Because of mean reversion of the aggregate shock process, following a low re-
alization of the aggregate TFP shock, the fall in the current price of used capital
dominates the fall in its future expected value, generating a value of waiting to dis-
invest in the future, further delaying reallocation and amplifying the static effects
analyzed in section 1.3.
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1.5 A DSGE model with endogenous irreversibil-
ity
This section presents an infinite-horizon general equilibrium model that combines all
the static and dynamic effects illustrated in the previous sections and includes risk
aversion and endogenous labor supply, allowing for a quantitative evaluation of the
mechanism.
1.5.1 Households
There is a representative household who consumes the output good, supplies labor
and owns shares in all firms in the economy. Her preferences are described by the
utility function
E0
∞∑
t=0
[log (ct)− ψnt] (1.12)
where ct is consumption and nt are hours worked.
The representative household’s budget constraint is
ct = wtnt + πt (1.13)
where πt are aggregate profits.
10
The labor supply schedule is defined by the first order condition that equates the
marginal rate of substitution between hours and consumption to the wage wt
ψct = wt. (1.14)
10Alternatively, one could write this budget constraint including the household’s choice of buying
and selling shares in all firms. In equilibrium, her portfolio would have to coincide with the distri-
bution of firms in the economy and stock prices would be given by the firms’ value functions below.
The distinction between these two formulations is immaterial in terms of competitive equilibrium
allocations and prices.
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1.5.2 Firms
Consider now firms’ optimization problem. In each period t, productivity of firm
j is the product of an aggregate component zt ∈
{
zL, zH
}
that follows a Markov
chain with transition matrix Tz and an idiosyncratic component sjt ∈
{
sL, sH
}
with
Markov transition matrix Ts. The firm produces a homogenous output good with
technology
yjt = ztsjtk
α
jtn
ν
jt (1.15)
with α + ν < 1, and chooses current labor demand and the future level of capital
in order to maximize its value for the consumer taking prices qt and wt as given.
11
By assuming a flexible labor market with no adjustment costs, I can separate the
labor demand choice from the investment decision in a very convenient way. I will
first describe the intratemporal labor decision and then derive the implied return on
capital in order to formulate the intertemporal investment problem.
Labor demand equates the marginal product of labor to the wage rate:
njt =
(
νztsjtk
α
jt
wt
) 1
1−ν
(1.16)
Using (1.16), it is easy to derive an expression for output net of the wage bill as a
function of the two productivity shocks, current capital level and wage:
yjt − wtnjt = A (wt) z
θ
t s
θ
jtk
αθ
jt , (1.17)
where A (wt) =
[(
ν
wt
) ν
1−ν
− wt
(
ν
wt
) 1
1−ν
]
, and θ = 1/ (1− ν). This transformation of
the production function is used by firms in order to evaluate the return on investment
in physical capital. In other words, the flexible labor demand decision is incorporated
in their expectations as they know that in every period they will be free to reoptimize
their required labor input.
11Differently from the simple models presented above, here I assume that capital is chosen one
period in advance. This assumption makes the model more easily comparable with standard business-
cycle models.
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Let m be the distribution of firms over individual capital level and idiosyncratic
productivity. Both the price of used capital and the wage will depend on it, so that
this distribution is now a state variable with its own law of motion.
mt+1 = Γ(mt, zt) (1.18)
Let us focus on a recursive solution to the firm’s problem, with state vector
(k, s, z,m). After observing the state, each firm decides whether to invest or dis-
invest, and by how much. Switching to recursive notation, the value of an investing
firm is
V i(k, s, z,m) = max
k′≥(1−δ)k
A (w) zθsθkαθ−Q [k′ − (1− δ) k]+βE
{ c
c′
V (k′, s′, z′,m′)|s, z
}
(1.19)
and the value of a disinvesting firm is
V d(k, s, z,m) = max
k′≤(1−δ)k
A (w) zθsθkαθ−q [k′ − (1− δ) k]+βE
{ c
c′
V (k′, s′, z′,m′)|s, z
}
(1.20)
At the beginning of each period, the discrete choice between investment and disin-
vestment gives V (k, s, z,m) = max
{
V i(k, s, z,m), V d(k, s, z,m)
}
. Note that these
Bellman equations implicitly define the value of the firm as the present discounted
value of profits (i.e. output net of the wage bill and investment expenditure), evalu-
ated using the representative household’s stochastic discount factor.
1.5.3 General Equilibrium
Market clearing in the used capital market needs to be imposed in an analogous way to
the simpler models in the previous sections. Investing firms demand new capital and
used capital by solving a standard CES expenditure minimization problem and market
clearing implies that total investment in used capital equals total disinvestment.
I can now define a recursive competitive equilibrium.
Definition 1. A recursive competitive equilibrium is defined as a set of functions m,
Γ, w, q, Q, π , C, N , V i, V d, V , n, k′, i, inew, iused, d that solve the household’s and
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firms’ optimization problems and clear markets for the output good, labor and used
capital:
• Consumption C(z,m) and labor supply N(z,m) solve the consumer’s problem
of maximizing (1.12) subject to (1.13)
• Firms labor demand n(k, s, z,m) satisfies equation (1.16)
• The value functions V i, V d and V satisfy the functional equations (1.19), (1.20)
and V (k, s, z,m) = max
{
V i(k, s, z,m), V d(k, s, z,m)
}
• For investing firms, i.e. firms such that V i(k, s, z,m) ≥ V d(k, s, z,m) the policy
function k′(k, s, z,m) solves (1.19), investment is i(k, s, z,m) = k′(k, s, z,m)−
(1−δ)k and is allocated to new and used investment goods according to the CES
expenditure minimization first order condition:
iused(k, s, z,m)
inew(k, s, z,m)
=
1− η
η
(q(z,m) + γ)−ǫ
• For disinvesting firms, i.e. V i(k, s, z,m) < V d(k, s, z,m), the policy func-
tion k′(k, s, z,m) solves (1.20) and disinvestment is d(k, s, z,m) = (1 − δ)k −
k′(k, s, z,m)
• Aggregate profits are given by π(z,m) = z
∫
skαnν dm(k, s)− w(z,m)N(z,m)
−Q(z,m)
∫
i(k, s, z,m) dm(k, s) + q
∫
d(k, s, z,m) dm(k, s)
• The market for the output good clears:
C(z,m) = z
∫
skαnν dm(k, s)−Q(z,m)
∫
i(k, s, z,m) dm(k, s)+
q
∫
d(k, s, z,m) dm(k, s)
• The labor market clears: N(z,m) =
∫
n(k, s, z,m) dm(k, s)
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• The market for used capital clears:∫
d(k, s, z,m) dm(k, s) =
∫
iused(k, s, z,m) dm(k, s)
• The price functions q(z,m) and Q(z,m) satisfy equation (1.4)
• The transition function Γ defines the evolution of the distribution of firms m
according to the policy function k′ and the Markov transition matrices Ts and
Tz
1.5.4 Calibration
Table 1.2 reports the choice of parameter values. When possible, these choices reflect
the attempt to stay close to previous work on firm heterogeneity and investment
for comparison purposes (in particular Khan and Thomas, 2013). A period coincides
with a year: this choice is motivated by the fact that both data on capital reallocation
and on micro-level investment are yearly.
Parameters β, ψ and δ correspond to a yearly interest rate of 4 percent, hours
worked equal to .33 and an investment/capital ratio of 6.5%. The capital share α is
then set to match a capital/output ratio around 2.5. The labor share ν is 60% as in
US postwar data.
Both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks are initially parametrized as AR(1) pro-
cesses in logs with autocorrelations ρz and ρs and standard deviations of innovations
σinn,z and σinn,s. Then they are discretized following the Rouwenhorst method with
two values for each shock.
In particular, aggregate productivity zt is parametrized as in Khan and Thomas
(2013), who estimate a process for the Solow residual in US data. This gives a
standard deviation of innovations of .014 and an autocorrelation coefficient of .909.
The standard deviation of the process for the idiosyncratic shock s is calibrated
to match the standard deviation of the distribution of investment ratios computed
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by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), which is .33. The autocorrelation of the process
is parametrized as in Khan and Thomas (2013) to be equal to .65. This implies a
standard deviation of innovations of .084.12
The investment technology is defined by two parameters: η and ǫ. The first
parameter is calibrated to match the steady-state ratio of used capital to total capital
purchased by investing firms. The target chosen is a ratio of 30%, which is an upper
bound of the estimates found by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2007), in order to take into
account that smaller firms out of their sample are likely to buy a higher ratio of used
capital, as this ratio appears to be decreasing in firms’ size in their empirical evidence.
The elasticity of substitution between new and used investment goods ǫ is a key
parameter of the model. Edgerton (2011) estimates this elasticity using data from
construction equipment, aircraft and farming equipment and exploiting a tax-credit
reform that affected only new investment. He finds values in a range between 1 and
10. I set ǫ = 5 as my benchmark value. Beside being an intermediate value in this
range of estimates, it allows to match the standard deviation of the ratio between
used and new capital expenditure from ACES data, which is around 1%. I show the
results for different value of ǫ in Appendix C. Note that the baseline choice implies
that the relative price of used capital will move less in the model than in the data
shown in the empirical section, so that this parametrization is quite conservative.
Finally, I set γ = .01, which implies an average level of irreversibility of .96, close
to the constant resale price in Khan and Thomas (2013). Hence, in the stationary
equilibrium the baseline economy is a very close match to a version of the Khan and
Thomas (2013) economy without financial frictions.
12The discretization with a two-state Markov chain implies that the average autocorrelation of
investment rates and the frequency of large adjustments (lumpiness) cannot be matched at the same
time as the standard deviation of investment rate, differently from Khan and Thomas (2013).
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Parameter Value
β .96
δ .065
ψ 2.15
α .27
ν .6
σinn,z .014
ρz .909
σinn,s .084
ρs .65
η .7
ǫ 5
γ .01
Table 1.2: Parameter values in the baseline
model
1.5.5 Computation
I solve the model using an extension of the method of Krusell and Smith (1998) and
Khan and Thomas (2008, 2013) that takes care of “non-trivial market clearing” in
the market for used capital.13 I approximate the distribution m with its first moment,
aggregate capital. Agents perceive a law of motion log (K ′) = φˆ0+φˆ1 log (K)+φˆ2z+η
and price functions qˆ (K, z), wˆ (K, z). Given these perceptions, I solve the individual
firm’s problem by value function iteration and obtain the policy functions, making
13By “non-trivial market clearing”, Krusell and Smith (2006) mean that a price has to be solved
for at each period during the simulation equating total supply and total demand (in this case for
used capital), differently from what happens for instance in Krusell and Smith (1998), where the
rental rate of capital can be easily solved for analytically given the predetermined level of aggregate
capital.
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them dependent on the current resale price qt. Then, I simulate a continuum of
firms using the simulation method of Young (2010) and update the price functions
by explicitly imposing market clearing in the used capital market (and in the labor
market) along the simulation. Finally, I update the laws of motion using standard
regression methods up to convergence. The accuracy of the solution is illustrated in
Appendix C.
1.6 Results
This section presents the numerical results from the full model, starting from firm
dynamics in a stationary equilibrium and then moving on to the business-cycle prop-
erties of the model.
1.6.1 Stationary equilibrium: no aggregate uncertainty
This subsection describes the equilibrium of the model when there is no aggregate
uncertainty and z is always equal to its mean. Consider first the investment policy
function obtained by solving the firms’ optimization problem. As in the simpler
models presented in the previous sections, the wedge between the price of investment
goods Qt and the resale price qt generates inaction areas, where firms optimally let
their capital depreciate without taking any action. As qt < Qt, it is always the case
that the capital level that solves (1.19) without the inequality constraint of positive
investment, call it ki(k, s, z,m), is strictly less than the capital level that solves (1.20)
without the inequality constraint of positive disinvestment, call it kd(k, s, z,m). It
follows that the policy function for future capital will be:
k′(k, s, z,m) =

ki(k, s, z,m), k ≤ ki(k, s, z,m)/(1− δ)
(1− δ)k, ki(k, s, z,m)/(1− δ) < k ≤ kd(k, s, z,m)/(1− δ)
kd(k, s, z,m), k > kd(k, s, z,m)/(1− δ).
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Figure 1.6 illustrates the policy function for future capital for firms with low produc-
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Figure 1.6: Policy function for future capital level
tivity (thin blue line) and high productivity (thick red line) under the parametrization
reported in Table 1.2. The variable on the x-axis is the current capital level, while on
the y-axis I plot next period capital. In a world without resale frictions, this picture
would consist of only two horizontal lines, one at higher level for sH and one at a
lower level for sL and firms would jump from one level to another depending on the
current realization of s and regardless of their size k, given that there would be no
adjustment costs. However, partial irreversibility induces disinvesting firms not to
sell the whole amount of capital needed to jump to the bottom part of the blue line
(point B). This is because they expect to need to reinvest in the future if they receive
a positive idiosyncratic shock in the following period and they would clearly incur
a loss due to the fact they would repurchase capital at a higher price than the one
obtained for their disinvestment. In other words, the wedge between the price paid
for investment and the price received for disinvestment creates an option value from
waiting and hence an inaction region where firms optimally wait before taking any
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action and just let their capital depreciate in the hope for a high productivity shock.
The inaction region for low productivity firms is the upward sloping part of the thin
blue line, between points A and B, which coincides with the depreciation line (dashed
black line). Note that there is an inaction region also for high productivity firms (top
right in the figure), but it turns out that firms never invest enough to enter this area
in equilibrium.
Firm level dynamics in the stationary equilibrium are as follows. As soon as firms
get a high idiosyncratic shock, they jump to the horizontal part of the thick red
line. They stay there as long as they have high productivity. As soon as they get
a bad shock that brings them to sL, they sell part of their capital and jump down
to the thin blue line, close to point A. Then, as long as they have productivity sL
they move down left along this line until they reach point B, where they stay until a
further positive shock. Hence, on the market for used capital, supply comes from the
firms that have a high level of capital and get a negative idiosyncratic shock, whereas
demand comes from firms of all sizes that obtain a positive shock, plus the smallest
firms with low productivity that invest to keep their size constant.
These firm-level dynamics give rise to the stationary distribution plotted in Figure
1.7, where the x-axis is again k and the y-axis is the mass of firms m. The thick
red line with high mass on the right-hand side of the picture represents firms with
productivity sH . Moving towards the left, the thin blue lines with crosses represent
the masses of firms with productivity sL. Gradually, the mass decreases as some of
the firms with those sizes receive a positive shock and only the remaining fraction let
their capital depreciate for one more period. At the left end of the picture, there is a
mass of low productivity firms that just rebuy their depreciated capital and keep the
same small size until they get a positive idiosyncratic shock (point B).
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Figure 1.7: Stationary distribution of firms
1.6.2 Business cycles and capital reallocation
I will now turn to describe the properties of the economy when it is hit by aggregate
productivity shocks. Table 1.3 shows standard business-cycle statistics as well as
statistics for the resale price of capital and the reallocation series, taken from a
simulation of the model economy. The first row presents the unconditional mean of
the variables of interest. To construct the second and third rows, I HP-filter the data
with a smoothing parameter of 6.25 and then compute relative standard deviations
and correlations with output.14 The standard deviation of output is in parentheses.
It is instructive to compare these business-cycle statistics with those obtained in an
economy with constant resale price (Table 1.4), which closely resembles a version of
the Khan and Thomas (2013) economy without financial frictions.
As far as standard business-cycle variables are concerned, endogenous irreversibil-
14Khan and Thomas (2013) use a smoothing parameter of 100. In the interest of a comparison
with their results, I recompute these two tables with a smoothing parameter of 100 in Appendix C.
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ity reduces output and employment volatility slightly and investment volatility quite
significantly (this result is discussed in more detail in a following subsection). By
comparing the last columns of Tables 1.3 and 1.4, it can be seen that going from a
constant q to a market-clearing resale price of capital, reallocation turns from being
strongly countercyclical (the puzzle) to being strongly procyclical and approximately
three times as volatile as output. In the data, the ratio between the standard devia-
tion of (filtered) reallocation and output is 7.942 and their correlation is .562. Hence,
the model cannot quite match the empirical volatility ratio and at the same time it
overestimates the correlation with output. However, both statistics are significantly
closer to the data than in the model with constant resale price.
In Appendix C, it can be seen that robustness exercises with respect to the elas-
ticity of substitution ǫ lead to very similar qualitative results. The volatility of the
reallocation series is decreasing in ǫ, as expected: the lower this elasticity, the more
specific used capital, and hence the stronger the effects of aggregate shocks on reallo-
cation. The high correlation with output is robust to different values of this elasticity.
Statistic Y C I K N q reall
mean .587 .489 .097 1.490 .335 .9521 .048
σ(.)/σ(Y ) (1.39) .474 4.102 .257 .546 .198 3.276
corr(.,Y) 1 .895 .936 -.271 .988 .963 .959
Table 1.3: Business-cycle statistics: baseline model
Statistic Y C I K N q reall
mean .587 .489 .097 1.493 .335 .9512 .0484
σ(.)/σ(Y ) (1.54) .431 5.04 .291 .657 0 1.184
corr(.,Y) 1 .764 .914 -.212 .984 0 -.7937
Table 1.4: Business-cycle statistics: constant q
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A limitation of the model is that the volatility of the resale price qt is small
compared to the volatilities implied by the sectoral data presented in section 1.2
and Appendix A. However, this suggests that even a small amount of volatility and
procyclicality in this price can go a long way in explaining the empirical patterns of
capital reallocation.
In Figures 1.8 and 1.9, I show the (unfiltered) paths of the resale price and the
reallocation series when the economy goes from a long series of high realizations of the
aggregate productivity shock to a long series of low realizations. It can be clearly seen
that in the baseline model the initial fall in the resale price induces a large decrease
in capital reallocation. This is in contrast with a model with constant resale price
(black line with crosses), where reallocation actually increases in the first two years
of the recession, and then falls gradually as the capital stock and the size of the whole
economy decrease.
Figure 1.10 illustrates the effect of endogenous irreversibility on the dispersion of
marginal product of capital, as measured by the average marginal product for high
productivity (sH) firms and that for low productivity ones (sL). Consistently with
a growing body of empirical evidence (Bloom et al., 2012), the model implies that
returns are more dispersed in recessions than in booms. This is clearly related to
the lack of reallocation, because large unproductive firms downsize less than they
would do in a model with constant irreversibility and this prevents an equalization of
marginal returns. The previous literature has either taken the countercyclicality of
dispersion of returns as fully exogenous (e.g. Bloom et al., 2012) or explained it as
a consequence of financial frictions (e.g. Chen and Song, 2013). This paper suggests
a different explanation, based on partial capital specificity, which bears important
consequences for policy in the current recovery. If one interprets the high levels of
observed dispersion of returns from capital as due to a worsening of credit frictions,
it is possible that a credit expansion or unconventional monetary policy could facil-
itate reallocation and strengthen the recovery. If instead the high dispersion is fully
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efficient and due to capital specificity and equilibrium irreversibility, then no policy
intervention is in order and credit expansions are not relevant.
The dynamics of the distribution of firms over the business cycle are illustrated in
Figure 1.11. It can be seen that the distribution becomes more compressed when the
economy moves from a boom to a recession: large unproductive firms downsize by
less than they do in booms (compare points A and A’), while highly productive units
expand by less. Jointly, these facts explain the fall in reallocation and the increase
in the dispersion of returns.
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Figure 1.8: Price of used capital
Transition from long sequence zt = z
H to long sequence zt = z
L. Response of the price of used
capital. Comparison between the baseline model and a model with constant resale price. Unfiltered
simulated data.
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H to long sequence zt = z
L. Response of capital reallocation.
Comparison between the baseline model and a model with constant resale price. Unfiltered simulated
data.
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Figure 1.10: Dispersion of returns
Transition from long sequence zt = z
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L. Response of the ratio between
the average marginal product of high productivity firms (sH) and that of low productivity firms
(sL). Comparison between the baseline model and a model with constant resale price. Unfiltered
simulated data.
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1.6.3 Amplification of aggregate TFP
The procyclicality of reallocation generates endogenous movements in aggregate TFP,
amplifying the exogenous aggregate productivity shock. Measured TFP, call it Zt, is
the Solow residual that an econometrician would compute by assuming an aggregate
production function Yt = ZtK
α
t N
ν
t . A large part of the variation in this variable is
due to the exogenous component zt, while the rest is due to how capital and labor are
allocated across the heterogeneous productive units in the economy. In the model, this
second component, TFPend ≡ log(Zt)− log(zt), is of second order, when compared to
the exogenous one, so the absolute importance of the allocative component of TFP
should not be overemphasized.
However, this component is magnified by endogenous irreversibility, as can be seen
in Table 1.5, where both the ratio between its volatility and the volatility of the shock
(σTFPend/σz) and the ratio between its volatility and that of output (σTFPend/σY ) in-
crease by more than four times when going from constant to endogenous irreversibility.
Importantly, this should be seen as a lower bound for the importance of capital re-
allocation for aggregate TFP, because the model generates less volatility in both qt
and the reallocation series than we observe in the data.
The amplification mechanism for TFP works as follows: during recessions, real-
location decreases and firms with idiosyncratic productivity sL are in a sense “too
large”, which not only implies that capital is less productively used, but also em-
ployment is “too high” in these relative less productive firms, as labor demand is
an increasing function of a firm’s capital stock. Hence the allocation of inputs gets
further away from the one that would arise in a model where investment and disin-
vestment are fully flexible. However, the allocation is always efficient, in the sense
that it would coincide with the choice of a planner that faced the same reallocation
frictions.
Furthermore, to see how this mechanism is propagated over time, observe again
the policy functions illustrated in Figure 1.6. When large firms are hit by a negative
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idiosyncratic shock, they sell part of their capital once and then they just let their
capital depreciate until they become highly productive again. This means that if they
sell a small amount of capital in the first period, they will remain “too large” (relative
to a model with constant q) for several periods, until they get a positive idiosyncratic
shock again. Hence, the negative effects of lower reallocation on aggregate productiv-
ity in recessions are propagated over time trough these movements in the distribution
of firms. This implication of the model seems consistent with the patterns observed in
the current slow recovery of productivity in the UK, that Broadbent (2012) attributes
precisely to insufficient capital reallocation.
It is worth emphasizing that the amplification of TFP in the model is an increas-
ing function of the dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity across firms: the more
dispersed productivity is, the larger the benefits from reallocation. Hence, the pro-
cyclicality of capital reallocation induces larger movements in aggregate productivity
when the variance of st is higher. For instance, doubling the unconditional variance
of st leads to σTFPend/σz = 0.0278 and σTFPend/σY = 0.0178. In this paper, the
volatility of idiosyncratic productivity is calibrated to match micro-level investment
data following the methodology of Khan and Thomas (2008, 2013). However, in the
literature there is no unanimous consensus on this parameter value and in general on
the procedure to parametrize the idiosyncratic productivity process. For example,
Bloom et al. (2012) estimate time-varying volatilities of firm-level productivity and
get values for volatility of up to 12% quarterly in high uncertainty periods. This again
suggests that the amplification of aggregate productivity delivered by the present pa-
per is a lower bound for the empirical effect of procyclical capital reallocation on
TFP.
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Model σTFPend/σz σTFPend/σY
Constant q 0.0034 0.0021
Baseline 0.0134 0.0093
Table 1.5: Amplification of endogenous TFP
1.6.4 Endogenous irreversibility smooths aggregate invest-
ment
The previous literature on investment irreversibility has debated whether the observed
smoothness of the aggregate investment series can be attributed to irreversibility at
the micro level. Bertola and Caballero (1994) affirm this point in a partial equi-
librium model and suggest that the fear of not being able to disinvest may act as
a smoothing device at the time of investing, making firms more cautious in their
investment decisions and generating inaction regions. However, Veracierto (2002)
introduces constant partial irreversibility in a general equilibrium model with hetero-
geneous plants and shows that the properties of aggregate investment are unchanged
when moving from totally flexible to totally irreversible investment.15 This is because
the consumption smoothing force makes the interest rate adjust in such a way that
aggregate investment has the same desired properties for the representative agent.
Furthermore, aggregate shocks are just shifting the inaction region without affecting
its size, so that the mass of firms in the inaction region is not changing significantly
over time.
The present model reaffirms the original conjecture of Bertola and Caballero
(1994) by making irreversibility an equilibrium outcome that moves over the busi-
ness cycle. Investment becomes more irreversible in recessions, when unproductive
firms would like to disinvest by more. This makes investment riskier for firms, hence
15Of course, the properties of micro-level investment decisions are very different depending on the
level of irreversibility.
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making them more cautious at the time of investing. Furthermore, the endogenous
prices for investment goods are acting in the direction of smoothing the investment
decisions even more: in a recession, when investment falls, used capital is cheaper,
which implies that total investment becomes slightly cheaper (Qt falls) hence damp-
ening the fall in aggregate investment. The opposite happens in booms, when firms
want to invest more, but Qt increases.
As can be seen comparing again Tables 1.3 and 1.4, the volatility of aggregate
investment relative to output falls from 5 to 4. Following the previous literature
on micro lumpiness and aggregate investment (e.g. Khan and Thomas, 2008), I
also report the volatility and autocorrelation of the unfiltered investment/capital
ratio. Table 1.6 compares the baseline model with (i) a fully flexible model without
irreversibility and (ii) the model with constant q. With endogenous irreversibility,
the investment/capital ratio is more persistent and its innovations are less volatile
than in the two comparison models, and closer to the US data reported by Khan and
Thomas (2008), presented in the last row.
Model σinn,I/K ρI/K
Frictionless .010 .675
Constant q .009 .582
Baseline .008 .680
Data .008 .695
Table 1.6: Volatility and autocorrelation of aggregate investment rates
Relatedly, another feature of the model is that following a bad aggregate shock the
inaction region becomes larger. This is because the higher wedge between the price of
new investment goods and the resale price increases the option value of inaction. This
feature of the model resembles the behavior of a model with non-convex adjustment
costs and uncertainty shocks (e.g. Bloom et al., 2007). In that case, the freezing
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of investment activity associated with a widening of the inaction region is driven by
exogenous increases in uncertainty. In this model, the same behavior arises in response
to first order productivity shocks, via the endogenous reaction of the resale price of
capital, without resorting to changes in second order moments. This time-varying
wedge may have important policy implications. For example, investing subsidies like
those included in the US fiscal stimulus package of 2009 are likely to have procyclical
multipliers in this setting, as more firms are in the inaction region in recessions and
are thus likely to be less responsive to this kind of stimulus.
1.6.5 Investment-specific shocks
In the baseline version of the model, business cycles were driven by aggregate pro-
ductivity shocks. However, a large literature emphasize the importance of shocks to
the productivity of investment as important drivers of aggregate fluctuations (e.g.
Greenwood et al., 2000).
In this subsection, I argue that the main mechanism of endogenous irreversibility
and capital reallocation is robust to this different source of business cycles. To see why
this is the case, let us first define the modified model. For simplicity, let the aggregate
productivity parameter z be constant and equal to 1. Let pt be the relative price of
new investment goods in terms of consumption. Investment goods are produced using
the output good as input by a competitive firm. Hence shocks to the marginal cost of
production of new investment goods translate into shocks to pt. Let this shock follow
a Markov chain with two values pt ∈
{
pL, pH
}
.
The CES price index for a bundle of new and used investment is now
Qt = [ηp
1−ǫ
t + (1− η)(qt + γ)
1−ǫ]
1
1−ǫ (1.21)
where qt is the relative price of used capital in terms of the consumption good.
Consider a persistent 1% increase from pL to pH , illustrated in the first panel of
Figure 1.12 (solid black line). When the shock hits the economy, new investment
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becomes more expensive, inducing a recession as is standard in the literature on
investment-specific shock. Importantly, in the present model, the shocks also leads
to a fall in capital reallocation (second panel).
To see why this is the case, consider first the buyers on the market for used capital.
The increase in the price for new investment goods has two effects of opposite sign
on their demand for used capital: on the one hand, total investment is now more
expensive (Qt is higher), leading to a fall in demand for all kinds of investment
goods. On the other hand, for a given total investment, firms are willing to partially
substitute from new to used investment goods, leading to an increase in demand for
used. It turns out that for the calibrated elasticity of substitution between new and
used investment, the first effect dominates and demand for used capital falls. Hence
qt (first panel, dashed blue line) increases only gradually with the result that qt/pt is
below its average for several periods.
For disinvesting firms, given partial irreversibility, when the shock hits it is a bad
time to sell assets: they know that the resale price is likely to increase and that
they might have to rebuy some capital at a higher Qt in case they receive a positive
idiosyncratic shock in the near future. This implies that also investment-specific
shocks induce a procyclical response of capital reallocation.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper shows that the procyclicality of capital reallocation can be rationalized
in a model where the resale price of capital is endogenous. According to the sectoral
data presented, this price is strongly procyclical, making it harder to reverse past in-
vestment decisions during recessions. The model generates this fact as an equilibrium
outcome by assuming that new and used investment goods are imperfect substitutes
because of partial firm-level capital specificity. Hence, in a recession higher supply of
used capital and lower demand lead to a fall in the price, inducing both static and
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Figure 1.12: Investment-specific shock: investment prices and reallocation
Transition from long sequence pt = p
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H . Response of the relative price of
used capital (in terms of consumption) and capital reallocation (lower panel).
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dynamic effects on investment and reallocation via the equilibrium response of real
option values. This mechanism induces endogenous movements in aggregate TFP,
because during expansions, when the resale price of capital increases, the allocation
of capital and labor gets closer to the one that would arise in a flexible model and
vice versa in downturns more capital is operated by unproductive firms.
Endogenous irreversibility is a plausible mechanism behind a smooth aggregate
investment series. In this sense the paper provides an explicit microfoundation for
what in the aggregate resembles a convex capital adjustment cost. Furthermore, the
model generates a countercyclical dispersion of returns, consistently with a growing
literature on firm-level uncertainty. Importantly, this result can be fully efficient in
a Pareto sense. Previous work has connected a high dispersion of returns in reces-
sions with the malfunctioning of credit markets, hence providing one rationale for
expansionary credit policies. This paper suggests that part of this increased disper-
sion, which has been emphasized both in academic and policy work during the recent
recession, may be unrelated to credit conditions and attributable to partial capital
specificity.
While this model assumes perfect capital markets, it is clear that financing con-
straints may play an important role in shaping investment dynamics. Introducing a
collateral constraint that ties the borrowing capacity to the resale value of a firm’s
capital is likely to further amplify the mechanism described in the paper. This has
important implications for the question on the source of business cycles. Previous
work based on a constant value of collateral has suggested that procyclical capital
reallocation is evidence in favor of exogenous credit shocks (Cui, 2014). However,
the value of a firm’s collateral depends on the resale price of its assets. Hence, an
extension of the present model with collateral constraints could potentially generate
an endogenous tightening of collateral constraints after a negative TFP shock, recon-
ciling both the cyclicality of reallocation and that of credit availability with standard
productivity shocks.
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Furthermore, US plant level data suggest that while entry is strongly procyclical,
exit is almost acyclical (Lee and Mukoyama, 2013). This evidence on exit is to some
extent a puzzle for models with productivity shocks where the exit decision is driven
by a fixed cost of production denominated in units of the output good. In such
models, after a bad aggregate TFP shock, more firms optimally decide to liquidate
their capital and exit. Endogenous irreversibility seems to be a promising explanation
for this puzzle. In a recession, on the one hand the value of staying in business falls,
so that more firms would like to exit, but on the other hand also the value of exit falls,
as it depends of the resale price of capital, so that overall the incentive to liquidate
is dampened.
Finally, this paper provides a natural framework to analyze movements in the
utilization rate of capital both in the aggregate and at the micro-level. A large firm
hit by a negative profitability shock can choose whether to reallocate its assets or
to keep them idle for some time, hoping for an improvement in business conditions.
The previous literature on heterogeneous firms and capacity utilization has imposed
restrictions on the possibility to sell assets after the realization of idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shocks in order to justify the choice by unproductive firms to keep some
idle capital (e.g. Hansen and Prescott, 2005, Sustek, 2011).
In the context of a model with endogenous irreversibility, no such assumptions
are necessary. A version of the model that includes endogenous capacity choice (see
chapter 2) yields a natural solution to the question of whether to sell assets or keep
them idle. Depending on aggregate conditions, the resale price may be high enough
to induce reallocation or low enough to make it optimal to keep capital idle. The key
mechanism works through equilibrium changes in two option values: the put option
value to resell and the value to keep capital idle and save on production costs. The
price of used capital responds to aggregate shocks and makes one or the other option
more valuable at different points in the business cycle. Hence cyclical movements in
output, reallocation and utilization can be jointly explained in a model of endogenous
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irreversibility.
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Appendix A: Additional empirical evidence and data
sources
Further evidence on capital reallocation: UK sales of used equipment (Figure 1.13)
and global sales of used commercial ships (Figure 1.14).
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Figure 1.13: Capital reallocation in UK during the Great Recession
Cyclical components of quarterly sales of used equipment and UK real GDP, deflated using the GDP
deflator.
Further evidence on the price of used capital over the business cycle:
Ships I gather price series for new and used ships from the mid-90’s onwards. It
is interesting to observe that prices and quantities traded fall contemporaneously in
2008, and that the price index of used ships is more volatile than the price index of
new ships (Figures 1.14 and 1.15). Similarly to what discussed in section 1.2 for the
aircraft sector, also in the case of ships the resale price of more specific models in
terms of possible routes (e.g. the very heavy and large Capesize bulk carrier) grows
more strongly in the period 2006-2008 and then falls by a larger fraction towards the
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Figure 1.14: Ships: number of second-hand sales
Global yearly sales of second-hand commercial ships. Source: Clarkson
end of 2008 than that of less specific ones (e.g. the more flexible and small Handysize
bulk carrier). This is shown in Figure 1.16.
Vehicles In the case of vehicles and trucks one can compare two separate separate
CPI series, one for new (CPI new vehicles) and one for used (CPI used cars and
trucks). Figure 1.17 shows the cyclical components (HP-filtered) of the CPI for used
cars and trucks and the CPI for new vehicles, both relative to the total CPI including
all items. It emerges that the price of used vehicles is much more volatile and more
procyclical than that of new ones, which is actually acyclical (their correlations with
GDP are 0.41 and -0.09 respectively). The volatility of prices of used vehicles is
smaller than that of aircraft and ships, arguably because vehicles are a less specific
type of asset. Hence, this difference in volatilities is broadly consistent with a theory
based on capital specificity.
Construction equipment Edgerton (2011) constructs an index of the price of
used construction machinery by collecting data on auctions where this equipment is
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reallocated across US construction firms. These data are illustrated in Figure 1.18
and show that the price of used construction equipment fell by more than the corre-
sponding PPI (construction machinery) both in the 2001 and in the 2009 recession,
and is in general significantly more volatile. In 2009 the index of used construc-
tion equipment is more than 15% below trend, while the corresponding PPI of new
construction machinery is slightly above trend.
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Figure 1.15: Ships: price indices of new and used
Price indices of new and second-hand commercial ships. Yearly frequency.
69
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
 
 
Capesize, 5y old
Handysize, 5y old
Figure 1.16: Ships: price of used Capesize and used Handysize
Prices in million $ of second-hand 5 year-old Capesize (more specific) and Handysize (less specific).
Weekly frequency: estimated values based on actual transactions and shipping market information.
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Figure 1.17: Vehicle prices and GDP
Cyclical components of CPI new vehicles, CPI used cars and trucks and US real GDP. Quarterly
frequency. Both CPI series are divided by CPI All items.
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Figure 1.18: Construction equipment prices and GDP
Cyclical components of construction equipment PPI, price index of used construction equipment
(Edgerton, 2011) and US real GDP. Yearly frequency.
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Data sources Data on capital reallocation in the US come from the Compustat
dataset and have been kindly made available by Andrea Eisfeldt on her personal
webpage. Data on sales of used equipment in the UK come from the Office for
National Statistics (ONS) Survey of Capital Expenditures. Data on aircraft prices are
compiled by Aircraft Values. Data on commercial ships are compiled by Clarkson and
VesselsValue. The price index for used commercial equipment has been constructed
by Edgerton (2011) using auction prices. Data on US GDP, GDP Deflator, CPI, CPI
for new and used vehicles, as well as PPI for the construction sector come from the
US Bureau of Economic Analysis and the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data on
UK GDP and GDP deflator come from the ONS.
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Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
(i) By equating (1.5) and (1.6), the market-clearing condition for used capital can be
written as follows:
G(q, z, ǫ) ≡ θ(q)
∫
sI
[(
αzs
Q(q)
) 1
1−α
− k0
]
dF (s)−
∫ sD [
k0 −
(
αzs
q
) 1
1−α
]
dF (s) = 0.
(1.22)
where sI = Q(q)
αzkα−1
0
, sD = q
αzkα−1
0
, Q(q) = [η+(1−η)(q+γ)1−ǫ]
1
1−ǫ , θ(q) = ( q+γ
Q(q)
)−ǫ(1−η)
is the ratio of used investment to total investment for investing firms and I have left
implicit the dependence of θ, q and Q on ǫ. Equation (1.22) defines the market-
clearing price q as an implicit function of the aggregate productivity parameter z
and the elasticity of substitution between new and used capital ǫ. We can obtain
the derivative of q with respect to z by applying the Implicit Function Theorem to
function G and we get16
dq
dz
= −
Gz
Gq
(1.23)
with
Gz =
θ
(1− α)z
∫
sI
(
αzs
Q
) 1
1−α
dF (s) +
1
(1− α)z
∫ sD (αzs
q
) 1
1−α
dF (s)
and
Gq = θq
∫
sI
(
αzs
Q
) 1
1−α
dF (s)−
θQq
(1− α)Q
∫
sI
(
αzs
Q
) 1
1−α
dF (s)−
1
(1− α)q
∫ sD (αzs
q
) 1
1−α
dF (s)
Note that in applying Leibniz rule to derive this expression we do not need to worry
about the derivatives of the end points sD and sI because by their definition, the
respective integrands are equal to zero when evaluated at these points.
Hence φq,z(ǫ) ≡
dq
dz
z
q
, the elasticity of q with respect to z, is
φq,z(ǫ) = −
Fz
Fq
=
θ
(1−α)
∫
sI
(
αzs
Q
) 1
1−α
dF (s) + 1
(1−α)
∫ sD (αzs
q
) 1
1−α
dF (s)
θqq
∫
sI
(
αzs
Q
) 1
1−α
dF (s) + θQqq
(1−α)Q
∫
sI
(
αzs
Q
) 1
1−α
dF (s) + 1
(1−α)
∫ sD (αzs
q
) 1
1−α
dF (s)
(1.24)
16Notation: Call fx be the partial derivative of function f with respect to argument x.
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Now, note that when ǫ = 0 (Leontief investment technology), the share of used capital
to total investment becomes θ = 1− η, so that θq = 0, while the price index becomes
Q = η + (1− η)(q + γ), so that we get Qq = 1− η. Hence we can write
φq,z(0) =
(1− η)
∫
sI
(
αzs
Q
) 1
1−α
dF (s) +
∫ sD (αzs
q
) 1
1−α
dF (s)
(1− η)2 q
η+(1−η)(q+γ)
∫
sI
(
αzs
Q
) 1
1−α
dF (s) +
∫ sD (αzs
q
) 1
1−α
dF (s)
(1.25)
and this establishes that φq,z(0) > 1 as q < 1 ⇒ (1 − η)
q
η+(1−η)(q+γ)
< 1. Standard
arguments can be used to show that φq,z is continuous.
(ii) It suffices to observe that the equilibrium supply of used capital S∗used, i.e.
is total reallocation, is a decreasing function of z
q
(as above, we can disregard the
derivative of sD as the integrand is zero when evaluated at sD):
S∗used =
∫ sD [
k0 −
(
αzs
q
) 1
1−α
]
dF (s) (1.26)
Hence, the sign of its derivative with respect to z is the sign of φq,z−1. This establishes
that in the limit for sufficiently low elasticity of substitution between new and used
capital, reallocation is increasing in z, i.e. “procyclical”.
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Appendix C: Accuracy and robustness
Figure 1.19 illustrates the accuracy of the solution by showing the simulated series
of aggregate capital (solid red line) and a forecast series constructed using the esti-
mated coefficients of the law of motion and iterating on the forecast (blue crosses), as
suggested by den Haan (2010). The R2 of the regression of log capital on constant,
its lag and aggregate productivity is .9993.
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Figure 1.19: Actual law of motion and its forecast
Robustness exercises: business-cycle statistics for different values of ǫ and HP-
filter smoothing parameter.
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Statistic Y C I K N q reall
mean .595 .495 .099 1.518 .335 .948 .042
σ(.)/σ(Y ) 1.34 .470 4.25 .257 .539 .192 4.25
corr(.,Y) 1 .838 .950 -.281 .989 .952 .956
Table 1.7: Business-cycle statistics: ǫ = 1
Statistic Y C I K N q reall
mean .588 .489 .097 1.490 .336 .959 .055
σ(.)/σ(Y ) (1.40) .442 4.242 .266 .558 .172 2.617
corr(.,Y) 1 .905 .936 -.277 .984 .970 .960
Table 1.8: Business-cycle statistics: ǫ = 10
Statistic Y C I K N q reall
σ(.)/σ(Y ) (2.05) .539 3.786 .403 .532 .183 3.011
corr(.,Y) 1 .914 .930 .048 .963 .916 .9585
Table 1.9: Business-cycle statistics: baseline model, HP smoothing parameter = 100
Statistic Y C I K N q reall
σ(.)/σ(Y ) (2.25) .545 4.398 .407 .626 0 1.055
corr(.,Y) 1 .828 .887 .114 .966 0 -.592
Table 1.10: Business-cycle statistics: constant q, HP smoothing parameter = 100
77
Chapter 2
Sell It or Keep It Idle? Partial
Irreversibility and Capital
Utilization
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Motivation
When is it optimal for unprofitable firms to keep part of their capital idle instead of
downsizing? In this chapter, I develop a model of partially irreversible investment
with endogenous capacity utilization to address this question. First, I discuss the
relation between partial irreversibility and capital utilization for an individual firm
and then I embed this problem in an equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms,
aggregate shocks and endogenous irreversibility.
Capital utilization has been recognized as an important amplification channel
for productivity shocks since the early RBC literature (e.g. Kydland and Prescott,
1988). In a one-sector model of the economy, if the utilization rate of capital is cho-
sen purely based on static considerations such as the wage rate or energy cost, a
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degree of investment irreversibility is necessary to justify why capital is kept idle in a
constrained-efficient equilibrium. Absent any irreversibility, in a representative-firm
model, idle capital could be used to increase consumption. In presence of heteroge-
neous firms with different levels of productivity, unproductive firms could also sell
idle capital to more productive firms that may be willing to operate it.
The previous literature on capital utilization has either assumed full irreversibility
of capital (Pindyck, 1988), implying that downsizing in response to negative prof-
itability shock is impossible, or time-to-build (Greenwood et al., 1988, Kydland and
Prescott, 1988), implying that the current level of capital was chosen in the pre-
vious period and hence capital cannot be reallocated back to the consumer before
production.
The first contribution of this paper is to consider any level of partial irreversibility.
This allows me to clarify the relation between irreversibility and utilization: I derive
a necessary condition on the degree of irreversibility that makes underutilization an
efficient outcome in response to negative profitability shocks. In a partial equilibrium
setting, I allow for investment and reallocation (downsizing) before production and
argue that underutilization of capital still arises optimally in response to negative
transitory shocks when the resale price of capital is below a threshold that depends
only on the discount factor and the depreciation rate.
Idle capital has an option value: the firm may benefit from it in the future, should
stochastic profitability improve. When a sufficiently large negative transitory shock
hits, I show that underutilization of capital becomes optimal as it allows the firm to
save on the cost of downsizing and then re-expanding if profitability improves.
After deriving these analytical results, I solve the model numerically for different
values of the volatility and persistence of the profitability shock. Three testable
implications of the model emerge. First, only sufficiently large negative shocks lead
to underutilization. As a consequence, the unconditional mean of the utilization
rate is decreasing in the volatility of the shock. Second, the average level of capital
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is increasing in this volatility. This is because the underutilization option insulates
profits from negative shocks, hence decreasing the downside risk of investment. Third,
while transitory shocks lead to underutilization, persistent shocks of the same size call
for downsizing. If the shock is sufficiently persistent, it is unlikely that the firm will
need the current level of capital in the foreseeable future. Hence the option value of
idle capital is low and it is optimal to downsize before production.
Finally, I consider an equilibrium model of asset allocation and utilization with
heterogeneous firms hit by both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Because of firm-
level capital specificity, used investment goods are imperfect substitutes for new goods
and the resale price of capital becomes endogenous. In good times, this price is high
and all firms hit by negative shocks choose to reallocate their assets and downsize.
In bad times this price falls. Firms with very low productivity sell their assets, while
firms with an intermediate level of productivity optimally choose to hold on to their
capital and keep part of it idle.
The macroeconomic literature has generally treated utilization and allocation of
capital in isolation (see next subsection for details on the literature). This paper
is a step towards building a joint theory of capital reallocation and utilization. I
show that these decisions are inherently interconnected through the dynamics of the
resale price of capital. In future work I will study how these two channels interact
to determine the dynamics of output and aggregate productivity in a quantitative
model of the business cycle.
2.1.2 Related literature
A starting point for the work presented here is the seminal paper on real options by
Pindyck (1988). The author develops a partial equilibrium model of fully irreversible
investment with endogenous choice of capacity utilization. A key result is that be-
cause of discounting, the intratemporally optimal capacity (which does not take into
account the opportunity cost of capital) is generally larger than the actual size of the
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firm. Hence the firm typically operates at full capacity, unless it is hit by a large
negative shock. Relatedly, McDonald and Siegel (1986) build a model with discrete
and irreversible investment decisions with a temporary shut-down option.
With respect to this literature, this paper contributes by generalizing the setup in
a number of dimensions. First, I allow for partial investment irreversibility. Capital
can be purchased and then resold, though at a lower price.1 I derive both analytical
and numerical results that show that depending on the level of the resale price,
unprofitable firms choose either to sell part of their capital or to keep it idle. Second,
I consider shocks of different persistence and discuss how this affects the optimal
utilization choice, while the real options literature focuses only on unit root processes.
Finally, I embed the firm’s problem in a model of industry equilibrium with imperfect
substitutability between new and used investment goods, where the resale price of
capital is determined in equilibrium. Firms face both aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks. When the economy enters the bad state, meaning that a fraction of firms
become very unproductive and need to downsize, the resale price of capital falls and
firms with intermediate levels of productivity find it optimal to hold their capital and
keep part of it idle.
A large literature deals with capital utilization in representative-firm RBC models.
A key reference is Greenwood et al. (1988), who endogenize utilization by assuming
that capital depreciates faster, the more intensively it is used in production. This
constitutes a key channel in the transmission of investment specific shocks. In this
paper, I abstract from this depreciation-in-use assumption in order to simplify the
analysis by making the utilization choice fully intratemporal. On the other hand,
I allow for firm heterogeneity and reallocation of capital before production. Other
papers on utilization in RBC models include Kydland and Prescott (1988) and Hansen
and Prescott (2005).
Idiosyncratic firm shocks generate strong incentives to reallocate capital instead
1Full irreversibility arises as the special case with resale price equal to zero.
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of keeping it idle. However, few papers study capital utilization in the context of
a model with production heterogeneity and all of them make strong irreversibility
assumptions, that is assumptions on the possibility to reallocate capital. Both Coo-
ley et al. (1995) and Sustek (2011) build economies with production heterogeneity
and capacity choice. Plants observe their idiosyncratic productivity and then choose
their capacity utilization level. Low-productivity plants keep some capital idle. Im-
portantly, in both papers underutilization happens only because reallocation cannot
take place after the realization of the idiosyncratic shock. In absence of such restric-
tion, idle capital would flow to the more productive firms. In the present paper, I
allow both reallocation and utilization decisions to take place after the shocks are
realized and show that less-than-full utilization can still be optimal if the equilibrium
price of used capital is sufficiently low. More in general, this paper contributes to
the growing literature on business cycle models with production heterogeneity (e.g.
Khan and Thomas, 2008, 2013). This literature has so far abstracted from capital
utilization.
On the empirical side, Gavazza (2011b) uses data on commercial aircraft to study
the relationships between trading friction in resale markets, asset allocation and ca-
pacity utilization, showing that larger frictions in the resale of capital induce lower
utilization rates. Gavazza (2011a) introduces leasing of capital in a model of costly
capital reallocation and shows that because of irreversibility, following negative prof-
itability shocks carriers return their leased aircraft, but retain and underutilize their
owned aircraft. This leads to a higher utilization rate for leased capital. An empirical
analysis and a test of the implications of the present model is left for future work.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to study the implications of adding the option
to lease capital in the present model.
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2.2 Individual firm’s problem
In this section I introduce the problem of a firm who produces output using capital
with stochastic productivity.2 Investment is partially irreversible, as only a fraction
of its value can be recovered if capital is resold. Production costs depend on the
amount of capital effectively used in production, which is at most equal to the total
capital owned by the firm. This allows me to endogenize capital utilization.
I will discuss under what conditions on the resale price of capital and under what
properties of the profitability shocks underutilization arises as the optimal response
to low profitability.
2.2.1 Model
An infinitely-lived risk-neutral firm produces output using capital. Its period profit
function (gross of investment) is π(x, s) where x is capital used in production and s
is a non-negative productivity shock. I make the following assumptions on the profit
function:
• A1) π is at least twice differentiable with respect to x and once with respect to
s
• A2) π(0, s) = 0, ∀ s
• A3) πx(0, s) > 0, ∀ s
• A4) πxx(x, s) < 0, ∀ (x, s)
• A5) πx(x, s) < 0, for x large enough, ∀ s
• A6) πs(x, s) > 0, ∀ (x, s)
• A7) πxs(x, s) > 0, ∀ (x, s).
2Or, equivalently, stochastic demand for the output good, that is, shocks to the output price.
Hence I will use productivity and profitability interchangeably in this partial equilibrium model.
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Assumptions A1-A4 and A6-A7 are entirely standard and are satisfied in most ex-
isting models with productivity shocks and decreasing returns. Assumption A5 is
less standard. It states that the profit function becomes decreasing (in capital) for a
large enough level of capital. This assumption allows me to obtain a well-defined in-
tratemporally optimal production size, that is the level of utilization that maximizes
π(., s).3 In the numerical examples, I will work with the following parametrization:
π(k, s) = skα − ck with α ∈ (0, 1), c > 0. One can easily microfound the linear
cost function ck by assuming a complementary input in production with constant
marginal cost c (e.g. energy), as in Burnside et al. (1995) and Atkeson and Kehoe
(1999).4
The firm can choose its level of capital before production. This assumption allows
me to isolate the effect of partial irreversibility on utilization decisions: the firm is
always free to change its level of capital after the shock hits, if it wants to do so, before
producing. Hence underutilization is not the direct consequence of an unchangeable
“wrong” size inherited from past decisions.
Capital depreciates at rate δ ∈ [0, 1] per period. When investment is positive,
the relative price of capital in terms of the output good is 1. When investment is
negative, however, the firm obtains a price q ∈ [0, 1] for its disinvestment. In this
section, I treat q as an exogenous parameter and discuss how its level affects the
optimal investment and utilization choices. In the next section, I endogenize q in an
equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms.
Let β ∈ (0, 1) be the discount factor and let s follow a Markov process with tran-
sition probabilities given by G(s′|s). The value function of the firm can be expressed
as follows.
V (k, s) = max
{
V i(k, s), V d(k, s)
}
(2.1)
3Pindyck (1988) assumes a quadratic production cost, which is a special case of A5.
4To see this, assume that the production function has capital and energy as inputs and is defined
by f(k, e) = s (min {k, e})
α
. The constant marginal cost of energy is c. Clearly, optimality requires
k = e which gives the profit function in the main text.
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where V i and V d are the values conditional on positive (or zero) and negative invest-
ment respectively.
V i(k, s) = max
k′≥(1−δ)k
{
(1− δ) k − k′ +max
x≤k′
{π(x, s)}+ βE [V (k′, s′)|s]
}
(2.2)
and
V d(k, s) = max
k′≤(1−δ)k
{
q [(1− δ) k − k′] + max
x≤k′
{π(x, s)}+ βE [V (k′, s′)|s]
}
(2.3)
Notice that the firm can choose its level of capital k′ and then can choose to produce
using any level of capacity x below and up to k′. Both decisions are based on the
same information set, that is the history of s up to time t. Hence, at the moment
of investing/disinvesting, the firm can anticipate how much capital will be put in
production as a function of k′ and s. This is given by the optimal production capacity:
X(k′, s) = min {k′, x˜(s)} (2.4)
where x˜(s) solves πx(x˜(s), s) = 0. In words, the firm computes the intratemporally
optimal size x˜(s) by maximizing period profits. If this quantity is less than the capital
level k′, there will be underutilization. If it is greater or equal to k′, there will be full
utilization.
Accordingly, the value functions can be rewritten as follows.
V i(k, s) = max
k′≥(1−δ)k
{(1− δ) k − k′ + π (X(k′, s), s) + βE [V (k′, s′)|s]} (2.5)
and
V d(k, s) = max
k′≤(1−δ)k
{q [(1− δ) k − k′]] + π (X(k′, s), s) + βE [V (k′, s′)|s]} (2.6)
The solution to this dynamic program is fully characterized by policy functions
for capital level K such that k′ = K(k, s) and production capacity X such that
x = X(k′, s).
If q < 1, the wedge between the cost of positive investment and the resale price
generates inaction areas, where firms optimally let their capital depreciate without
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doing any investment or disinvestment. It is necessarily the case that the capital
level that solves (2.5) without the inequality constraint of positive investment, call it
Ki(k, s), is strictly less than the capital level that solves (2.6) without the inequality
constraint of positive disinvestment, call itKd(k, s). It follows that the policy function
for future capital will be:
K(k, s) =

Ki(k, s), k ≤ Ki(k, s)/ (1− δ)
(1− δ) k, Ki(k, s)/ (1− δ) < k ≤ Kd(k, s)/ (1− δ)
Kd(k, s), k > Kd(k, s)/ (1− δ) .
(2.7)
In this subsection, I will establish some results on when underutilization is optimal.
Before doing this formally, observe that in absence of partial irreversibility, that is
when q = 1, the firm will never want to underutilize capital. In fact, in this case
the firm could always sell any excess capacity and then rebuy it in the next period
at the same price in case it is optimal to expand again. Because of discounting and
depreciation, this dominates holding idle extra-capacity. Moreover, again because of
discounting and depreciation, the intertemporally optimal level of capital is in general
less than the level that maximizes period profits. Without partial irreversibility, the
problem becomes fully differentiable and the first order condition for capital level is
1− β (1− δ) = πx (K(k, s), s) (2.8)
which can be solved for the policy function. As the left hand side of (2.8) is positive,
we have K(k, s) < x˜(s). From a purely static point of view, the firm would like
to maximize π. However, from a dynamic point of view, the cost of capital has to
include the opportunity cost due to discounting as well as depreciation.5 Hence the
optimal capital level will be less than the statically optimal capacity, leading to full
utilization in all periods and states.
5This generalizes a similar point made by Pindyck (1988) in a model without depreciation.
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2.2.2 Analytical results
I will now show that there is an upper bound on the resale price of capital q such
that below this level of irreversibility it is never optimal to keep capital idle. After
I have established this, I will show that with sufficient irreversibility idle capital can
arise as optimal in response to a transitory profitability shock.
Proposition 2. If q > β (1− δ), then full utilization is always optimal, that is
X(K(k, s), s) = K(k, s), ∀ (k, s).
Proof I will first assume that the policy function involves underutilization for a
certain state (k, s) and show that this leads to a contradiction. Let k˜ ≡ K(k, s) and
x ≡ X(k˜, s). Assume x < k˜. It is convenient to define the following function:
W (k′, s) ≡ max
y≤k′
{π(y, s) + βE [V (k′, s)|s]} .
Consider the case k˜ < (1 − δ)k (the opposite case will follow a fortiori). The
assumed policy function implies
V (k, s) = q
[
(1− δ) k − k˜
]
+ π(x, s) + βE
[
max
{
V i(k˜, s′), V d(k˜, s′)
}
|s
]
(2.9)
with
V i(k˜, s′) = −
[
K(k˜, s′)− (1− δ) k˜
]
+W (K(k˜, s′), s′) (2.10)
for values of s′ that imply non-negative investment and
V d(k˜, s′) = −q
[
K(k˜, s′)− (1− δ) k˜
]
+W (K(k˜, s′), s′) (2.11)
for values of s′ that imply negative investment.
Consider now an alternative strategy, that is selling the additional unused amount
of capital (k˜−x) in the first period and then following the same policy function from
the second period onwards. This strategy gives full utilization in the first period and
I will use letter F to characterize its outcomes. We have KF (k, s) = X(k, s) and let
V F (k, s) be the associated value of the objective function.
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Let ∆(k, s, s′) be the difference between the value associated with strategy F
and that associated with the assumed policy as a function of the initial state and the
realization of the second period shock. We can partition the set of possible realization
of s′ as follows. There are
• (i) Values of s′ that call for non-negative investment in the second period under
both the assumed policy and strategy F , that is K(k˜, s′) ≥ (1− δ) k˜ > (1− δ) x
• (ii) Values of s′ that call for negative investment in the second period under
both the assumed policy and strategy F , that is(1− δ) k˜ > (1− δ) x ≥ K(k˜, s′)
• (iii) Values of s′ that call for non-negative investment in the second period under
strategy F , but for negative investment under the assumed policy function
(1− δ) k˜ > K(k˜, s′) ≥ (1− δ) x
Let us begin with case (i). We have
∆(k, s, s′) = [q − β (1− δ)]
(
k˜ − x
)
> 0 (2.12)
For case (ii), we obtain
∆(k, s, s′) = q [1− β (1− δ)]
(
k˜ − x
)
> 0 (2.13)
For case (iii), we get
∆(k, s, s′) = q [1− β (1− δ)]
(
k˜ − x
)
− β (1− q)
[
K(k˜, s)− (1− δ) x
]
(2.14)
and because
β (1− q)
[
K(k˜, s)− (1− δ) x
]
≤ β (1− q)
[
(1− δ) k˜ − (1− δ) x
]
we have
∆(k, s, s′) ≥ q [1− β (1− δ)]
(
k˜ − x
)
> 0
Hence, the alternative strategy gives a higher payoff for all realizations of the second
period shock (and then follows the same policy from then onwards). This implies that
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the difference between the value of the strategy denoted by F and the value function,
which is equal to E {∆(k, s, s′)|s}, is positive. This contradicts the fact that K is the
policy function for the problem.
Finally, it is easy to see that the same arguments hold a fortiori for the case of
non-negative investment in the first period, that is k˜ ≥ (1− δ) k.
Proposition 2 establishes that there is a minimum level of irreversibility below
which idle capital is never optimal. This level is fully determined by only the discount
factor and the depreciation rate. Intuitively, when q > β(1−δ), the expected return on
capital is sufficiently low that is optimal to respond to negative shocks by downsizing
instead of holding idle capital. A corollary of Proposition 2 is that in the special case
of full depreciation δ = 1 it is never optimal to underutilize capital. This is fairly
intuitive, as idle capital would be anyway destroyed before next period’s production
and hence has no option value.
Proposition 2 states a necessary condition for idle capital, but does not say when
underutilization is optimal. In order to gain intuition on this question, I will now
consider a simplified version of the model under the case q < β(1 − δ). This will
allow me to show that for sufficiently large negative transitory profitability shocks it
is optimal to underutilize capital.
The only modification to the model presented above is the following: productivity
s is stochastic in the first period and after that is deterministic and constant. More
specifically, I assume that s0 is drawn from a distribution G(s) on [0,∞) with E {s} =
1. For t = 1, 2, ... we have st = 1. This assumption defines an extreme case of
transitory shock. Let kSS be the steady-state value of capital for this economy, that
is the capital level that solves 1− β (1− δ) = πx(k
SS, 1) and assume the initial value
k−1 = k
SS. To establish the optimality of idle capital, I will consider the firm’s
behavior for low productivity shocks in period 0, that is s0 < 1. In this simple model
the first period capital choice is a simple differentiable problem and I can prove the
following.
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Proposition 3. Let q < β (1− δ) and define sU as the solution to πx((1− δ) k
SS, sU) =
0. In response to sufficiently low productivity shocks, such that s0 < s
U , it is optimal
to underutilize capital, that is x0 < k0.
Proof I will first impose full utilization and compute the optimal behavior under
this restriction, defined by functions KF0 (s0) and X
F
0 (K
F
0 (s0), s0) = K
F
0 (s0), with
associated indirect utility V F (s0). Then, I will introduce endogenous utilization and
show that the associated policy functions KU0 (s0) and X0(K
U
0 (s0), s0) < K0(s0) give
rise to higher utility V (s0)
U > V (s0)
F whenever s0 < s
U .
First, notice that for k0 ≤
kSS
1−δ
(which will always be the case for s0 < 1), the
value from t = 1 onwards is
V1(k0) = (1− δ) k0 − k
SS + π(kSS, 1) + β
π(kSS, 1)− δkSS
1− β
(2.15)
so the discounted marginal value of capital at t = 1 from the point of view of t = 0
is β (1− δ).
Hence, for the range of shocks considered in the proposition, optimal policy under
the restriction of full utilization is easily characterized as follows. Let sD be the lower
bound of the inaction region in period 0, that is the productivity level that solves
q − β (1− δ) = πx((1− δ) k
SS, sD). Notice that sD < sU as q < β (1− δ).
• if s0 ≤ s
D then the firm disinvests, choosing KF0 (s0) < (1− δ) k
SS by solving
q − β (1− δ) = πx(K
F
0 (s0), s
D). The associated value is given by
V F (s0) = q
[
(1− δ) kSS −KF0 (s0)] + π(K
F
0 (s0), s0) +W (K
F
0 (s0))
• if sD < s0 ≤ s
U the firm is in the inaction region and chooses KF0 (s0) =
(1− δ) kSS. The associated value is
V F (s0) = π((1− δ) k
SS, s0) + V1((1− δ) k
SS)
Now consider the possibility of choosing the optimal utilization rate of capital and
not downsizing for any value of s < sU . Formally, this means KU0 = (1− δ) k
SS and
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XU0 (K
U
0 , s0) solves πx(X
U
0 (K
U
0 , s0), s0) = 0. The associated value is
V U(s0) = π(X
U
0 (K
U
0 , s0), s0) + V1((1− δ) k
SS)
which implies the following differences in attained utility:
• if s0 ≤ s
D,
V U(s0)−V
F (s0) = π(X
U
0 (K
U
0 , s0), s0)−π(K
F
0 (s0), s0)+(1− δ)
2 kSS−(1− δ)KF0 (s0) > 0
Notice that there are two reasons why this expression is positive: both the
difference in period 0 profits and the second part of the expression are positive.
This is because underutilization allows to maximize profits in period 0 as well
as to save the reinvestment in period 1.
• if sD < s0 ≤ s
U ,
V U(s0)− V
F (s0) = π(X
U
0 (K
U
0 , s0), s0)− π((1− δ) k
SS, s0) > 0.
In this case the choice of capital level is the same under the two scenarios, but
underutilization allows to maximize static profits in period 0.
To conclude the proof, it is easy to see that KU(s0) = (1− δ) k
SS dominates any
disinvestment for all s0 < s
U because the sold capital would have to be repurchased
in period 1 at price of 1 and q < β (1− δ) so this would be suboptimal.
Proposition 3 establishes that when downsizing is sufficiently costly, it is optimal
to respond to sufficiently large transitory negative shocks by underutilizing capital.
2.2.3 Numerical results
In this subsection I parametrize the model and illustrate its key properties. A period
is a quarter. The profit function is π(k, s) = skα− ck.6 Table 2.1 shows the choice of
parameter values. The values of α, β and δ are standard in the macro literature.
6In this model, including labor as a second input in the Cobb-Douglas production function
amounts to a simple modification of the curvature parameter α and the mean of s as long as the
labor decision is fully flexible.
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I consider an autoregressive process for productivity: log(st+1) = ρ log(st)+ut with
ρ ∈ [0, 1) and ut iid normally distributed with mean −
σu
2
and standard deviation σu.
I fix σu = .068 to match the yearly volatility of firm’s idiosyncratic shocks in chapter
1 and then compare a model with ρ = 0 (“iid s” model) with a model with ρ = .95
(“persistent s” model).
The parametrization of the production (or energy) cost and the resale price is
meant to be illustrative of the properties of the model. I set c = .2 and q = .9 <
β (1− δ). A full calibration of the model is left for future work.
Parameter Value
α .33
β .99
δ .025
c .2
σu .068
ρ ∈ {0, .95}
q .9
Table 2.1: Parameter values in the baseline
model (individual firm)
I solve the model by iterating on the value function defined in (2.1), (2.2) and
(2.3). In the following, I discuss and illustrate three numerical results that arise from
simulation of the model. Let us consider the “iid s” model first.
Result 1. Only sufficiently large negative shocks lead to underutilization. The average
utilization rate is therefore decreasing in the volatility of the profitability shock.
The intertemporally optimal capital level is generally smaller than the static-
profit-maximizing size, because the former takes into account the opportunity cost
of capital due to discounting as well as the depreciation rate. Hence the utilization
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rate is normally one, and only falls below one when st is sufficiently low relative to
kt−1. In this case, downsizing is sufficiently costly that the firm chooses to use the
underutilization option.
In Figure 2.1 I start the firm from the capital level that arises after a long series of
shocks equal to the mean of s and then hit it with a one standard deviation positive
(blue line) or negative (red line with crosses) innovation ut. I construct the impulse
responses by computing the difference between the path of the firm hit by each shock
and a firm that is hit by no shock (and hence keeps fully utilizing its capital). In the
upper panel, we see an asymmetry in the response of capital: a positive shock calls
for positive investment, while a negative shock leads to inaction and capital decreases
only by the depreciation rate. In both cases, utilization (lower panel) is full and does
not respond to the shock. However, for a shock size of three standard deviations, the
response is different, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. A negative shock of this size leads
to underutilization, as can be seen in the lower panel.
The relationship between volatility and the average utilization rate (obtained from
a long simulation) is shown in Figure 2.3. To construct this graph, I solve the model
for three different values of σu, equal to the baseline value, the baseline value times 2
and the baseline value times 3. Average utilization falls as the shocks become larger,
consistently with the impulse response functions illustrated above.7
Result 2. Endogenous utilization leads to higher average capital relative to full uti-
lization. The difference in average capital between endogenous utilization and full
utilization is increasing in the volatility of the profitability shock.
When the firm can choose the utilization rate, the downside risk coming from
negative shocks is lower than when utilization is restricted to be full all the time.
Profits can be insulated from large negative shocks by underutilizing capital instead
of downsizing. Furthermore, large positive shocks lead to larger investment, because
7As the model is non-linear, larger volatility changes also the thresholds for underutilization.
However this effect is quantitatively small and dominated by the direct effect of larger shocks.
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Figure 2.1: Impulse Response Functions (1 standard dev. shock)
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Figure 2.2: Impulse Response Functions (3 standard dev. shock)
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Figure 2.3: Volatility and average utilization rate
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the firm is less concerned about a potential reversal of its profitability in the future.
These two effects jointly contribute to a larger average size. This is illustrated in
Figure 2.4, where I contrast the baseline model with endogenous utilization with a
model where utilization is restricted to be full for different values of the volatility
parameter σu. Average capital increases sharply with higher volatility, but only when
utilization is endogenous.
Figure 2.5 illustrates a sequence of capital and utilization taken from a long simu-
lation of the model with high volatility, equal to three times the baseline value. Here
we can see that the lowest values for the utilization rate (lower panel) coincide with
the periods when the firm restricted to fully utilize its capital (upper panel, red line
with crosses) chooses to downsize by more than depreciation.
Consider now the “persistent s” model.
Result 3. While large negative transitory shocks lead to inaction and underutilization,
highly persistent shocks of the same size lead to downsizing and full utilization.
I solve the model with autocorrelation of shocks ρs = .95. In Figure 2.6 I start
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Figure 2.4: Volatility and the mean of capital
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Figure 2.5: Simulation: endogenous v. full utilization
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the firm from the same initial capital as in Figure 2.2 and then hit it with the same
negative innovation. While in Figure 2.2 st was iid over time, in Figure 2.6 the
shock is expected to persist for a long time. Hence, the firm chooses to downsize
(upper panel) instead of holding extra capital idle. This result is consistent with a
key intuition developed with the analytical results in the previous subsection: idle
capital not only allows to maximize static profits, but it also saves future investment
costs, when the current low profitability is expected to improve in the near future.
However, if the current negative conditions are very persistent, the value of current
disinvestment dominates this effect and downsizing becomes optimal.
Figure 2.6: Impulse Response Functions (3 standard dev. persistent shock)
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2.3 Equilibrium with heterogeneous firms and ag-
gregate shocks
In this section I embed the individual problem described in section 2.2 in a model with
heterogeneous firms and aggregate shocks. The level of partial irreversibility qt be-
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comes endogenous and time-varying, as firms can trade used capital on a competitive
market as in chapter 1.
In a numerical example, I show that when some firms are hit by large negative
shocks and need to downsize, the resale price of capital falls and firms hit by smaller
negative shocks choose to underutilize their capital instead of reallocating it to more
productive firms. In this sense, I provide a joint theory of capital allocation and
utilization that can be used in future work to study the cyclicality of productivity in
a quantitative model.
2.3.1 Environment and firms’ values
An infinitely-lived risk-neutral representative household with discount factor β ∈
(0, 1) consumes the output good and owns all firms in the economy.8
There is a continuum of firms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] producing a homogeneous
output good with production function yj,t = sj,tx
α
j,t, where xj,t is utilized capital. As
in the previous section, profits are given by πj,t = yj,t − cxj,t.
Productivity sj,t follows a Markov process with transition matrix Ts(z), where z
is an aggregate shock, following another Markov process with transition Tz. Note
that the realization of the aggregate shock affects the transition probabilities of the
idiosyncratic shock, but there is no direct effect of the aggregate state on current pro-
duction. This allows me to isolate equilibrium real-options effects following aggregate
shocks.
The utilization decision is identical to the previous section and is again denoted
by function X. However, the intertemporal investment decision is now modified as
follows: if the firm decides to sell capital, the price is qt, if the firm chooses to buy
capital, the price is denoted by Qt ≥ qt.
9
Let m be the distribution of firms over individual states (kt, st), with transition
8Alternatively, one can interpret the model as a small open economy.
9This was constant and equal to 1 in the previous section.
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equation mt+1 = Γ(mt, zt). This object is a state variable of the problem, because it
will help firms to forecast future prices. The firm’s problem is recursive in the state
vector (kt, st, zt,mt). Switching to recursive notation, the value of investing for a firm
with previous capital level k and productivity s is
V i(k, s, z,m) = max
k′≥(1−δ)k
{
Q [(1− δ) k − k′] + s [X(k′, s)]
α
− cX(k′, s) + βE [V (k′, s′, z′,m′)|z, s]
}
(2.16)
and the value of a disinvesting firm is
V d(k, s, z,m) = max
k′≤(1−δ)k
{
q [(1− δ)k − k′] + s [X(k′, s)]
α
− cX(k′, s) + βE [V (k′, s′, z′,m′)|s, z]
}
.
(2.17)
Overall, the value of a firm is V (k, s, z,m) = max
{
V i(k, s, z,m), V d(k, s, z,m)
}
.
2.3.2 New and used capital
Disinvesting firms sell their used investment goods. As in chapter 1, investing firms
can invest either by purchasing new investment goods or a CES aggregator of new
and used investment goods
k′ − (1− δ)k = i˜new + g(inew, iused) (2.18)
g(inew, iused) = [η
1
ǫ (inew)
ǫ−1
ǫ + (1− η)
1
ǫ (iused)
ǫ−1
ǫ ]
ǫ
ǫ−1 (2.19)
where i˜new and inew are new investment goods and iused is used capital sold by disin-
vesting firms. η ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter that determines the average ratio of new to
used investment, while ǫ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between new and used
investment goods. One can interpret this elasticity as an inverse measure of capital
specificity. When ǫ→∞, new and used capital are perfect substitutes and the model
nests the standard case of constant resale price q = 1−γ . On the other hand, when ǫ
is 0, the technology does not allow any substitutability between new and used capital.
Note that new investment goods can be directly put in the production of new capital
(˜ij,new) or bundled with used investment goods (ij,new).
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The price of a unit of new capital in terms of the output good is 1, while the unit
cost of a unit of used capital is equal to the sum of the price of used capital qt and a
per-unit reallocation cost γ. Hence, the CES price index associated with a bundle g
of new and used investment goods is
Q = [η + (1− η)(q + γ)1−ǫ]
1
1−ǫ . (2.20)
For a given chosen capital target k′, investing firms split their investment between
new and used in order to minimize their expenditure. As long as q + γ < 1 (which
will be satisfied in the following example), firms set i˜new = 0 and allocate their
expenditure on new goods inew and used capital in order to satisfy the following first
order condition:
iused
inew
=
(
1− η
η
)
(q + γ)−ǫ . (2.21)
The market for used capital clears, meaning the total disinvestment coming from
disinvesting firms equals total investment in used capital coming from investing
firms.10
2.3.3 Numerical example
I show a numerical example that illustrates how aggregate shocks affect utilization
decisions through changes in the resale price of capital. Table 2.2 shows the parameter
values. Several of them are in common with the individual firm’s problem described
in section 2.2 and are reproduced here for convenience. The parametrization of the
productivity process and the production cost is only meant to be illustrative of the
properties of the model. I assume that in the good state there are two values for st:
sL and sH , with iid transition probabilities ps = .5. In the bad state, which happens
with probability pz = .01 a third, lower value s
LL becomes possible, and a fraction
10The market for the new output good also clears: consumption plus new investment equals output
net of production costs and reallocation costs. This market-clearing condition is trivially satisfied
thanks to risk-neutrality.
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χ = .03 of firms transit into this state in every quarter. The values of η, ǫ and γ are
chosen following the calibration in chapter 1.
Parameter Value
α .33
β .99
δ .025
c .2
(sLL, sL, sH) (.5, 1, 1.3)
ps .5
χ .03
pz .01
η .7
ǫ 5
γ .01
Table 2.2: Parameter values in the equilib-
rium model
I solve the model using a version of the Krusell and Smith (1998) algorithm, based
on the approximation of the distribution of capital by means of its first moment.
Firms hold a subjective belief on the law of motion of aggregate capital and the law
of motion of qt. Given these perceived laws of motion, I solve the individual problem
by value function iteration as in section 2.2. Then, I simulate the economy and impose
market clearing period by period. At the end of the simulation, I run regressions to
update the laws of motion and proceed up to convergence of the actual laws of motion
to the perceived ones.
A complication arises because of the necessity to impose market clearing in the
market for used capital. Demand and supply on this market are obtained by aggregat-
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ing the policy function described above, which has kinks because of irreversibility and
because of the utilization option: even a small decrease in the resale price may lead
to a jump from downsizing to inacting and underutilizing capital. Market clearing
requires interpolation of these demand and supply schedules. Appendix A illustrates
the potential inaccuracy due to these kinks and describes a simple way to deal with
interpolation of kinked functions efficiently in the market-clearing stage of the algo-
rithm.
The left-hand panel of Figure 2.7 shows the policy function for capital choice in
the good aggregate state. The dashed-dotted red line represents the capital choice
for firms with productivity sH , while the solid blue line represents the capital choice
for firms with productivity sL. For both types of firms, the inaction region coincides
with the depreciation line (dashed black line). It can be seen that reallocating some
capital is optimal for a firm that goes from high to low productivity: there is a gap
between the two lines.
When the bad aggregate shock hits (right-hand panel), a fraction χ of firms have
productivity sLL and downsize to the thin black dotted line. Firms going from sH to
sL stop reallocating and immediately enter the inaction region. The reason for this
behavior is the fall in the resale price qt. Instead of selling part of their capital, these
firms wait and keep it idle, hoping for one of two outcomes: a new transition to sH
or a higher resale price.
In order to illustrate this point, I simulate the economy and show a transition
from a long sequence of good aggregate state to a long sequence of bad aggregate
state. Figure 2.8 shows that the aggregate utilization rate falls when the aggregate
shock hits (period 1 in the figure), as both firms with sL and sLL find it optimal to
underutilize their capital.
Figure 2.9 illustrates the dynamics of the resale price, compared with those ob-
tained in a model without option to underutilize capital (full utilization). It can be
seen that the fall in qt is smaller when underutilization is allowed, because firms with
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low productivity have two ways to save on their production costs: reallocating or
keeping capital idle. On the contrary, in the full utilization model the shift in supply
is larger because unproductive firms’ only way to avoid a large fall in profits is to
downsize. This suggests that an implication of endogenous utilization is a reduction
in the volatility of the resale price of capital.
Figure 2.7: Policy function
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2.4 Conclusion
This paper studies the relation between partial investment irreversibility and capital
utilization. In a partial equilibrium setting, I establish conditions on the degree of
irreversibility and size of transitory shocks such that firms optimally choose to keep
idle capital even when they could downsize before production.
I embed this problem in an industry equilibrium model with endogenous irre-
versibility. Aggregate shocks affect the utilization rate through equilibrium move-
ments in the resale price of capital. The allocation of capital across heterogeneous
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Figure 2.8: Capital utilization rate
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Figure 2.9: Resale price of capital
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firms and the distribution of utilization rates are jointly determined in equilibrium.
There are two main directions of future work that follow naturally from this paper.
First, using disaggregated data at the industry or firm-level, I will test the results
of section 2.2 on the relations between the volatility and persistence of shocks and
utilization and investment decisions. Second, I will calibrate the economy described
in section 2.3 and analyze how allocation and utilization of capital determine the
dynamics of output and aggregate productivity in a quantitative model of the business
cycle.
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Appendix A: An algorithm to interpolate kinked
policy functions accurately and efficiently
The model is solved using a version of the Krusell and Smith (1998) algorithm. The
distribution of capital is approximated using its first moment. Firms perceive laws of
motion for aggregate capital and the resale price. For a given policy function obtained
by value function iteration, the model is simulated in order to impose market clearing
and update the perceived law of motion up to convergence with its actual counterpart.
In order to impose market clearing in the market for used capital, it is necessary to
evaluate aggregate demand and aggregate supply for used capital at different values
for qt on a grid in each period of the simulation, and then solve for the market-
clearing qt, which in general will not be a grid point. Hence, interpolation is necessary.
These aggregate demand and supply functions are derived by aggregating individual
policy functions, which have kinks because of the inequality constraints in (2.16) and
(2.17). However, interpolation of kinked functions will unfortunately not preserve the
properties of the true policy function, and will introduce further kinks, which have
no economic rationale and lead to inaccuracy in the computation of the equilibrium
price.
Here, I briefly show a way to circumvent this problem by applying the interpolation
on a smooth transformation of the kinked policy function, preserving the economic
properties of the solution and obtaining an accurate solution efficiently. In order to
illustrate first the problem and then my solution, I will introduce a simple static
problem. It will be then straightforward to see how the solution to this problem can
be applied to the full model specified in the main text.
Consider the problem
max
k′≤(1−δ)k
q [(1− δ)k − k′] + sk′α
where k and s are treated as fixed numbers and we want to compute the solution as
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a function of q.
k′(q) =

(1− δ)k¯(q), if k ≥ k¯(q)
(1− δ)k, otherwise
(2.22)
where the disinvestment threshold is defined by k¯(q) ≡ (αs
q
)
1
1−α/(1−δ). Equivalently,
k′(q) = min
{
(1− δ)k¯(q), (1− δ)k
}
.
Imagine that we have solved for this policy function for two values of q, qi and
qj > qi (grid points) and assume that the market clearing price is ql ∈ (qi, qj) and we
want to rely on interpolation to compute the policy function for this price.11 Figure
2.10 illustrates the problem. The policies for qi and qj are the thin blue lines, while
the depreciation line is the dashed black line. If we simply interpolate (2.22) on the
grid for q and evaluate it at ql, we obtain the blue dashed-dotted line, which clearly
does not have the same properties of the original policy function: it has two kinks
instead of one and it is upward sloping with a slope different from (1 − δ) between
k¯(qj) and k¯(qi). However, observe that the function k¯ is smooth in q. Hence, we can
interpolate this function, evaluate k¯(ql), and then reconstruct the policy function as
follows:
k′(ql) =

(1− δ)k¯(ql), if k ≥ k¯(ql)
(1− δ)k, otherwise.
(2.23)
This gives the thick red line, which represents an accurate evaluation of the true
policy function, preserving the properties of the solution, with only one kink at the
threshold for disinvestment.
In order to implement this algorithm to solve the full model, I solve the individual
problem using q as a pseudo-state variable and obtain the thresholds of the inaction
region as functions of q. In the simulation stage, in each period I compute the
equilibrium price by interpolating these thresholds and then reconstruct the policy
functions to compute how much capital each firm buys and sells before moving to the
11Clearly, in this simple case, this is not needed, because we have an analytical solution for the
policy function, but this is not the case in the dynamic model.
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next period.
Figure 2.10: Interpolation of kinked policy functions
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Chapter 3
Optimal Policy with Endogenous
Signal Extraction
Joint with Esther Hauk and Albert Marcet.
“In the policy world, there is a very strong notion that if we only knew the
state of the economy today, it would be a simple matter to decide what the
policy should be. The notion is that we do not know the state of the system
today, and it is all very uncertain and very hazy whether the economy is
improving or getting worse or what is happening. Because of that, the
notion goes, we are not sure what the policy setting should be today. [...]
In the research world, it is just the opposite. The typical presumption is
that one knows the state of the system at a point in time. There is nothing
hazy or difficult about inferring the state of the system in most models”
(James Bullard, interview on Review of Economic Dynamics, November
2013)
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3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation
The opening quote states that inferring the underlying state of the economy is a
key practical difficulty in setting macro policy. One could say that this is not such
an insurmountable problem: a policy-maker should choose the optimal policy taking
into account the uncertainty (“haziness”) about the underlying state given the in-
formation available to him. However, information available to policy-makers is often
endogenous to policy decisions. Hence, in general the problem of designing optimal
policy contingent on endogenous information cannot be separated from the problem
of inferring the state of the world from the observables. In this paper we develop a
general solution to the problem of finding optimal policy with signal extraction from
endogenous variables and we illustrate our results in a simple model of fiscal policy.
To illustrate the importance of this issue, consider the fiscal policy response to
the recent financial crisis. In 2008-2009 policy-makers observed a large fall in output
and employment, but it was unclear whether the recession was due to a shock to
productivity or to a demand shock or some combination of both. Nonetheless, policy-
makers had to design a reaction to the recession, based only on a signal extraction
on the nature of the shock. Since output itself depends on whether an expansionary
fiscal policy or austerity is adopted, the problem of signal extraction is endogenous
to the choice of policy.
The G20 decided in its Washington meeting to take aggressive expansionary fis-
cal policy measures in order to reactivate the economy. Those measures involved
spending 2% of world GDP. Policy-makers were uncertain about the fiscal deficits
that would ensue. From the relatively optimistic initial estimate many governments
have eventually switched to the opposite fiscal policies, implementing tax hikes and
austerity programs. In many occasions the switch to austerity has been quite sud-
den. Austerity had to be even stricter because of the higher spending that the G20
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encouraged.1
The standard literature on Ramsey-optimal fiscal policy assumes that taxes can
be a function of the realizations of the shocks hitting the economy. However in the
real world these policies can only depend on observable variables such as income, that
in turn responds simultaneously to taxes as well as the underlying shocks. Automatic
stabilizers, e.g. income taxes and unemployment benefits, are a leading example of
policies that respond to aggregate endogenous information. This paper addresses the
question of how to design such instruments optimally.
The existing literature on optimal policy with signal extraction has already pointed
out that there can be an endogeneity issue when signals respond to policy. However
it has worked only with linear models, where a “certainty equivalence” result arises:
under Partial Information it is optimal to apply the same policy as under Full In-
formation to the conditional expectation of the underlying shocks. While the signal
extraction can in some cases depend on the policy, the optimal policy itself is inde-
pendent of the information structure and can be derived easily.2
A model of fiscal policy is non-linear in nature. For instance, productivity shocks
enter multiplicatively with hours worked in the budget constraint. Furthermore, the
existence of a Laffer curve creates non-linearities in tax revenue. This paper derives
general non-linear methods to solve for optimal policy when there is no separation
of any kind between optimization and signal extraction, leading to a violation of
“certainty equivalence”.
We first analyze optimal policy in a static (or two-period) model of optimal con-
trol with multidimensional uncertainty and an endogenous signal. The density of the
signal depends on the optimal policy and vice versa. We derive a first order condition
1The Spanish Finance Minister at the time, Pedro Solbes, published an article in El Pa´ıs on
the 10th of November 2013 under the title “Cuando decid´ı salir del Gobierno” explaining how the
outcome of this meeting eventually lead to the current Spanish Debt crisis and near-default in
summer 2012.
2See subsection 3.1.2 for a detailed discussion of the literature.
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(FOC) for the optimal policy relying on first principles. This optimality condition is
different from the standard FOC found in dynamic stochastic models: the probabili-
ties of each state of nature need to be weighted by a kernel that depends on the effect
of policy on the observed signal. The FOC is derived for a general model so that our
results can be widely applied. We show how “certainty equivalence” arises in some
special cases as an implication of our general theorem.
Our leading example is a two-period version of the standard fiscal policy model
of Lucas and Stokey (1983). We introduce two shocks (to demand and to supply)
and to make the issue of hidden information relevant we assume incomplete insurance
markets as in Aiyagari et al. (2002). Then we solve for optimal Ramsey taxation
under the assumption that the government does not observe the realizations of the
shocks, but it only observes some endogenous signal, such as output or hours worked.
This model yields interesting insights about the conduct of fiscal policy. First,
hidden information can be a driver of tax smoothing: taxes are less volatile relative
to a case with Full Information. This is because one implication of the optimal policy
is to average all the possible contingencies using “proper” weights for each contingency
that depend on how reactive observables are to policy. This identifies a reason for
tax smoothing different from the standard one in Ramsey policy.
When we consider a case with very high government spending, capturing a situa-
tion of fiscal crisis, the implied policy reaction can be very non-linear. In particular,
in a case when future taxes could be close to the maximum of the Laffer curve, as was
arguably the case in some European economies in the current crisis, a government
may go very quickly from not reacting to low observed output to increasing taxes very
strongly as output goes down. This sudden adjustment occurs once policy-makers re-
alize that a fiscal crisis may materialize under the worst possible realizations of the
shocks in the next period, but importantly this inference is endogenous to the out-
put observed and the policy chosen. This may rationalize why some countries first
reacted slowly to the crisis and then went for austerity quickly but with a delay. We
112
also show the consequences of using the existing linear methods based on “certainty
equivalence” when the actual optimal policy is highly non-linear.
Finally, we build an infinite-horizon model that confirms our main results in a
dynamic setup: the Ramsey government under Partial Information may react with
a delay to a downturn. The delayed fiscal adjustment induces a longer recession
relative to the Full Information benchmark, as has arguably happened in the countries
that expanded government spending after November 2008 and eventually introduced
austerity measures. It may seem that irresponsible politicians amplified the recession
by delaying tax increases, but (in the model) this is a feature of an optimal decision.
3.1.2 Related literature
Most of the literature on optimal policy in dynamic models in the last thirty years has
disregarded the issue of endogenous signal extraction. However, Partial Information
and signal extraction were often present in the early papers on dynamic models with
Rational Expectations (RE).
Signal extraction with an exogenous signal is well understood; it goes as far back
as Muth (1960). Typically, it just requires a routine application of the Kalman filter.
Because the signal extraction problem is solved before deciding on policy it is said
that there is a “separation principle” between optimization and estimation.
Few papers have studied optimal policy when signals are endogenous. Pearlman
et al. (1986), Pearlman (1992) and Svensson and Woodford (2003) consider linear
Gaussian models where the policy-maker and the private sector have the same infor-
mation set. In other words information is partial but symmetric. In this case, they
show that the “separation principle” continues to hold. Baxter et al. (2007, 2011)
derive an “endogenous Kalman filter” for all these cases which is equivalent to the
solution of a standard Kalman filter of a parallel problem where all the states and
signals are fully exogenous.
Closest to our work is Svensson and Woodford (2004). They consider optimal
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policy in a non-microfounded linear Rational Expectations model, where the gov-
ernment’s information set is a subset of the private sector’s information set. They
show that, even though the “separation principle” fails because of asymmetric infor-
mation, there is a suitable modification of the standard Kalman filter that works,
thanks to linearity and additively separable shocks. Moreover optimal policy has the
“certainty equivalence” property: under Partial Information the government applies
the Full Information policy to its best estimate of the state. In our setup, because of
non-linearity, both the “separation principle” and “certainty equivalence” fail. Aoki
(2003) applies these results to optimal monetary policy with noisy indicators on out-
put and inflation. Nimark (2008) applies them to a problem of monetary policy where
the central bank uses data from the yield curve while at the same time understanding
that it is affecting them.
Our contribution is to consider a fully microfounded optimal policy model and
to provide a general solution to the endogenous signal extraction and optimization
problem when the government (or, more generally, a Stackelberg leader) conditions
on a signal simultaneously determined with policy. There is no separation of any kind
if the shocks and policy variables are allowed to enter non-linearly in the equilibrium
conditions. We find how “certainty equivalence” arises in the linear case using our
general theorem and we show a case where the correct solution is highly non-linear
in nature and, therefore, a linear approximation can be misleading in this case.3
The effect of policy choices on information extraction about unobserved variables
is also considered in the armed-bandit problems of decision theory. For some applica-
tions to dynamic macro policy see Kiefer and Nyarko (1989), Wieland (2000a, 2000b)
and Ellison and Valla (2001), or to monopolist behavior see Mirmann, Samuelson and
Urbano (1993). Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006) use a similar learning frame-
3Optimal non-linear policies have been found in the literature but for totally different reasons.
Swanson (2006) obtains a non-linear policy when he relaxes the assumption of normality in the
linear model with separable shocks. He considers a model where the separation principle applies.
The non-linearity results entirely from Bayesian updating on the a priori non-Gaussian shocks.
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work to explain business-cycle asymmetries. In these papers the planner’s decision
influences the probability of next period’s signal, but the current signal is unaffected
by the current policy decision so that separation holds given the past policy decision.
It would be interesting to blend the issues in these papers with the one studied in the
current paper.
Furthermore, a wide literature considers models where competitive agents use
prices as signals of unknown information.4 Since prices are taken as given by com-
petitive agents the signal extraction problem can be solved with standard filtering
techniques and the issue we address does not arise in this literature.
The literature of optimal contracts under private information and incentive com-
patibility constraints (or the “New Dynamic Public Finance” as in Kocherlakota,
2010) is perhaps less directly related to our work. This literature usually assumes
revelation of the private information conditional on the equilibrium actions (the “in-
vertibility” case where we argue below Partial Information is not relevant) but it
assumes that agents react strategically to the optimal contingent policy set up by the
principal, an issue that we abstract from. In our setup the government conditions
on aggregate variables and, since agents are atomistic, the policy function (R in the
text) does not affect agents’ decision while the government action (the tax rate τ in
our main example) does and it is taken as given. On the other hand, there is an
interaction between the signal extraction problem and the optimal policy decision
that the literature on incentive compatibility constraints often ignores. Blending the
two issues would be of interest but it is left for future research.
4Lucas’s (1972) seminal paper, and Guerrieri and Shimer (2013) analyze a competitive market
in this setup. For an optimal policy problem see Angeletos and Pavan (2010) where those solving
a signal extraction problem are the agents (not the government). The whole controversy about
whether asymmetric information RE equilibria could be reached as discussed in Townsend (1983) is
also within this framework.
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3.2 A simple model of optimal fiscal policy
We first present a simple model of optimal policy. This will serve the purpose of
illustrating the problem of endogenous signal extraction and it will be of interest
on its own. It is a very simple two-period version of Lucas and Stokey (1983). We
introduce incomplete insurance markets to be consistent with the Partial Information
story.
3.2.1 Preferences and technology
The economy lasts two periods t = 1, 2. A government needs to finance an exogenous
and deterministic stream of expenditure (g1, g2), where subscripts indicate time peri-
ods, using distortionary income taxes (τ1, τ2) and bonds b
g issued in the first period
that promise a repayment in second period consumption units with certainty.
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents. Each agent i ∈ [0, 1] has
utility function
E
[
U
(
ci1, l
i
1, c
i
2, l
i
2; γ
)]
(3.1)
where
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where cit and l
i
t for t = 1, 2 are consumption and hours worked respectively, with
u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, v′ > 0, v′′ > 0.
γ is a random variable with distribution Fγ, we refer to it as a “demand shock”.
When γ is high, agents like first period consumption relatively more than other goods.
At the same time high γ makes them willing to work more in their intratemporal
labor-consumption decision and also more impatient in their intertemporal allocation
of consumption. Vice versa, for low γ. Given that agents are identical, in the following
we drop the subscripts i for notational convenience.
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The production function in each period is linear in labor and output is given by
yt = θtlt for t = 1, 2. (3.2)
The random variable θ1 = θ has distribution Fθ and we will refer to it as the “pro-
ductivity shock”. As far as θ2 is concerned, we will distinguish two cases, one where
θ2 = θ1, in which case the productivity shock is permanent, and one where θ2 = Eθ,
that is, second period productivity is a known constant, equal to the mean of the first
period shock, in which case the productivity shock is temporary. Notice that in both
cases θ2 is known given θ1.
To summarize, the state of the economy is fully described by a realization of the
random variables A ≡ (γ, θ), these variables are observed at the beginning of period
t = 1 by consumers and firms, but not by the government. γ and θ are assumed to
be independent. The distributions Fγ and Fθ represent the government’s perceived
distribution of the exogenous shocks.
We will consider agents that have rational expectations. To this end, denoting by
Φ the space of possible values of A, we assume that agents know that fiscal policy
is given by a triplet of functions (τ˜1, τ˜2, b˜
g) : Φ → R3 and these are actually the
equilibrium values of taxes and government bonds for each A.
Consumers’ choices and prices are contingent on the state (γ, θ) observed in period
t = 1. Agents choose (c1, c2, l1, l2, b) : Φ→ R
5 knowing the fiscal policy and the bond
price function q : Φ→ R. Obviously, the solution of the agents’ problem in this setup
coincides with the non-stochastic model where γ, θ are known. Uncertainty will only
play a role in the government’s problem, to be specified later.
Firms also observe θ at t = 1. Profit maximization implies that agents receive a
wage equal to θt, so that the period budget constraints of the representative agent
are
c1 + qb = θl1(1− τ˜1) (3.3)
c2 = θ2l2(1− τ˜2) + b (3.4)
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where q is the price of the government discount bond b. The above budget constraints
have to hold for all realizations γ, θ we leave this implicit.
3.2.2 Competitive Equilibrium
Here we provide a definition of competitive equilibrium. The definition is standard
in the literature, it is common to both the Full Information (FI) and the Partial
Information (PI) equilibria that we analyze.
Definition 2. A competitive equilibrium is a fiscal policy (τ˜1, τ˜2, b˜
g), price q and
allocations (c1, c2, l1, l2, b) such that when agents take (τ˜1, τ˜2, q) as given the allocations
maximize the agents’ utility (3.1) subject to (3.3) and (3.4). In addition, bonds and
goods markets clear, so that bg = b and
ct + gt = θlt for t = 1, 2. (3.5)
This definition embeds competitive equilibrium relations insuring that wages are set
in equilibrium and that the budget constraint of the government holds in all periods
due to Walras’ law.
Utility maximization implies for all A
v′ (l1)
u′ (c1)
= θγ(1− τ˜1) (3.6)
v′ (l2)
u′ (c2)
= θ2(1− τ˜2) (3.7)
q = β
u′ (c2)
γu′ (c1)
(3.8)
As anticipated, the demand shock enters the first period labor supply decision de-
scribed by (3.6) as well as the bond pricing equation (3.8). A competitive equilibrium
is fully characterized by equations (3.3) to (3.8).
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3.2.3 Ramsey Equilibrium
To describe government behavior we now provide a definition of Ramsey equilibrium.
As is standard we assume the government has full commitment, perfect knowledge
about how taxes map into allocations for a given value of the underlying shocks A
and that it chooses the best policy for the consumer.
We first give the standard definition when both government and consumers observe
the realization of A.5
Definition 3. A Full Information (FI-) Ramsey equilibrium is a fiscal policy
(τ1, τ2, b
g) that achieves the highest utility (3.1) when allocations are determined in a
competitive equilibrium.
Our interest is in studying optimal taxes under Partial Information. More pre-
cisely, we assume that taxes in the first period have to be set before the shock A is
known but after observing a signal s that depends potentially on aggregate outcomes
observed in period 1, s = G(c1, l1, q, A) for a given G.
Definition 4. A Partial Information (PI-) Ramsey equilibrium when gov-
ernment observes a signal s is a FI-Ramsey equilibrium satisfying
1. τ1 is measurable with respect to s
2. fiscal policy (τ1, τ2, b
g) achieves the highest utility from among all equilibria sat-
isfying 1.
Restriction 1 can be expressed as the PI-Ramsey equilibrium having to satisfy
τ1 = R(s) for all A ∈ Φ, for someR : R→ R (3.9)
We are interested in the case when this restriction prevents the PI-Ramsey equilibrium
from achieving the FI version.
5In these definitions we take for granted that we only consider tax policies for which a competitive
equilibrium exists and is unique.
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Note that consumers may or may not know that (3.9) holds, in any case they take
as given the tax rate that arises from this equation and equilibrium. Even if they
knew (3.9), they would not be able to exploit this knowledge in their optimization
problem, because they are atomistic and cannot affect the aggregate signal, and hence
the tax rate.6 We assume that s is an aggregate variable so that as long as consumers
are infinitesimal they take the tax level τ as given. In this model, as is standard in
Ramsey equilibria, the tax level τ and the equilibrium allocations (and therefore s)
are determined simultaneously as a consequence of the government’s choice for R.
FI-Ramsey equilibria
Using the so-called “primal approach” and standard arguments it is easy to show
that an allocation is a competitive equilibrium if and only if, in addition to resource
constraints (3.5), the following implementability condition holds
γu′ (c1) c1 − v
′ (l1) l1 + β [u
′ (c2) c2 − v
′ (l2) l2] = 0. (3.10)
The standard approach to find Ramsey policy under FI is to maximize (3.1) subject
to (3.10). We now slightly deviate from this traditional approach in order to obtain
a formulation of the FI problem that is as close as possible to the PI problem.
Implicit in the standard definition of FI Ramsey equilibrium is the assumption
that the government knows how the economy reacts to a given tax policy given each
value of A.We find it convenient to write out this reaction function explicitly since this
reaction function is the natural way to write the problem under Partial Information.
Using (3.5) for t = 1 to substitute out consumption in (3.6), we get
v′ (l1)
u′ (θl1 − g1)
= θγ(1− τ1), (3.11)
Letting h be the function that gives the l1 that solves this equation for given τ1, θ, γ
we can rewrite the above equilibrium condition as
l = h(τ, θ, γ) (3.12)
6This differs from the situation in the New Public Finance where consumers optimize given the
policy function R which is a function of individual choices.
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where we have again suppressed the time subscript from first period labor and tax
rate. This shows how the signal l reacts to the tax choice.
Now we write the equilibrium utility function as a function of first period equilib-
rium allocations and shocks only. Using the resource constraints (3.5) to substitute
out ct in (3.10) gives one equation that, for each A, involves only the unknowns l1, l2.
This defines implicitly a function that maps an equilibrium l1 into a second period
equilibrium labor l2, call this map L
imp
2 : Φ× [0, 1]→ R,
7 so that
Limp2 (A, l1) for all A ∈ Φ (3.13)
solves (3.10). The welfare of the planner for each A can be written as
W (l;A) ≡ U(θl − g1, l, θ2L
imp
2 (l, A)− g2, L
imp
2 (l, A); γ) (3.14)
= U(c1, l1, c2, l2; γ)
Note that the only arguments in W are the observed variable l and the shock γ. The
functions U and Limp2 are embedded in the definition of competitive equilibrium and
known by the government.
Given the above discussion, the FI Ramsey Equilibrium reduces to solving
max
τ :Φ→R
E[W (l;A)] (3.15)
s.t. (3.12)
Obviously the result is the same as to maximize (3.1) subject to (3.10) given A.
The standard approach in Ramsey policy analysis is to not even write the con-
straint (3.12) in (3.15). This is reasonable as under FI this constraint is not binding,
its only role is to give the FI-Ramsey tax policy RFI : Φ→ R in the first period, but
this constraint will be active in the PI formulation.
7Under some specific assumptions on u and v, it will be possible to solve for l2 as a function of
l1 in closed form. In general, the marginal effect of l1 on l2 is easily found by applying the implicit
function theorem to (3.10). See our examples below.
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PI-Ramsey equilibria
We focus on the case when the signal is just labor so s = l1 = l (in the robustness
section we consider the case when output y = θl1 is observed). The only difference
under PI is that the additional constraint (3.9) appears and that the choice is over
a tax contingent on the signal. Hence a PI-Ramsey equilibrium (given a signal l)
solves
max
R:R→R
E[W (l;A)] (3.16)
s.t. (3.12)
τ = R(l)
This gives rise to a non-standard maximization problem. We tackle this issue by
application of calculus of variations in section 3.3.
3.2.4 The economic consequences of PI for taxation policy
Before giving a mathematical solution it is worthwhile discussing the economic issues
raised by limited information in the fiscal policy example we use.
As is well known the optimal FI policy is one of tax smoothing over time as the
government wants to spread the distortions equally in the two periods. In the case of
CRRA preferences
u (c) =
c1+αc
1 + αc
, v (l) = B
l1+αl
1 + αl
for αc ≤ 0, αl, B > 0, tax smoothing will be perfect and Ramsey policy under FI
involves setting a constant tax rate τ = τ1 = τ2 that solves the intertemporal budget
constraint
τθl1 − g1 + β
u′(c2)
γu′(c1)
(τθ2l2 − g2) = 0. (3.17)
It is clear from (3.17) that the government needs to know the realization of both
productivity and demand shock in order to implement this policy under FI. In par-
ticular, the realization of θ = θ1 is a crucial piece of information, as it determines the
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revenue that a given tax rate is going to raise. The demand shock γ also matters as it
affects both the objective function and the interest rate that the government will have
to pay on its debt. Furthermore, both shocks clearly contribute to the determination
of an allocation (c1, c2, l1, l2).
Under PI the government can only condition its policy on l, without knowing
what combination of the shocks gives rise to a given observation. Depending on the
realizations, the government would like to set different tax rates and under some
preference assumptions (e.g. log-quadratic, discussed in section 3.4) it may even be
the case that a certain increase in hours would call for a tax cut if driven by a high
realization of γ, but would call for a tax hike if driven instead by low θ. Since the
government does not observe these shocks, this makes this model a very interesting
framework to study optimal policy with PI.
Clearly, under PI the choice of constant taxes is not feasible. The government has
to fix τ1 while it is still uncertain about the revenue that this tax rate will generate
and it will enter period 2 with an uncertain amount of debt. Once θ and γ are known
in period 2 the government will have to set τ2 so as to balance the budget in the
second period in order to avoid default, so to the government τ2 is unavoidably a
random variable at the time of choosing τ1.
Arguably, uncertain tax revenue is a crucial feature of actual fiscal policy decision,
and tax rates are decided based on information from equilibrium outcomes that are
observed frequently. In this sense, one can interpret this model as a simple model
of optimal automatic stabilizers, as these are fiscal instruments that are designed to
respond to endogenous outcomes, such as income or unemployment, independently of
the source of fluctuations in these variables. The optimal design of these instruments
requires a simultaneous determination of the density of taxable income and the policy.
The next section studies a generic problem that allows the determination of taxes
under limited endogenous information.
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3.3 Optimal Control under Endogenous Signal Ex-
traction (ESE)
Maximization problems such as (3.16) can be characterized as “optimal control under
endogenous signal extraction”. The key difficulty in (3.16) is that the policy choice
R affects both the policy action τ as well as the distribution of the signal s = l.
The signal provides information about the two unobserved exogenous shocks (γ, θ),
so that the optimal policy depends on the conditional density f(γ,θ)|l, but this density
depends itself on the tax policy R. Therefore the choice of an optimal R must be
consistent with the implied density fA|s. To our knowledge this is the first paper to
consider such a difficulty. The literature has considered setups where separation holds
in the sense that fA|s does not depend on R, see subsection 3.1.2 for a discussion.
Here we provide a solution for a general setup.
Many problems in economics have this form. It can be thought of as a Stackelberg-
reaction-function game where the “leader” (in section 3.2, the government) chooses
its policy (or reaction) function R optimally given the reaction of the “follower” h,
but h is given and independent of the choice on R. Unlike standard Stackelberg
games the actions τ and s are determined jointly in this setup, there is a hierarchy
only in the way leader and follower choose the reaction functions R, h. Simultaneity
is the standard assumption in Ramsey equilibria, where the equilibrium allocations
are influenced only by the policy action τ, not by the whole policy function. This is a
natural assumption when, as is standard in Ramsey taxation, followers are atomistic
and the signal is an aggregate variable.8
We now present a generic problem of optimal control under endogenous signal
extraction. This generalizes the PI-Ramsey Problem without adding any difficulty to
the proof. The generalization may be useful in other applications.
8Simultaneity also occurs in the literature on supply function equilibria (Klemperer and Meyer,
1989). Here firms simultaneously choose a supply function.
124
Consider a planner/government that chooses a policy variable τ ∈ T ⊂ R, ob-
serves endogenous signal s ∈ S ⊂ R at the time of choosing τ , when random variables
A ∈ Φ ⊂ Rk have a given distribution FA.
9
The planner’s objective is to maximize E [W (τ, s, A)] for a given payoff function
W . The planner knows that a value for the policy variable τ maps into endogenous
signals through the following equation
y = h(τ, A) (3.18)
The government is assumed to know W, h, FA, it does not observe the value of A.
This nests the case when other endogenous variables enter the objective function,
as these can be embedded in W. We did this in section 3.2 through the use of the
Limp2 function defined in (3.13) to substitute out l2 in the objective function.
Optimal behavior under uncertainty implies that the government chooses a policy
contingent on the observed variable s, therefore the government’s problem is to choose
a policy function R : S → T setting policy actions equal to
τ = R(s) (3.19)
Our interest lies in solving for the case that the exact value of A can not be inferred
from the observed s, the chosen τ , knowledge of h and of (3.18). This happens,
generically, when the dimension of A is higher than the dimension of s (k > 1) and
some of the variables in A have a continuous density. In terms of the fiscal policy
example when the signal s = l is observed, the values of θ, γ remain hidden even after
the choice of τ has been made for a given observed labor l.
To summarize, we wish to solve the following model of Optimal Control with
9It is possible to generalize the problem to the case of multidimensional policy instruments and
signals. However, notation becomes cumbersome, hence we only refer to the univariate case in the
following.
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Endogenous Signal Extraction:
max
{R:S→T }
E [W (τ, s, A)] (3.20)
s.t. (3.18), (3.19)
To see why a standard first order condition does not apply, we can rewrite the
objective function as follows∫
E [W (τ, s, A)| s] fs(s)ds (3.21)
Taking derivatives with respect to τ and if fs(s) could be taken as given we would
find the following optimality condition
E [Wτ +Wshτ | s] = 0 for all s. (3.22)
In most applications in dynamic models this would be correct, but it is not the correct
FOC in our case because, in general, R determines the density fs. To see this notice
that since s is determined implicitly by
s = h(R(s), A)
fs|A depends on R. Therefore fs =
∫
A
fs|A fA is also endogenous to R. The derivative
of fs with respect toR should be taken into account in deriving optimality conditions,
as we do below.
3.3.1 General first order conditions
Let us call S(R, A) the observable s induced by the shock A and a policyR. Formally,
S(R, A) is defined as follows: define H as
H(s, A;R) ≡ s− h(R(s), A). (3.23)
then H(s, A;R) = 0 gives the equilibrium value of s. We consider R such that
S(R, A) is uniquely defined for all A ∈ Φ.
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The policy variable that is realized for each value of the shocks A and for a given
policy function R is then given by
T (R, A) = R (S(R, A))
Notice the following distinction between the objects S, T and R: the latter is a
function of s while S and T are functions of R and the realizations of the shocks.
Let F be the value of the objective function for a given choice for R.10
F (R) ≡E [W (T (R, A) , S (R;A) , A)] (3.24)
We can now re-define the Optimal Control with Endogenous Signal Extraction prob-
lem as
max
{R:S→T }
F(R) (3.25)
and denote its solution by R∗.
3.3.2 Apparent PI: Invertibility
In some cases the government can still implement the FI policy even if it does not
observe the shocks. This occurs whenever the information set of the government is
invertible, allowing it to learn the true state of the economy A from observing the
signal s.11
10Notice that F maps the space of functions into R. The expectation operator integrates over
realizations of A using the government’s perceived distribution of A, so that the above objective
function is mathematically well defined given the above definitions for T, S and under standard
boundedness conditions.
11In the literature of optimal contracts under private information and incentive compatibility
constraints this is the standard assumption, which amounts to assuming full revelation, but those
papers concentrate on the difficulties raised by the reaction of the agents’ to the choice of R, this
reaction is the reason that the Full Information solution is not reached in those papers.
Invertibility also holds in the supply function literature (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989) because
uncertainty is onedimensional.
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To formally define Invertibility, consider the set of all possible values (τ, s) in the
FI case, namely
M∗≡
{
(τ, s) ∈ R2 : τ = R∗FI
(
A
)
and s = h
(
R∗FI
(
A
)
, A
)
for some A ∈ Φ
}
(3.26)
Let M∗τ (M
∗
y ) denote the projection of M
∗ on T (S)
Definition 5. Invertibility holds if for any s ∈M∗s there exists a unique τ ∈M
∗
τ
Clearly, Invertibility is satisfied if h
(
RFI∗ (A) , A
)
= s defines implicitly a unique
value for A for all s.
Invertibility will often occur when the dimension of τ is the same as the dimension
of A. Even if A is high-dimension, Invertibility also obtains if Φ is a finite set, in this
case we can expect to be able to map an equilibrium into the shock since there are
finitely many realizations, only by coincidence would the same equilibrium point (τ, l)
occur for two different realizations of A.
Proposition 4. Under Invertibility R∗ = RFI∗
This follows from the fact that the PI case is a restricted FI case, therefore the
value in the PI case is less than or equal than the FI case, and the value of the FI
case is achievable under Invertibility.
To illustrate a case of Invertibility, consider the example of section 3.2, assume
that γ = 1 with certainty. The government does not observe the random value of θ
and it has to choose taxes observing l. This is only apparently a PI problem, because
the government can infer θ from observing the labor choice, hence the government
can implement the FI policy.
3.3.3 General case of PI
The case of interest in this paper arises when knowledge of (τ, s) is not sufficient to
back out the actual realizations of the shocks from (3.18). Observe that
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Remark 1. Invertibility is generally violated if
• A has higher dimension than s and some element of A has a continuous distri-
bution or
• if h
(
RFI∗ (·) , ·
)
is non-monotonic.
In these cases the solution (3.20) should take into account that the distribution
is endogenous to policy while, at the same time, the policy depends on the optimal
filtering of the fundamental shocks A given the observed signal s.
Let S∗ be the support of the random variable S(R∗, A). For the general case we
will show that
Proposition 5. Assume there is a solution R∗ to the PI problem (3.20) and As-
sumptions 1-6 stated in Appendix A hold. Assume in addition that S(R∗;A) has a
density. Let S∗ be the support of S(R∗;A). The solution R∗ satisfies the following
necessary first order condition
E
(
W ∗τ +W
∗
s h
∗
τ
1− h∗τR
∗′
∣∣∣∣S(R∗;A) = s) = 0 (3.27)
for s ∈ S∗ in a set of probability one.
To find the optimality condition in Proposition 5 we use a variational argument.
In the following paragraphs we show some of the key steps in the proof. For a detailed
proof see Appendix A.
Take any function (a variation) δ : S∗ → R and a constant α ∈ R. Now consider
reaction functions of the form R∗ + αδ. For a given δ consider solving the (one-
dimensional) maximization problem
max
α∈ℜ
F(R∗ + αδ) (3.28)
In other words, now we maximize over small deviations of the optimal reaction func-
tion in the direction determined by δ. It is clear that
0 ∈ argmax
α∈ℜ
F(R∗+αδ) (3.29)
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In Appendix A we show that ∂F(R
∗+αδ)
∂α
evaluated at α = 0 is
E
(
(W ∗τ +W
∗
s h
∗
τ )
δ
1− h∗τR
∗′
)
= 0 (3.30)
This can be derived by carefully writing down all the derivatives involved.
The general definition of conditional expectation implies (3.27).
Notice that, as we anticipated, the first order condition (3.27) does not coincide
with the FOC when separation holds (3.22). The term 1
1−h∗τR
∗′
acts as a kernel, or as
a measure change, it is the new term relative to the standard case when fA|s does not
depend on R. The term 1
1−h∗τR
∗′
captures the effect of the choice of R on the density
fs that, as we anticipated, had to appear in some way in the optimality conditions.
With Proposition 5 in hand we can derive previous results available in the lit-
erature on optimal policy under Partial Information as special cases. The following
corollary shows some cases that had been considered in the literature and that gave
rise to separation.
Corollary 1. (separation) Assume for some s ∈ S∗ one of the following hold
1. (Invertibility) there is a unique A ∈ Φ such that S(R∗, A) = s.
2. (exogenous signals or linearity) hτ is given constant for all A ∈ Φ such that
S(R∗, A) = s.
Then the general FOC (3.27) reduces to the FOC under separation (3.22).
The proof is trivial: in both cases 1
1−h∗τR
∗′
is known given s so that this terms
goes out of the conditional expectation in (3.27) and it cancels out. Case 1 obtains
a generalization of the Invertibility theorem we found before. Case 2 is useful to
discuss the various approaches to optimal policy under Partial Information that have
been discussed in the literature. Consider the case of exogenous signals, when s is a
function of A only, in this case hτ = 0 so case 2 applies. The armed-bandit problems
are also a special case of this, since it is only previously determined policies that
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influence the signal, so that with respect to the current signal we still have hτ = 0.
Note that the linear models that have been analyzed in the literature (Svensson and
Woodford, 2004) arise as a special case of (3.27) when hτ is a known constant due to
linearity.
The condition (3.27) is useful for comparability with the standard FOC in the
cases of corollary 1, but it turns out to be less convenient for computations. The
reason is that (3.27) contains the derivative of the policy function to be computed
R∗′. An algorithm trying to approximate R∗ numerically will have to ensure that not
onlyR∗ is well approximated but that its derivative is well approximated as well along
the iterations. For this purpose it is more convenient to use an envelope condition
that delivers the optimality condition that will be stated in Proposition 6.
Note that (3.27) conditions on s. If in addition we condition on some additional
variables in A the remaining variables can be taken as given. More precisely, let us
partition A = (A1, A2) where A1 ∈ R and assume for all possible values of
(
y, A2
)
one can back out a unique value of A1 that is compatible with
(
s, A2
)
, so that
H
(
s, A1, A2;R
∗
)
= 0 (3.31)
holds. This equation defines an implicit function A1 = A
∗(s, A2) that, given the
information on s, maps a realization of A2 into the corresponding A1 for the optimal
policy.
Proposition 6. The optimality condition (3.27) is equivalent to∫
Θ2(s,R)
W ∗τ +W
∗
s h
∗
τ
h∗A1
fA1(A
∗(s, A2))fA2(A2)dA2 = 0 for all s (3.32)
where Θ2 (s,R
∗) is the support of A2’s conditional on observing s, stars denote that
the partial derivatives and A1 are evaluated at A
∗
(
s, A2
)
.
This condition is much easier to use for computations than (3.27) because it does
not involve the derivative of R∗. The only cost is that it has to assume that the
function A∗ is uniquely defined. This will not only simplify computations but it also
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honors the title of the paper, as its derivation involves explicitly fA|s which is precisely
the filter that is determined endogenously by the optimal choice of policy.
We now give the main steps of the proof. Using the notation f(x) + g(x) =
(f + g)(x) note that
E
(
W ∗τ +W
∗
s h
∗
τ
1− h∗τR
∗′
∣∣∣∣S(R∗, A) = s, A2 = A2) = W ∗τ +W ∗s h∗τ1− h∗τR∗′ (τ ∗, s,A∗ (s, A2) , A2).
By the law of iterated expectations (3.27) implies
E
(
W ∗τ +W
∗
s h
∗
τ
1− h∗τR
∗′
(τ ∗, s,A∗ (s, A2) , A2)
∣∣∣∣S(R∗, A) = s) = 0 for any s ∈ S∗. (3.33)
so that we can integrate over A2’s only as long as A1 is substituted by A
∗(s, A2)
whenever these shocks appear as arguments of W ∗τ , W
∗
s , h
∗
τ and fA1 . Therefore this
can be rewritten as∫
Θ2(s,R∗)
W ∗τ +W
∗
s h
∗
τ
1− h∗τR
∗′
(τ ∗, s,A∗ (s, A2) , A2)fA1(A
∗(s, A2))fA2|s dA2 = 0 (3.34)
To find fA2|s proceed as follows. First we find f s|A2 . Notice that given A2 = A2
we have that s = A∗−1
(
A1, A2
)
where A∗−1 is the inverse function of A∗(·, A2). By
the change of variable rule
fs|A2
(
s, A2
)
= fA1
(
A∗(s, A2)
) ∣∣A∗s(s, A2)∣∣ (3.35)
where
∣∣A∗s(s, A2)∣∣ is the Jacobian of A∗(·, A2). To find this Jacobian we apply once
again the implicit function theorem to H and get
A∗s
(
s, A2
)
=
(
h∗A1
)−1
(1− h∗τR
∗′) (3.36)
Plugging (3.36) into (3.35) gives f s|A2 . A standard application of Bayes’ rule gives
fA2|s in terms of fs|A2 namely
fA2|s =
fs|A2fA2∫
fs|A2fA2 dA2
(3.37)
Plugging the above formula for fA2|s in (3.27) and since the denominator fs(s)
drops out in the first order condition gives (3.32).
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This proof highlights that fA|s depends on R
∗′as it appears in the Jacobian in
(3.36) and it also determines A∗.Therefore we have that fA|ydepends on the policy
function R∗and Bayes’ rule implies that the signal extraction fA2|s depends on the
optimal policy R∗. This justifies that we dub the maximization problem (3.20) and
the title of the paper “endogenous filtering”.
3.3.4 Linearity and “certainty equivalence”
We now show that if we consider a linear model (quadratic objective function and
linear reaction function), we obtain the “certainty equivalence” result of Svensson
and Woodford (2004).
Assume the objective function is
W (τ, l) = −
ωτ
2
τ 2 −
ωll
2
2
(3.38)
and the reaction function
l = h+ hττ + hθθ + hγγ (3.39)
where the ω’s are positive coefficients and the h’s are any real numbers.
Using Svensson and Woddford’s (2004) notation, let X ≡ (1, θ, γ)′. Then the Full
Information optimal policy is
τ = FX
where
F =
(
−
ωlhτh
ωτ + ωlh2τ
,−
ωlhτhθ
ωτ + ωlh2τ
,−
ωlhτhγ
ωτ + ωlh2τ
)
.
The FOC under PI (3.27) becomes
E [ωττ + ωlhτ (h+ hττ + hθθ + hγγ) |l] = 0 (3.40)
which can be rewritten as
(
ωτ + ωlh
2
τ
)
τωlhτh+ ωlhτhθE [θ|l] + ωlhτhγE [γ|l] = 0 (3.41)
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which implies that optimal policy is given by
τ = FE [X|l] (3.42)
where F is the same vector of coefficients found under Full Information, that is, inde-
pendently of the information structure and distribution of the shocks. This property
of optimal policy with PI in linear models is called “certainty equivalence”, as the
government forms the best estimate of the state and behaves as if this estimate was
certainty, or Full Information.
However, the “separation principle” does not hold, because one cannot compute
the expectation of the state E [X|l] without knowledge of the policy. To see this,
consider for example E [θ|l], which can be rewritten as
E [θ|l] = E [X|h+ hτFE [X|l] + hθθ + hγγ = l] (3.43)
This shows that optimal policy (3.42) and signal extraction (3.43) have to be solved
jointly as a system.
3.3.5 Set of possible values and transversality condition
Let us know go back to the general non-linear case. So far we have ignored two issues
that often complicate obtaining solutions to dynamic stochastic problems, namely, the
ex-ante restriction of the set of possible values of choice variables and the transver-
sality condition.
In many models of optimal choice under uncertainty it is important to know
the range of possible values that endogenous variables can take. One reason this is
important is that if the true solution is non-linear and approximations to non-linear
functions can only be accurate on a compact set, one needs to know, at least roughly,
what are the likely values of the equilibrium solution. A second reason is that it is
possible that the solution may be simply undefined outside a certain range of the
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endogenous variable so that the algorithm may break down if it attempts to compute
the solution outside that range.12
In our case and, in particular, in the two-dimensional uncertainty case posed by
the fiscal policy example, the limits of l are easy to find ex-ante by exploiting the fact
that the extreme values for l coincide with the FI case. More precisely, assume that
l is monotonic in both γ and θ. In particular, assume that l is increasing in γ and
decreasing in θ.13 It is clear that, letting lmin and lmax be the extreme values of l in
the PI solution, we have
lmin = L(R
∗; θmax, γmin) = L
FI(θmax, γmin)
lmax = L(R
∗; θmin, γmax) = L
FI(θmin, γmax)
and the PI solution is in the interval [lmin, lmax] , which is trivial to compute.
Another issue is that in most infinite-dimensional optimization problems the first
order conditions derived by applying δ variations to the policy function do not de-
termine a unique policy function, one needs to add another condition that holds as a
terminal or initial condition, often referred to as a “transversality condition”. Since
R∗′ appears in (3.27) it appears that a transversality condition may be needed as the
solution in a given value of s may depend on the solution for other values.
But there are two reasons why this is not a problem in our case. First, because
there are two natural end conditions: using the above discussion about extreme values
of l it is trivial to establish that at the extremes the optimal tax is given by the FI
12In fact, for applications of the promised utility approach to solving incentive problems, one needs
to know the set of possible values to even be able to formulate a consistent recursive problem. This
problem does not arise in our case, where the set of possible τ ’s can be restricted to a large set in
the formalization of the maximization problem.
13This will be the case in the log-quadratic case shown in section 3.4. Such monotonicity can be
easily proved in the FI case, although it should be checked with a candidate solution for R∗.
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solution so that
R∗(lmin) = R
FI(θmax, γmin)
R∗(lmax) = R
FI(θmin, γmax)
give terminal and initial condition for R∗ that are trivially computed.
Second, because when we rewrite the optimality condition as (3.32) the derivative
R∗′ does not appear so the optimal value for each s can be found independently of
the solution in other points.
3.3.6 Algorithm
Given (3.32) it is easy to calculate the PI solution using the following numerical
algorithm. Fix a value for s. We must be able to compute A∗(s, A2) for a given
candidate of τ = R∗(s). Then at a possible candidate τ we can evaluate the integrand
in (3.32) for each possible A2 since we have the corresponding A1 = A
∗(s, A2). We
compute the integral by running A2 from the lowest to highest possible value of A2
given the candidate τ . Note that these limits to the possible values of A2, defining
Θ2(s,R
∗), are endogenous to τ and they have to keep A1 within the admissible limits
of the support of A1. This operation maps a value of a candidate τ to the left side of
(3.32), the optimal τ = R∗(s) is found by solving this non-linear equation that makes
this integral as close as possible to zero.
3.4 Solution of fiscal policy example with ESE
3.4.1 Log-quadratic utility
We now study the optimal fiscal policy model introduced above using the tools de-
veloped in the previous section. For simplicity we study a special case that allows for
an analytical reaction function h. Assume u(c) = log(c) and v(l) = B
2
l2. Both the
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productivity and the demand shock are temporary. In the second period, θ2 is known
to be equal to the mean of θ.
We show numerical examples with the following parameter values and distribu-
tional assumptions: let θ be uniformly distributed on a support [θmin, θmax], γ uni-
formly distributed on [γmin, γmax] and assume β = .96, B calibrated to get average
hours equal to a third and government expenditure constant and equal to 25% of
average output. The mean of γ is 1 and the mean of θ is 3. The supports of both
shocks imply a range of ±10% from the mean.
We first present the FI solution in order to illustrate the optimal response of taxes
and allocations to the two different shocks we consider. Notice that the equilibrium
condition (3.6) becomes
Bl1c1 = γθ1(1− τ1) (3.44)
and after substituting out consumption using the resource constraint, we obtain that
labor supply is the positive root of a quadratic equation, so that the reaction function
(3.12) specializes to
l = h(τ, θ, γ) =
Bg1θ
−1 +
√
(Bg1)2θ−2 + 4Bγ(1− τ)
2B
. (3.45)
It is important to note that in general the productivity shock θ has two opposing
effects: the substitution effect between leisure and consumption and the wealth effect,
that acts in the opposite direction. With log-quadratic preferences, the second effect
dominates and hence high realizations of θ will lead to low labor, ceteris paribus. On
the other hand it can be seen from equation (3.45) that hours are increasing in the
demand shock γ.
In Figure 3.1 we illustrate how hours and taxes move with the two different shocks
under FI. On the left side of the figure, we keep γ constant and equal to its mean
and we show that both hours and taxes are decreasing in the productivity shock.
On the right side, we keep θ constant and equal to its mean and show that labor is
increasing in γ, while taxes are decreasing. This shows that when we introduce PI
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with only hours being observed, if the government sees an increase in l, it would want
to react in opposite directions depending on the source of the shock: this would call
for a tax increase, if driven by low θ, or a tax cut if driven by high γ. Hence this
model is particularly interesting to analyze optimal policy with endogenous PI since
by observing a certain value l¯ and imposing a tax rate τ¯ the government cannot infer
the value of the shocks.
Figure 3.1: Hours and taxes with Full Information
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Under PI, for an intermediate value of l¯ the government is uncertain whether say
both θ and γ are high, or vice versa, and in general there is a continuum of realizations(
θ¯, γ˜(θ¯, l¯;R)
)
consistent with the observation of l¯ and a policy R. Therefore it cannot
choose the policy under Full Information (constant taxes) since the realizations of γ
and θ enter separately in (3.17).
The partial derivatives hτ and hγ are easily obtained analytically. In particular
hτ (τ, θ, γ) =
−1√
(Bg1)2 (θγ)
−2 + γ−14B(1− τ)
. (3.46)
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It is clear that both the productivity shock and the demand shock affect this slope,
therefore endogenous signal extraction is an issue. Hence we proceed to find a R∗
that satisfies (3.32) using the algorithm described in subsection 3.3.6
Figure 3.2 illustrates the optimal policy for this case, plotting the tax rate against
observed labor. The red line is R∗, while the yellow region is the set of all equilibrium
pairs (lFI , τFI) that could have been realized under Full Information.
As explained in subsection 3.3.5, the lowest (and highest) labor that is realized
under FI is also the lowest (highest) value that can occur under PI and the PI tax
is the same as the FI tax. In these extremes there is full revelation but anywhere
between these two extremes the government has to choose a policy without knowing
the values of γ, θ that give rise to equilibrium taxes or labor. It can be seen that
the optimal policy calls for a tax rate in between the minimum and the maximum FI
policies for each observation (but it is sometimes far from being the average of those
tax rates.
For low labor, the government learns that productivity must be high, so the tax
rate can be rather low. The lowest labor realization leads to the FI equilibrium for
(θmax, γmin). Then taxes start to increase: higher l’s signal lower expected produc-
tivity and hence revenue, as the set of admissible θ’s is gradually including lower and
lower realizations. This goes on up to a point where the set of admissible θ’s con-
ditional on l is the whole set [θmin, θmax]. From that point on, the tax rate changes
slope and becomes decreasing with respect to l. This is because now, with any θ
being possible, increasing l signals an increasing expected revenue, hence allowing
lower tax rates on average, up to the point where the highest θ’s start being ruled
out, at which point the policy becomes increasing again, up the full revelation point
lmax = L
FI(θmin, γmax).
To gain further understanding on the implications of PI for the properties of
the model, we plot again hours and taxes as functions of each shock individually in
Figure 3.3. In all four panels, we reproduce the FI outcomes shown in Figure (FI)
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Figure 3.2: Optimal policy with log-quadratic utility
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(blue dashed-dotted lines). The red lines represent the PI outcomes. For instance in
the left panels we keep γ equal to its mean and we plot hours and taxes as functions
of θ. Of course the government does not observe the values of θ and γ, but only
hours. Interestingly, it can be seen that hours become more volatile in response
to productivity shocks under PI and taxes become smoother and change the sign
of their response to θ. This is because under this parametrization the government
learns little about the realizations of θ and hence optimally chooses to cut taxes as
hours increase.14 On the right-hand side, we plot again hours and taxes as functions
on γ, keeping θ equal to the mean. For intermediate values of γ, the government
is relatively confident about the realization of the demand shock, hence the policies
under FI and PI are very close. However for extreme realizations the government is
fooled about which shock is driving hours, hence it cuts taxes for very low γ’s and
increases taxes for very high γ’s, believing that changes in productivity are responsible
14We will see in the next subsection that this property of the solution will change with higher
government expenditure.
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Figure 3.3: Hours and taxes with Partial Information and Full Information
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for the observed behavior of hours.
We also plot the locus of admissible realization of shocks for l¯ = .33 in Figure 3.4.
The wealth effect of productivity makes it an increasing function in the (θ, γ) space.
Now conditional on l, we can have combinations of high productivity (low wealth
effect on labor supply) and high demand or low productivity and low demand.
Optimal policy with PI calls for a substantial smoothing of taxes across states.
This can be seen in Figure 3.5, where the equilibrium cumulative distribution function
of tax rates under PI (red line) is contrasted with the one obtained under FI (blue
dotted line). This result is rather intuitive and it carries a general lesson for optimal
fiscal policy decisions under uncertainty: When the government is not sure about
what type of disturbance is hitting the economy, it seems sensible to choose a policy
that is not too aggressive in any direction and just aims at keeping the budget under
control on average.
In our model, this smoothing of taxes across states will imply a larger variance of
tax rates in the second period with respect to the FI policy. In the second period,
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Figure 3.4: Set of admissible shocks
2.7 2.8 2.9 3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1
1.01
1.02
1.03
θ
γ
 
 
PI
FI
all the uncertainty is resolved and the tax rate will be whatever is needed to balance
the budget constraint. This is of course taken into account at the time of choosing
a policy under uncertainty, so that we could say that optimal policy is very prudent
while the source of the observed aggregate variables is not known and then responsive
after uncertainty has been resolved. In this sense, this model can rationalize the slow
reaction of some governments to big shocks like the current recession. The Spanish
example in the latest recession is a case in point. In 2008, it was far from clear
how persistent the downturn would be and also whether is was demand-driven or
productivity-driven and the government did not adjust its fiscal stance quickly, only
to make large adjustments in the subsequent years. We will discuss this further in
the paper.
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Figure 3.5: Equilibrium CDF of tax rates
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3.4.2 Close to the top of the Laffer curve
Let us now look at the case where government expenditure is very high, equal to 60%
of average output in both periods.15 We will see that this leads to a very non-linear
optimal policy and to an exception to tax-smoothing across states. This example is
of interest for several reasons. From an economic point of view, private information
is of more importance here: since the government needs to balance the budget in the
second period it is thus now very concerned about the possibility of a very low level of
productivity θ, as in this case tax revenue is low in the first period and a large amount
of debt will need to be issued in this case. A high debt, combined with high future
expenditure, may call for very high taxes in the future, it could even mean getting the
economy closer to the top of the Laffer curve, where taxation is most distortionary
and hence consumption is very low. This example will also be of interest because the
PI solution has some very different features from the FI outcome.
Figure 3.6 shows optimal policy for this case (red line), again contrasted with the
15All other assumptions on preferences and shocks are the same as in the previous section.
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set of tax-labor outcomes under FI (yellow region).
Figure 3.6: Optimal policy with high government expenditure
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The figure shows that the optimal solution is highly non-linear. The derivative
R∗′ is positive and relatively high in a middle range of levels of l, but both to the
left and to the right of this middle range R∗ it is much flatter. Notice that this is
the opposite of what happens with a low level of g in the previous subsection. When
government expenditure is sufficiently low, the government is very uncertain about
the true realization of θ. Hence higher labor does not allow a more precise signal
extraction about productivity. On the other hand, when g is sufficiently high, there
is an intermediate region of observables where the government becomes confident
about low realizations of θ. In Appendix B we prove this result by illustrating how g
affects the slope of the loci of realizations of the shocks.
To illustrate how the PI policy involves a relatively precise signal extraction on
θ with high government expenditure, consider the sets of possible realizations of θ
under FI in Figure 3.7 and under PI in Figure 3.8.
Consider Figure 3.7 first. It can be seen that under FI any realization of θ is
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Figure 3.7: Set of admissible θ’s with FI
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Figure 3.8: Set of admissible θ’s with PI
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consistent with an intermediate realization of l, but each of these θ’s would call for
a different tax rate. However, under PI, there can only be one tax rate for each
observed l and the government uses this policy to extract information on θ.
145
To see this, consider now Figure 3.8. The minimum value of l is only consistent
with the highest possible θ (and lowest possible γ) because the wealth effect dom-
inates. Under PI, increasing l from this point, the government becomes uncertain
and lower realizations of productivity become consistent with the observations. At
first, uncertainty is rising with l, but in the intermediate region of l’s the government
becomes more and more confident about low realizations of productivity. This leads
to the sharp increase in the tax rate, which in turn gives rise to feedback effect on
the set of possible θ’s: high taxes discourage work effort, so higher labor now is an
even stronger signal of low θ (high marginal utility from consumption). In this way
an optimal policy and a conditional distribution of shocks consistent with it confirm
each other in equilibrium.
Consistently with this analysis of the signal extraction, we also plot hours and
taxes as functions of each shock individually, and we contrast the PI outcomes with
the FI solution in Figure 3.9. On the left-hand side we consider productivity shocks
only. As illustrated above, in the intermediate region of l’s the government has a
precise signal about θ, hence PI and FI policies and allocations are very close to
each other. However for extreme realizations of θ the government is fooled about the
source of the fluctuations and does hardly respond to productivity. On the right-hand
side we consider only demand shocks. It can be seen that the PI government has very
imprecise information about γ. Hence it responds to these shocks with the opposite
slope with respect to the FI government. The case of high government expenditure
shows that optimal policy with PI can be very non-linear in order to avoid the worst
outcomes, e.g. in the model hitting the top of the Laffer curve or in the real world
a debt crisis. As shown in the previous subsection, when expenditure is low and
there are no concerns related to the government budget constraint, policy has to be
smooth, but when there are contingencies that are particularly dangerous for agents,
then optimal policy calls for being very reactive to observables in order to prevent
those cases to materialize. This is exemplified by the optimality of increasing taxes
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Figure 3.9: Hours and taxes with PI and FI: high g
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steeply in the first period to avoid having to distort the economy too heavily in the
second period if realized productivity turn out to be low (and hence the fiscal deficit
turns out to be high). This lesson seems relevant for the understanding of the fiscal
policy reaction to the financial crisis in 2008 and afterwards, especially in countries
like Spain and Italy, that arguably where in danger of getting close to the top of the
Laffer curve, as testified by the fact that significant increases in taxes after 2009 did
not raise the amount of revenue as much as it was desired by these governments.
3.4.3 Linear approximation
We now compare our solution to existing methods based on linear-quadratic optimiza-
tion (Svensson and Woodford, 2004). In order to do so, we modify our distributional
assumption and we assume that both θ and γ are normally distributed. We then trun-
cate these distributions at three standard deviations from the mean in order to have
a bounded support for the shocks in our solution method. The standard deviation of
each of the shocks is assumed to be 3% of the mean.
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In order to compute the linear approximation, we take a second-order approxima-
tion of the objective function and a first-order approximation of the reaction function
h around the allocation and policy that arises under Full Information when the shocks
take their mean value. Then, we compute the certainty equivalent policy as described
in subsection 3.3.4. Importantly, this policy can be found under Full Information and
then applied to the Partial Information case by simply computing the conditional
mean of the shocks for each value of l¯. Figures 3.10 and 3.11 compare the optimal
policy and the linear approximation in the case of low g and high g respectively. It
can be seen that the approximation is quite accurate for intermediate realizations of
labor, but less so for extreme values. This suggests that linear approximations can
be misleading when there is endogenous Partial Information and the economy is hit
by large shocks.
Figure 3.10: Linear approximation, low g
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Figure 3.11: Linear approximation, high g
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3.5 Robustness
3.5.1 Risk aversion and precautionary fiscal adjustments
As we have seen in the previous section, when the economy is close to the top of
the Laffer curve, optimal policy is very non-linear in the observable variable, creating
a region of sharp fiscal adjustments for intermediate realized values of labor. The
government raises taxes dramatically in the first period, in order to prevent the worst
scenarios with low productivity, high taxes and low consumption in the second period.
In this section, we consider a general CRRA utility function from consumption
u (c) =
c1+αc
1 + αc
and investigate how optimal policy changes with different degrees of the risk-aversion
parameter αc, while keeping quadratic disutility from labor effort as in our baseline
parametrization.
Figure 3.12 illustrates the optimal policy for αc = −1 (log utility, that is the base-
line case), αc = −1.5 and αc = −2. It can be seen that as risk aversion increases, the
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area where policy is more reactive of observables becomes wider, and the government
reacts strongly even for weaker signals of a recession. Intuitively, this is because the
government wants to avoid contingencies with high debt that would lead to high taxes
in the second period. The more risk averse the agent is, the more painful it is to be
in those states, where consumption has to be cut substantially. However, this larger
region of reaction also makes the policy function less steep, as can be seen from the
picture.
Figure 3.12: Changing risk aversion
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3.5.2 Permanent shocks and linear-quadratic utility
We now consider a permanent productivity shock, that is θ2 = θ1. This would be un-
interesting with log-quadratic preferences because hours would become independent
of θ as income and substitution effects would cancel out. Therefore we assume linear
utility from consumption u(c) = c and quadratic disutility from labor v(l) = B
2
l2,
which give another case with an analytical solution for the reaction function h and
its derivatives.
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In particular, it is easy to see from the first order condition (3.6) that the reaction
function (3.12) specializes to
l = h(τ, θ, γ) =
γθ
B
(1− τ), (3.47)
The optimal policy is illustrated in Figure 3.13 and is compared with the set of
FI tax rates conditional on l. In general, R∗ is decreasing as higher observed labor
suggests higher conditional expectation for productivity, hence allowing to balance
the intertemporal budget constraint with a lower distortionary tax. The figure also
compares the optimal policy with a linear policy obtained connecting the two full
revelation points with a straight line. While the optimal policy is not quite linear, in
this example a linear approximation would not be too wrong.
Figure 3.13: Optimal policy with linear-quadratic utility
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3.5.3 Observable output
Our previous example assumed that labor was observable. This made notation and
presentation easier as the shocks are not involved in the signal directly. We now
consider the case when the signal observed by the government is the total product, so
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s = y = θl. The government cannot sort out the values of the θ and l independently,
hence there still is a problem of signal extraction as the government can not back
out the values of (θ, γ). In addition we assume again linear-quadratic utility and a
permanent productivity shock.
Figure 3.14 illustrates the optimal policy for this case. It can be seen that the re-
sult is remarkably similar to that obtained in the previous subsection with observable
labor. However, in this case the government has a lot more information than in the
previous case. This is because current revenue τθl is known, and hence there is no
uncertainty about the amount of debt that needs to be issued. The only uncertainty
is about the amount of revenue that will be collected in the future, as the value of
(permanent) productivity is unknown.16 As we have seen, uncertainty about debt is
key to get large fiscal adjustments as in subsection 3.4.2.
Figure 3.14: Optimal policy with output observed
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16Note that if we had assumed, as in section 3.4, that θ2 is not random the model would not be
interesting, since in that case there would be no uncertainty about future revenue.
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3.6 An infinite-horizon model with debt
In this section we present an infinite horizon version of the optimal fiscal policy model
we have considered. We will see that some key intuitions developed in the two-period
model are still present and they lead to interesting dynamics. In particular, under PI
the government sometimes reacts slowly to recessions and as a consequence needs to
raise taxes for a longer time endogenously prolonging slumps. In this case the slow
reaction and the ensuing deepening of the recession is fully desirable.
As is well known, in the case of non-linear utility current interest rate is determined
by future taxes, hence the optimal policy under full commitment would be time
inconsistent, leading to some complications in the solution of optimal policy under
full commitment.17 In order to avoid these difficulties we assume a linear utility of
consumption.
We also assume that the shocks are iid over time as this reduces the number of
state variables and it abstracts from the issues of government experimentation that
has been studied in the armed-bandit literature of optimal policy that we discussed
in subsection 3.1.2.18 In this way we are left with the simplest infinite horizon model
of fiscal policy where endogenous signal extraction plays a role.19
3.6.1 Full Information
Our model under Full Information is a small variation of Example 2 of Aiyagari et
al. (2002), with linear utility from consumption and standard convex disutility from
labor effort. Preferences of the representative agent are given by:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [γtct − v(lt)] (3.48)
17Under Full Information and uncertainty this issue was first addressed in Aiyagari et al. (2002).
18For example Wieland (2000a, 2000b), Kiefer and Nyarko (1989), Ellison and Valla (2001)
19Combining this with issues of commitment and optimal experimentation is of interest but we
leave it for future work.
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where γt is a demand shock, iid over time.
The period t budget constraint of the representative agent is
ct + qtbt = θtlt(1− τt) + bt−1 (3.49)
where θt is an iid productivity shock. Note that the government can only issue real
riskless bonds bt.
The standard first order conditions for utility maximization are
v′(lt)
γt
= θt(1− τt) (3.50)
and
qt = β
γ¯
γt
. (3.51)
where γ¯ is the unconditional expectation of the demand shock γ.
The Ramsey government finances a constant stream of expenditure gt = g ∀t and
chooses taxes and non-contingent one-period debt in order to maximize utility of the
agent subject to the above competitive equilibrium conditions as well as the resource
constraint ct + g = θtlt. Under FI, the government can choose a sequence of taxes
conditional on a sequence of shocks At = (At, At−1, ..., A0), where At = (θt, γt).
The period-t implementability constraint is
bt−1 = ct −
v′(lt)
γt
lt + β
γ¯
γt
bt. (3.52)
We now introduce an upper bound on debt, bmax. We will assume that when-
ever debt goes above this threshold, the government pays a quadratic utility cost
β χ
2
(bt − b
max)2 and we will set the parameter χ to be a very high number in order to
mimic a model with an occasionally binding borrowing constraint while still retaining
differentiability of the problem.
The first order conditions for Ramsey allocations with respect to hours and debt
are:
γtθt − v
′(lt) + λtθt −
λt
γt
[v′(lt) + v
′′(lt)lt] = 0 (3.53)
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and
λt
γ¯
γt
= Etλt+1 + χ(bt − b
max)I[bmax,∞)(bt). (3.54)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier of constraint (3.49) and we denote by I[bmax,∞)(b)
the indicator function for the event b > bmax.
Thanks to the assumption of linear utility from consumption, the Ramsey policy
is time-consistent and allocations satisfy a Bellman equation that defines a value
function W FI(bt−1, At). Thus optimal taxes are given by a time-invariant policy
function τt = R
FI(bt−1, At)
3.6.2 Partial Information
We start the description of the PI problem by specifying its timing. At the beginning
of each period t, the Ramsey government observes the realization of the exogenous
shocks of last period At−1, the value of its outstanding debt bt−1 and the realization
of current labor lt. Based on this information, but before knowing the value of At, it
sets the tax rate τt. Formally, the choice of taxes at time t is contingent on - i.e. a
function of - (At−1, lt).
Note that because of the iid assumption on the shocks At, information about out-
standing debt summarizes all the information about past realizations that is relevant
in terms of the objective function and the constraints of the Ramsey problem. In
other words, the government cares about past realizations of the exogenous shocks
only to the extent that they affect the level of current outstanding debt. As a con-
sequence, debt is a sufficient state variable in addition to the current observed signal
lt. Hence the optimal policy has a recursive structure and taxes are given by a policy
function τt = R(bt−1, lt).
Define W as the value of the utility (3.48) at the optimal choice for given debt
before seeing the realization of l0. By a standard argument, the choice from period 1
onwards is feasible from period 0 onwards given the same level of debt. Therefore W
satisfies the following Bellman equation
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W (b) = max
R: ℜ2→ℜ+
E
[
γ(θl − g)− v(l) + βW
(
(b+ g − θl + v
′(l)l
γ
)γ
βγ¯
)
+
− β
χ
2
(
(b+ g − θl + v
′(l)l
γ
)γ
βγ¯
− bmax)2
]
(3.55)
where l satisfies l = h(R(b, l), θ, γ) where h(τ, θ, γ) is the labor that satisfies (3.50).
The only difference with respect to the reaction function in the two-period model
is that now the government should recognize that debt affects labor indirectly through
the tax rate.
At this point it is important to pause the maths for a second and discuss how
shocks and PI influence the optimal choice of taxes. Under incomplete markets a
sequence of adverse shocks (low θ) will lead to an increase in debt. This will be more
so under PI than under FI, because under PI the government only learns that a low
θ and, therefore, a low tax revenue, occurred with a delay. The reason that b is an
argument in R is that in the presence of incomplete markets, debt piles up after a
few bad shocks, much more so than under FI, therefore the government will have to
increase the level of taxes for a given lt to avoid debt from becoming unsustainable.
Note that in (3.55) we have substituted future debt using the budget constraint
(3.52). It is important to highlight a key difference with respect to the FI problem:
while in that case a choice of τt implied a choice of bt, now, bt is a random variable
even for a given choice of τt. In other words, just like in the two-period model, the
government is uncertain about how much debt will need to be issued and in particular
must take into account that bad realizations of productivity may lead to a debt level
above bmax, if taxes are not sufficiently high.
In order to solve the model, we exploit its recursive structure, by solving for the
PI first order condition at each point on a grid for debt and iterating on the value
function of the problem. To see how this works, consider the objective function
defined by the right-hand side of (3.55).
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For a given guess for the value function, this is just a function of observed labor
to which we can apply the main theorem of the paper (Proposition 5) and obtain the
general first order condition with PI.20
This first order condition involves the derivative W ′(b). In standard dynamic pro-
gramming it is well known that an envelope condition applies that allows the sim-
plification of the derivative of the value function. In Appendix C we show that an
analogous envelope condition holds under our PI model so that
W ′(b) = E
[
γ
γ¯
W ′(b′)
]
− χ(b′ − bmax)I[bmax,∞)(b
′). (3.56)
Hence by solving the first order condition using (3.56) and iterating on the Bellman
equation (3.55), we can approximate the optimal policy. In the next subsection, we
show some numerical results obtained after parametrizing the economy. While the
model is not meant to be a quantitative model of fiscal policy, it can nonetheless
rationalize important features of the fiscal response to the Great Recession, with slow
and large fiscal adjustments inducing protracted slumps.
3.6.3 Numerical results
In order to parametrize the economy we assume quadratic disutility from labor, and
the other parameters are as in the two-period model. The shocks are uniformly
distributed on a support of ± 5 % from their means, implying a volatility of 2.89%.
The debt limit is 20 % of mean output.
Figure 3.15 illustrates a key property of optimal policy by showing the tax policy
as a function of outstanding debt, for two different realization of the shocks: in both
panels we keep γ equal to its means, but while in the upper panel θ is also equal to
the mean, in the lower panel θ is equal to its minimum value. We contrast optimal
policy under PI with the FI counterpart (dashed-dotted line). In the upper panel,
we can observe a non-linearity of optimal policy with respect to debt. When the
20The FOC is explicitly shown in Appendix C.
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economy gets closer to the debt limit, the PI policy calls for a significantly larger
increase in taxes than the FI when the shocks are equal to their mean. This is
because observed labor takes an intermediate value for this realization of the shocks.
Hence, the government is uncertain about what combination of the shocks has been
realized and needs to avoid exceeding the debt constraint for all possible realizations
of θ’s. On the other hand the FI government knows that a lower tax rate is sufficient
to avoid a fiscal crisis for this combination of the shocks. In the lower panel, on the
other hand, signal extraction under PI is more precise, as the economy is hit by a
large negative productivity shock and both PI and FI call for similar tax responses,
independently of the debt level.
Figure 3.15: Tax policy as a function of debt
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We now show impulse response functions for our economy.21 In particular, we
engineer two different scenarios that give rise to a 1% fall in observed hours. With
linear utility from consumption, hours are increasing in θ, differently from the two-
period model. Hence a fall in hours can be driven by either low θ and high γ or vice
versa. In the first case (Figure 3.16), the shocks hitting the economy are a negative
21These non-linear impulse response functions are computed as percentage deviations from the
path that would arise absent all shocks.
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Figure 3.16: Impulse response function: low θ, high γ
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Figure 3.17: Impulse response function: high θ, low γ
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θ shock combined with a (smaller) positive γ shock. In the second case, we consider
the opposite combination of θ and γ.
When the true nature of the recession is productivity, the tax response under PI is
smaller then under FI. Hence, the government needs to respond by more in the second
period, after the nature of the shock becomes known. Eventually taxes increase by
more than under FI and stay high for a long time, inducing a (slightly) more persistent
fall in hours and output. This behavior of the economy is qualitatively similar to what
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happened in some European countries after the financial crisis (e.g. Spain), where an
initial slow reaction, or even an expansionary policy, has been followed by a necessary
large fiscal adjustment and the recovery has so far been very slow and weak.
On the other hand, when the true nature of the fall in hours is a demand shock
(Figure 3.17), the PI government reacts in the wrong direction, increasing taxes, while
the FI government cuts them. This policy is reversed in the second period, after the
past realization of the shocks become known.
While the PI policy is optimal in our setup where only current income can be
taxed, the above findings suggest that allowing for retrospective taxation could im-
prove welfare. Society would be better off if the government could adjust taxes on
past income after observing the realization of past shocks and consumers knew of this
possibility. However, retrospective taxation might not be easily implementable in the
real world due to time-consistency issues, as ex-post surprising taxes on past income
are non-distortionary.
Figure 3.18 illustrates a long stochastic simulation of the model. It is easy to see
that taxes are very responsive to debt. One interesting question is whether taxes
are smoother or more volatile under PI with respect to FI. Intuitively, there seem to
be two opposing forces. On the one hand, the PI government does not observe the
shocks, and hence smooths its policy across states for a given debt level. However,
this policy induces necessary fiscal adjustments following the dynamics of debt, so
that this pushes towards higher volatility under PI. The results from long simulations
is that this second effect seems to dominate (although slightly) and the FI government
is more successful than the PI government at smoothing tax rates. It can be seen
that often when debt gets close to the borrowing limit (20% of mean output) the PI
government imposes larger fiscal adjustments. This can be rationalized in analogy
with the example of the two-period economy close to the top of the Laffer curve. Fear
of future large required adjustments in the event of low θ lead the PI government to
raises taxes significantly.
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Figure 3.18: Simulation
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3.7 Conclusion
We derive a method to solve models of optimal policy with Partial Information with-
out any separation assumption between the optimization and signal extraction prob-
lem. In our model the optimal decision influences the distribution of the shocks
conditional on the observed endogenous signal, therefore the signal extraction and
optimization problem need to be solved consistently and simultaneously. The method
works in general and we show algorithms that solve these problems using standard
ideas for solving dynamic models. We also show that Partial Information on endoge-
nous variables matters as some revealing non-linearities appear in very simple models.
These non-linearities are due to the fact that in different regions of the observed signal
the information revealed about the underlying state changes in a non-linear fashion
even if the model is not highly non-linear.
Optimal fiscal policy under endogenous signal extraction calls for smooth tax
rates across states when the government budget is under control, and for regions of
large response to aggregate data when the economy is close to the top of the Laffer
curve or to a borrowing limit. Uncertainty about the state of the economy helps to
understand the slow reaction of some European governments to the Great Recession,
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followed by sharp fiscal adjustments and prolonged downturns: as the signal worsens
and it becomes more consistent with a slump in productivity the government becomes
certain that a lower productivity has occurred and this certainty accelerates.
Clearly, while we have illustrated the technique in a model of optimal fiscal policy,
the methodology can be easily extended to other dynamic models, for example in the
analysis of optimal monetary policy in sticky price models (e.g. Clarida et al. 1999)
under the assumption of Partial Information. Our optimal policy smoothing result
is likely to extend to that setup, potentially leading to a microfoundation for smooth
nominal interest rates.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 5
To arrive at Proposition 5 we first need to show that for any variation δ and small
α the equilibrium S(R∗ + αδ,A) is well defined with probability one. This will be
stated in Lemma 2. We first state a generic result on the existence and uniqueness
of solutions.
On the sets X ⊂ R, Y ⊂ Rn we consider functions f, fk : X × Y → R for
k = 1, 2, ...
Let d(f, g) be the sup norm
d(f, g) = sup
X×Y
|f(x, y)− g(x, y)|
We make the following assumptions
• Assumption L1: X and Y are compact, f(·, y) and fk(·, y) are absolutely
continuous for each y.
• Assumption L2: fk converge uniformly to f, i.e. d(f, fk)→ 0 as k →∞
• Assumption L3: for each y ∈ Y there is a unique solution to f(·, y) = 0. This
solution lies in the interior of X.
Hence, there is a well-defined mapping χ : Y → X with the property f(χ(y), y) =
0 and χ(Y ) ⊂ int(X).
Let Xd(y) ⊂ X be the set containing all points where the derivatives fx(·, y)
and fkx (·, y) exist for all k. Note that because of absolute continuity fx(·, y) and
fkx (·, y) are differentiable almost everywhere so X
d(y) has measure zero.
• Assumption L4: The partial derivatives of fk converge as follows
sup
x∈Xd(y),y
∣∣fx(x, y)− fkx (x, y)∣∣→ 0
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• Assumption L5: fx is uniformly bounded away from zero near the zeroes.
Formally, there is a constant K > 0 and an ε > 0 such that for all y ∈ Y and
all x such that |x− χ(y)| < ε, then x ∈ X and if fx(x, y) exists then
|fx(x, y)| > K
Furthermore, for all y, the sign of fx(x, y) is the same for any x such that
|x− χ(y)| < ε where fx exists.
Note that once we have uniqueness as in Assumption L3 the last assumption is
easily guaranteed, it just requires that the partial fx is not close to 0 near the zeroes,
for example if f(x, y) = φx + x3 it excludes φ = 0 but any other φ works. The sign
restriction excludes, for example, f(x, y) = |x| .
Lemma 1. (Existence and uniqueness of solutions) Under Assumptions L1-
L5 there exists a unique solution to fk(·, y) = 0 for all y for k is sufficiently high. Let
χk(y) denote this solution. Furthermore, d(χk, χ)→ 0 as k →∞.
Proof
Define the neighborhood of the zeros as the set
XY ε ≡ {(x, y) : for all y ∈ Y and x such that |x− χ(y)| < ε for some y ∈ Y }
where ε is as in assumption L5.
We first prove that fk(·, y) has a solution for all y for sufficiently high k.
The fundamental theorem of calculus gives∫ x
χ(y)
fx(x, y)dx = f(x, y) (3.57)
for all (x, y).22 Consider a y such that the sign of fx near χ(y) is positive. Using
assumption L5, if |x− χ(y)| < ε and if x > χ(y) we have∫ x
χ(y)
fx(·, y) > K(x− χ(y)) (3.58)
22It is understood that for x < χ(y) upper and lower limit of the integral need to be exchanged.
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Plugging x = χ(y)± ε/2 in (3.57) we have
ε
2
K < f(χ(y) +
ε
2
, y)
ε
2
K > f(χ(y)−
ε
2
, y)
A similar argument gives the reverse inequalities for y’s such that the sign of fx
is negative near χ(y).
This all implies that f(χ(y) ± ε
2
, y) are bounded away from zero, and of oposite
signs for all y.
Note that here we have used χ(Y ) ⊂ int(X) in guaranteeing that f is well defined
at x = χ(y)± ε
2
.
Applying uniform convergence of fk there is k sufficiently high so that d(fk, f) <
ε
4
K. The last two equations imply that if K > 0
ε
4
K < fk(χ(y) +
ε
2
, y)
ε
4
K > fk(χ(y)−
ε
2
, y)
Therefore fk(·, y) takes a positive and a negative value. This implies by the inter-
mediate value theorem that a solution to fk(·, y) = 0 exists for all y and for k high
enough. As promised, we have shown that fk(·, y) has a solution for all y for suffi-
ciently high k. Let us call this solution χk(y), since we have not proved uniqueness
all we know thus far is that χk(y) is a non-empty set.
We now prove that χk(y) ⊂ XY ε. We first show that
|f(x, y)| ≥ V for all (x, y) /∈ XY ε (3.59)
for a constant V > 0. To see this consider the infimum of |f | outside XY ε
V ≡ inf
X×Y−XY ε
|f(x, y)|
Compactness of X×Y −XY ε and continuity of f implies the infimum is attained
at some (x∗, y∗) ∈ X × Y −XY ε such that f(x∗, y∗) = V . If V = 0 this implies that
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x∗ = χ(y∗) and it contradicts the fact that all the zeroes of f are contained in XY ε.
Therefore V > 0.
Uniform convergence together with (3.59) implies∣∣fk(x, y)∣∣ > V/2 > 0 ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y −XY ε for k large enough
so that fk(x, y) = 0 can only happen for (x, y) ∈ XY ε for k large.
This proves that all solutions of fk (namely (x, y) where x ∈ χk(y)) must lie in
XY ε for k large enough.
All that is left to show is that χk(y) has only one element for k large enough.
Applying (3.57) and using assumption L5 in a similar way as we did above implies that
given any y for which fx is positive in assumption L5, for any elements x
′, x′′ ∈ χk(y)
with x′ ≥ x′′ then ∫ x′
x′′
fx(x, y)dx = f(x
′, y)− f(x′′, y) = 0
which is impossible since ∫ x′
x′′
fx(x, y)dx > K(x
′ − x′′) > 0
Therefore there exists a unique solution of fk(·, y) for k large enough for all y or,
equivalently, χk(y) has one element for all y.
To prove convergence of the solutions to χk(y) note that, given y, for any con-
vergence subsequence
{
χkj(y)
}∞
j=1
where the limit is denote limj→∞ χ
kj(y) = L(y),
uniform convergence of fk implies that f(L(y), y) = 0, so that L(y) = χ(y) and
χk(y)→ χ(y) as k →∞.
We apply Lemma 1 to show that S(R∗ + αδ,A) is well defined. We take h and
W as defined on sets for signals s ∈ S and policies τ ∈ T .
We need the following assumptions on our model. Recall H has been defined in
(3.23).
Assumptions
1. The sets S ,T are both compact. The set of realizations Φ is also compact
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2. h(·;A) is differentiable everywhere, |hτ | < Q uniformly on (s, A) for a constant
Q < ∞ and hτ is Lipschitz continuous with respect to s for s = S(R
∗, A) for
almost all A.
3. For eachA there is a unique solution S(R∗, A) ∈ int(S) settingH(S(R∗, A), A;R∗) =
0
4. R∗ is continuous in s. Furthermore, |R∗′| < KR, for a constant KR < ∞ for
s = S(R∗, A) for almost all A.
5. Either hτ (R
∗(s);A)R∗′(s) < 1 − K or hτ (R
∗(s);A)R∗′(s) > 1 + K for all
s = S(R∗;A) where the derivatives exist and for some constant K > 0.
Assumptions 1-2 can be imposed before knowing the solution to the PI problem.
Assumptions 3-5 depend on the solution R∗ which is not known ahead of time, but
they can be checked ex-post with a candidate solution. Typically R∗ will have a
bounded derivative almost everywhere and since we consider cases where S(R∗, A)
has a density these assumptions are easily verified.
Lemma 2. Consider a bounded function (a “variation”) δ : S → R differentiable
everywhere and with a uniformly bounded derivative. Under assumptions 1-5 S(R∗+
αδ,A) exists and is unique for α small enough.
Proof
We apply Lemma 1 when we take a sequence αk → 0. The objects in our model
maps into the notation of Lemma 1 as follows
-s takes the role of x and A takes the role of y in Lemma 1.
-f(·) ≡ H(·;R∗)
-fk(·) ≡ H(·;R∗ + αkδ)
We now have to check that assumptions 1-5 imply assumptions L1-L5.
Assumptions 1,2,4 imply Assumption L1.
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Absolute continuity of h implies
|H(s, A;R∗)−H(s, A;R∗ + αδ)| < Q α |δ(s)|
where Q < ∞ is the uniform bound on |hτ |. Since δ is bounded this implies that
H(.;R∗ + αkδ) convergence uniformly to H(·;R
∗) as in assumption L2.
Assumption L3 and 3 are equivalent.
Consider s, A where the derivatives hτ (·, A) and R
∗′ exist. We have
Hs(s, A;R
∗ + αkδ) = 1− hτ ((R
∗ + αδ)(s), A)(R∗′ + αδ′)(s)
Therefore
|Hs(s, A;R
∗)−Hs(s, A;R
∗ + αkδ)| =
|hτ ((R
∗ + αδ)(s), A)(R∗′ + αδ′)(s)− hτ (R
∗(s), A)R∗′(s)| =
| [hτ ((R
∗ + αδ)(s), A)− hτ (R
∗(s), A)] (R∗′ + αδ′)(s) + αδ′(s) |≤
QLαKδ(KR + αKδ
′
) + αKδ
′
the second equality follows from adding and subtracting hτ (R
∗(s), A)(R∗′ + αδ′)(s)
and where Kδ
′
is the bound on δ′, Kδ the bound on δ, and QL the Lipschitz constant
for hτ .
This guarantees Assumption L4.
Assumption L5 is given by assumption 5.
Therefore, Lemma 1 implies that S(R∗+αδ,A) is well defined for α small enough.
To prove Proposition 5 we now need to add
Assumption 6: W is continuously differentiable with respect to (τ, s) for almost
all A and when the derivative exists it is uniformly bounded.
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider a variation δ : S → R such that δ is continuous, differentiable, |δ(s)| ≤
Kδ and |δ′(s)| ≤ Kδ′ for all s for some constants Kδ, Kδ
′
<∞.
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Consider the problem defined by (3.28). For α small enough S(R∗ + αδ;A) is well
defined by Lemma 2, and so is F . It is clear that since R∗ + αδ is a feasible policy
function in the PI problem the solution of (3.28) is attained at α = 0. Since (3.28) is
a standard one-dimensional maximization problem this implies
dF(R∗ + αδ)
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=0
= 0 (3.60)
if this derivative exists. We now prove that this derivative exists and that (3.60)
implies (3.27). We consider here the one-dimensional case for τ and s, namely m =
n = 1, the generalization to the multivariate case is left for future work.
The assumptions on W and h imply
|Wτ | , |Ws| , |hτ | < K
Wh
for some finite constant KWh whenever the derivatives exist.
Take any sequence αk → 0. For each k we can write
F(R∗ + αkδ)−F(R
∗)
αk
=
∫
Φ
Mk(A) dFA(A)
for
Mk(A) ≡
W (T (R∗+αkδ, A), S(R
∗+αkδ, A), A)−W (T (R
∗, A), S(R∗, A), A)
αk
At all points A where R∗,W, h are differentiable at s = S(R∗, A) we have that
Mk(A)→
dW ((R∗ + αδ) (S(R∗+αδ;A)) , S (R∗+αδ,A) , A)
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=0
(3.61)
= W ∗′τ (A) {[R
∗′(A)]S∗′δ (A) + δ
∗(A)}+W ∗′s (A)S
∗′
δ (A) (3.62)
where
R∗′(A) = R∗′ (S(R∗;A)) (3.63)
δ∗′(A) = δ′ (S(R∗, A))
δ∗(A) = δ (S (R∗, A))
W ∗x (A) = Wx ((R
∗ (S(R∗, A)) , S (R∗, A)) for x = τ, s
S∗′δ (A) =
dS(R∗+αδ,A)
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=0
(3.64)
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(note there is a slight abuse of notation on R∗′ and δ∗′ as we use the symbol for the
function of s as well as for the function of A).
The only non-obvious term is the derivative S∗′δ , furthermore, this is the only
term that depends on δ at α = 0. The term S∗′δ can be found by applying the implicit
function theorem to
S(R∗+αδ;A) = h((R∗+αδ)(S(R∗+αδ;A)), A)
Carefully differentiating with respect to α we have
dS(R∗+αδ;A)
dα
= hτ ((R
∗+αδ)(S(R∗+αδ;A)), A) [(R∗′+αδ′)(S(R∗+αδ;A))] ·
·
dS(R∗+αδ;A)
dα
+ δ(S(R∗+αδ;A))
So that
S∗′δ (A) ≡
dS(R∗+αδ,A)
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=0
=
h∗τ (A)δ
∗(A)
1− h∗τ (A)R
∗′(A)
Using the boundedness assumptions it is clear that Mk(A) is uniformly bounded
on k for almost all A.
The assumption that S(R∗, A) has a density implies that the limit in (3.62) oc-
curs with probability one in A. Since Mk is uniformly bounded Lebesgue dominated
convergence implies
F(R∗ + αkδ)−F(R
∗)
αk
→
∫
Φ
([W ∗τR
∗′ +W ∗s ]S
∗′
δ +W
∗
τ δ
∗) dFA
Since this holds for any sequence αk → 0 it proves that the derivative of F with
respect to α exists for any variation δ and from (3.60) we have
∫
Φ
([W ∗τR
∗′ +W ∗s ]S
∗′
δ +W
∗
τ δ
∗) dFA = 0 (3.65)
Using the formula for S∗′δ (A) and rearranging, we conclude that for any variation δ∫
Φ
(W ∗τ +W
∗
s h
∗
τ )
δ∗
1− h∗τR
∗′
dFA = 0 (3.66)
Since (3.66) holds for any bounded δ with bounded derivative it also holds when
δ is any bounded function measurable with respect to s. Therefore, the general defi-
nition of conditional expectation implies (3.27).
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Appendix B: The effect of government expenditure
on the signal extraction
In this Appendix we show that in the log-quadratic case an increase in g can change
the sign of optimal policy in the intermediate region of the observables.
First, for a given l¯ consider the locus γ˜(R(l¯), θ, l¯) which is the inverse of the
reaction function h with respect to γ, implicitly defined by
h(R(l¯), θ, γ˜(R(l¯), θ, l¯))− l¯ = 0. (3.67)
Let ζ be the derivative of this function with respect to θ. This can be found using
the implicit function theorem, which gives the positive slope
ζ = −
hθ
hγ
=
g
√
(Bg)2 + 4Bθ2γ(1− τ) + Bg2
2θ3(1− τ)
(3.68)
Now we differentiate ζ with respect to g and get
dζ
dg
=
∂ζ
∂g
+
∂ζ
∂τ
∂τ
∂g
(3.69)
where all these partial derivatives are positive. Hence higher government expenditure
makes the loci of realizations of the shocks steeper.
Now we illustrate how this effect changes the nature of the signal extraction on
the shocks and hence the slope of optimal policy in the intermediate region of the
observables. For this purpose we will take a first order approximation of the loci γ˜.23
Consider Figures 3.19 and 3.20. When g is sufficiently low, the map of loci (solid
blue lines) moving in the direction of increasing l’s looks like in Figure 3.19. Starting
at lmin (bottom right corner) and increasing l the loci first hit the bottom-left corner,
where the lowest θ becomes possible, and then the top-right corner, where the highest
values for θ start to be inconsistent with the observed l’s. Hence in the intermediate
region of l’s all θ’s are possible, but clearly not all γ′s. In this region, the government
23In our computed examples these loci are very close to linear.
171
learns little about productivity. All the government learns is that the agent is working
more as l increases so expected output is higher and taxes can be lower. This gives
the negative slope of R∗ in subsection 3.4.1 with low government expenditure.
On the other hand, when g is sufficiently high, the slope of the loci becomes higher.
Hence, as illustrated in Figure 3.20, in the intermediate region of l’s the government
learns that only a relatively small set of θ’s is possible, whereas any γ is consistent
with the observations. This leads to the positive slope of the optimal tax rate in
subsection 3.4.2 with high government expenditure.
Figure 3.19: Loci of shocks realizations with low g
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Appendix C: Derivation of the Envelope Condition
(3.56)
In this Appendix we derive the Envelope Condition (3.56). First of all let us introduce
the necessary notation. A tax policy is a function of debt and labor R(b, l) and labor
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Figure 3.20: Loci of shocks realizations with high g
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is a function of a policy R, outstanding debt and the exogenous shock, L(R; b, A)
defined by the zero of
H(l, A,R) ≡ l − h(R(b, l), A), (3.70)
in analogy with the two-period model. By total differentiation of (3.70), the partial
derivative of labor with respect to debt, Lb, is given by
Lb(R, b, A) =
γθRb(b, l)
v′′(l) + γθRL(b, l)
. (3.71)
Now, for simplicity consider a case without borrowing penalty. In order to derive
the envelope condition, we differentiate (3.55) with respect to b and get
W ′(b) = E
[
(γθ − v′(l∗))L∗b +W
′
(
b∗
′
)(γ
γ¯
+ βb∗
′
LL
∗
b
)]
where
b∗
′
L =
−θγ + [v′′(L(R∗, A, b))L(R∗, A, b) + v′(L(R∗, A, b))]
βγ¯
l∗ = L(R∗; b, A)
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L∗b = Lb(R
∗; b, A).
Using (3.71) we can write
W ′(b) = E
[(
γθ − v′(l∗) + βW ′
(
b∗
′
)
b∗
′
L
) −γθR∗b(l, b)
v′′(l) + γθR∗L(l, b)
+W ′
(
b∗
′
) γ
γ¯
]
. (3.72)
Using Proposition 5, the FOC of PI Ramsey problem is
E
[(
θγ − v′(l∗) + βW ′(b′∗)b∗
′
L
) h∗τ
1− h∗τR
∗
L
|l¯
]
= 0 (3.73)
for all l¯. Furthermore, we have that the partial derivative of the reaction function h
with respect to taxes is
hτ =
−γθ
v′′(l)
.
So from (3.72) we get
W ′(b) = E
[(
γθ − v′(l∗) + βW ′
(
b∗
′
)
b∗
′
L
) h∗τ R∗b(l, b)
1− h∗τR
∗
L(L, b)
+W ′
(
b∗
′
) γ
γ¯
]
.
Now, applying the law of iterated expectations, using the fact that Rb(l, b) is known
given L, b and using (3.73), we obtain
W ′(b) = E
[
E
((
γθ − v′(L∗) + βW ′
(
b∗
′
)
b∗
′
L
) h∗τ R∗b(L, b)
1− h∗τR
∗
L (L, b)
∣∣∣∣L)+W ′ (b∗′) γγ¯
]
(3.74)
= E
[
0 +W ′
(
b∗
′
) γ
γ¯
]
(3.75)
Finally, adding the marginal cost of excessive debt this becomes
W ′(b) = E
γW ′(b′)
γ
− χ(b′ − bmax)I[bmax,∞)(b
′).
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